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This dissertation examines the contradictory imperatives of New Deal banking

reforms to explore both their notable successes and subsequent erosion. From the
perspective of overdeterminist Marxian class analysis,

we

explore the conflicting

objectives of New Dealers as they reflect the logic of a nascent Keynesianism.

that the

cheap

Keynesian project

money

capital

on

capital to

for

economic growth and

stability required the availability

downward

and commercial banks

pressure on the profitability of financial

in particular.

The

potentially detrimental

implications of this agenda on commercial bank profitability

was

particularly dire given

the crisis in commercial banking that prevailed during the great depression. This

obliged

New

of

promote vigorous investment. However, the provision of money

attractive terms can exert

capitalist firms,

We argue

Deal banking reforms

to institute a

complex pastiche of policies, some of

which enhanced and some of which constrained the

We examine certain

dilemma

profitability

of commercial banks.

aspects of New Deal banking legislation, such as the Glass-

Steagall Act (which prohibited the blending of commercial banking with other financial

capitalist activity

such as investment banking), the creation of deposit insurance, and the

imposition of interest rate controls, to discern their contradictory implications lor

vi

commercial bank

profitability.

In conducting this analysis, the dissertation has
applied

and extended the class analysis of financial capital provided
by overdeterminist Marxism
in

order to discern the various struggles both

among

financial capitalists and

between

productive and financial capital shape the profitability of financial capital.

Using
in the

this

framework,

post-war period

initially

we

argue that the success of the

produced a “pax financus”

in

New

Deal banking refonns

which the competitive

struggles amongst financial capital were moderated. However, the success of these

reforms also produced incentives to undermine the
regeneration of competitive struggles

among

New

Deal regulatory framework via

financial capitalists.

As

these struggles

intensified, financial innovations designed to circumvent regulatory restrictions

the conduct of commercial banking and other financial capitalist activity.

developments progressed, there has been

As

changed

these

a resurgence in the diversified financial

conglomerates (financial holding companies) reminiscent of those that flourished just
prior to the great depression.

vii
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CHAPTER

1

THE NEW DEAL FINANCIAL REFORMS AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE
KEYNESIAN AGENDA FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY

Revisiting

A

Problemitization

Of The

economic system.

Deal:

Radical Left’s Relationship

The prolonged devastation of the
the prevailing

New

The

great depression

Many of these

To

Capitalist

Reform

provoked widespread

critique of

critiques wrestled with the question of

whether capitalism per se was indicted by these cataclysmic economic and

social

conditions. Faced with the possibility that capitalism itself might be rejected amidst the
suffering and turmoil of the great depression,

many

advocates of capitalism were

persuaded of the advisability of embracing economic reforms. “’We

shall either adopt a

plan that will meet the problem of unemployment under capitalism, or a plan will be

adopted for us which will operate without capitalism.’” Marriner Eccles, depression-era

head of the Federal Reserve Board, warned
this context, the

in

February of 1933.

Roosevelt administration advanced the so-called

(in

Hyman

“New

1976, 106) In

Deal” reforms

to

address the crisis of the great depression and restore the viability of American capitalism.

President Roosevelt explained in 1936 that his

preserve the economic status quo by reforming

No

one

in the

United States believes more firmly than

slightest inclination to
its

Deal agenda was intended

change

hands and wait -

public. Instead

...

we

let

to

it:

business, private property and private prolit.

fold

New

that system,

...

all

If the

that

it

I

in the

system of private

Administration had had the

would have had

to

do was

to

the system continue to default to itself and to the

acted quickly and drastically to save

belief in private enterprise that

we

it.

It

was because of our

acted quickly and drastically to save

Humphries 1970, 10-11)

1

it.

(in

However, many

leftists

of diverse theoretical proclivities overlooked these explicitly

conservative motivations of New Dealers to
1

who opposed

capitalist reform. Leftists

New

with the anti-trust elements of the
allocation

make common cause with

the concentration of economic

Deal, while

mechanism saw commonalties with

for the state in

economic planning.

leftists

who

of

this project

power

often allied

critiqued the market

pro-capitalist advocates of an enlarged role

Leftist that

embraced an underconsumptionist

understanding of the great depression often endorsed Roosevelt’s concerns about
inadequate purchasing power."

Norman Thomas,

New

1932, confirmed this co-incidence between

demands, claiming

leftist

Deal policies and Socialist party

any platform [Roosevelt] had carried out was mine and the

that

socialists rather than his."

and

the Socialist presidential candidate in

(Thomas, 1967,

concerns converged,

many

1

12)

leftists

Given these points

at

which

New

of the day hoped that the

New

Deal

Deal would

New Deal braintruster and famous co-author of The
and Private Property explained the alliance between Berle, who “detested” anyone
who was “enamoured” of Marxism (ix), and leftists (including Marxists) in the following reference to one
particular program of the later New Deal era, the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC):
1

For example, the biographer of Adolph Berle, the

Modem Corporation

,

“Besides Berle, numerous economists, politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen took the TNEC seriously.
Marxists theorists too envisioned TNEC as an opportunity to invoke socialist planning and achieve political
viability

amid

a

mushrooming consensus

for state control. In the

atmosphere of 1939, the Left also found
Not a few Marxists

the state capitalism of Berle and the punitive taxation of the Brandeisians appealing.

then considered Keynesian ‘compensatory fiscal policy’ a reasonable
in

America. Thus

showcase

for

way

and Marxists would

antitrusters, capitalistic planners,

all

station

make

on the road

TNEC

to socialism

in part

‘

a

Keynesian economics’.” (Schwarz 1987, 136)

2

One of Roosevelt’s more famous statements in the under-consumptionist vein occurred prior
election, in May of 1932 when he explained the depression as follows: “’No, our basic trouble
insufficiency of capital.

It

was

insufficient distribution

speculation in production. While wages rose in

proportionately to the reward

many of our

to capital, and at the

our population was permitted to shrink.

We

of buying power coupled with an
industr ies, they did not as a

same time

the purchasing

power

banks were vying with each other,
capital at home and abroad.’” (Roosevelt 1967, 79)

2

is

not an

oversufficient

whole

rise

of the great groups of

accumulated such a superabundance of capital

some of the employing questionable methods,

to his

that our great

in their efforts to lend this

create an opening through

these

which they might expand upon

themselves with the

leftist allied

New

New

Thus

Deal reforms despite the public justification

of these reforms as a means of preempting demands

The

their radical agendas.

for

more

radical measures.

Deal reforms are often credited as providing some of the foundations

the period of vigorous post-war

economic growth and

relative

economic

for

stability that is

referred to as the “golden age’ of welfare state capitalism. But despite the economic and
social

improvements

initiated

by

New

disappointed in their hopes that these reforms might
transformation.

regarded the

Not only did these reforms

New

transpired that

Deal as merely a

many

Deal policies,

first

leftists

make way

fail to fulfill

were ultimately

for further radical

step towards radical transformation,

many of the achievements

of the

New

who

the aspirations of those

it

has

Deal have been subsequently

eroded, reversed and even vilified. In light of these disappointments, this dissertation

provides an analysis of both the achievements and limitations of the

effort to

provoke a rethinking of leftist

strategies to pursue radical

New

Deal

in

an

agendas by allying

with capitalist reforms.

Many
some

leftists

flaw(s) in the

survey the rise and decline of welfare

New

Deal reforms

future opportunities to craft better (and

dissertation does not depict the

later

emerged

to render these

New

that,

state capitalism in search

once corrected, would enable the

left to

of

seize

more enduring) economic reforms. This

Deal reforms as afflicted by some policy flaw

reforms unsustainably dysfunctional.

complex and sometimes divergent imperatives

3

that confronted

By

New

that

attending to the

Dealers,

we

acknowledge the considerable sophistication with which

the

New

Deal grappled with a

profoundly challenging economic situation. Rather than explaining the
downfall of New

Deal reforms on the basis of their shortcomings,

this dissertation

of New Deal measures as a consequence of their success.
of overdeterminist Marxian class analysis,
imperatives that animated

New

By employing

this dissertation

Deal reform. From

this

analyzes these reversals

the perspective

examines the contradictory

vantage point

we

argue that the

achievements of New Deal economic reforms provoked unintended consequences

that

ultimately subverted their viability.

While

this dissertation focuses

on a particular

reforms to discern their contradictory dynamics,

it

is

historical incidence

of economic

intended as a reflection on the

attempt to craft economic policy in general. Since contradiction (understood in the
overdeterminist sense described below)

is

ubiquitous,

we

argue that economic

interventions propel factors that both promote and undermine the stated intention of the

intervention.

No economic

intervention, within or outside capitalism, including those

advocated by Marxian class analysis, can escape these contradictory dynamics.

same token,

the

the decision not to intervene also sets in motion similar contradictory

dynamics. Since neither action nor refraining from action can escape

we

By

its

own

negation,

are obliged to confront the ultimate uncontrollability inherent in policy intervention.

By contending

that

this dissertation

no policy can be crafted

argues that

policies that will be

that

we must abandon

does not also imply

the quest to design

immune from unintended and

4

its

own

negation,

some optimal

set

self-sabotaging consequences.

of

By emphasizing
the

left

the uncontrollability of policy intervention, this

should refrain from making interventions.

motivated

to

promote activism

On

not to say that

the contrary this dissertation

(albeit an activism that is not

certainty that does not exist in a universe animated

is

is

assuaged by hopes of a

by contradiction). This

dissertation

regards the bringing to consciousness of the futility of the hope for certainty
as an
intervention that

may

support (and also,

capitalist alliances. If leftists

it

must be confessed, undermine)

have been persuaded

to

radical anti-

make common cause with

capitalist

exploitation because they perceive that refonns within capitalism offer them a greater

likelihood of achieving their goals, then problematizing this aspiration for “successful”

policy

may promote

a rethinking of strategy

on the

left.

By

repudiating reassurances that

complicity with capitalism offers a greater probability of achieving radical goals,

hoped

that this dissertation will

economic change

advance the

possibilities

New

Deal

animating

supported the

New

for

And The Role Of Financial Reform

Keynesian economic thought was immensely

who

of embracing the agendas

that include the opposition to capitalist exploitation.

Keynesianism, The

others

is

it

New

influential

among both

radicals and

Deal. Thus part of our exploration of the contradictions

Deal economic reforms requires

that

we

attend to

some of the

implications of the Keynesian theory that informed them. Although the early stages of the

New Deal

predate the publication of J.M. Keynes’ celebrated The General Theory of

Employment

Interest

and

Money

,

the general principles of Keynesian thought were

5

having an impact on policy circles

in the early 1930s.

3

Federal Reserve officials were

cognizant of the principles of counter-cyclical monetary policy prior
as of 1922 (as

Keynes himself acknowledged), although

somewhat

New

4

later.

the deliberate use of fiscal policy

Moreover, prominent advisors amongst the

Deal claimed

to

have arrived

at

came

intellectual leadership of the

Keynesian ideas independently of Keynes. 5 Thus,

despite the varying degrees of self-conscious awareness of Keynesian theory on the
part

of the architects of New Deal reforms, these early

New

Deal refonns are portrayed

in this

dissertation as Keynesian.

The Keynesianism
and

that

emerged

instability within a capitalist

Keynesianism sought
state

to create a

economic intervention

as

economy

hegemonic

Earlier publications of

full-employment economic equilibrium by means of

to stabilize aggregate

demand. Thus Keynesianism offered

Keynes had sketched out many of the

General Theory (for example, see Crotty, 1999) Arguably the
,

4

A

it

of its devastating and recurrent

ideas that were further developed in the
full theoretical

expression of “hegemonic”

World War two with the refinement of the “neoclassical Keynesian
by John Hicks, Paul Samuelson, Lawrence Klein, Franco Modigliani and others.

Keynesianism did not appear
syntheses” articulated

economic stagnation

attributed

inadequate aggregate demand.

to

the possibility of preserving capitalism, while ridding

3

6

until after

Money (1930, 255), concerning Keynes’ acknowledgement of the use of countermonetary policy at the Federal Reserve. Despite being obliged to abandon balanced budgets and
engage in stimulatory government spending early in the depression, the deliberate use of deficits to
promote economic recovery began in 1938, according to Arthur Smithies, of the Bureau of the Budget, (in
See

Treatise on

cyclical

Greer 1958, 54)
“
doubt
Mariner Eccles, chairman of the Federal Reserve in the 1930s, wrote of Roosevelt’s brain trust:
who
economist
English
the
Keynes,
Maynard
John
whether any of the men in my room had ever heard of
has frequently been referred to as the economic philosopher of the New Deal. .The concepts formulated,
which have been called Keynesianism’, were not abstracted from his books, which had never read, (in
5

I

I

.

I

Mayer 2001, 158)
Other interpretations of Keynesianism exist that differ from the Keynesianism that will be discussed
we will refer to the Keynesianism described in this section as “hegemonic"
the
Keynesianism, in that it was the interpretation of Keynes’ work that had such a dramatic impact on both

6

below. However,

mainstream of the economic profession and on the design of public

6

policy.

economic
demand.

instability

Many

Keynesianism

and depression,

leftists

that

if the

were persuaded

means could be found

that they could

to stabilize aggregate

make common cause

opposed economic stagnation and cyclical

with a

crises, particularly since
7

many

additional

demands

for redistributive

and egalitarian economic and social change

might be pursued via Keynesian interventionism.

Keynesianism traced the inadequacy of aggregate demand back
of aggregate demand that they deemed

to

Keynesianism concurred with Marxism
that firms are reluctant to

Weak

produce

or volatile aggregate

if

demand

be the most

volatile:

in the rejection

component

to the

investment spending

.

of Say’s Law, claiming instead

they fear detrimental aggregate

demand

conditions.

contributes to instability in investment spending

(since firms are insecure about their ability to sell their output), and unstable or low

investment exacerbates (via the Keynesian multiplier) aggregate demand problems. Thus

Keynesians sought

to create a virtuous circle in

spending would contribute

which brisk and

demand

stable investment

at

a level consistent with

employment, while strong aggregate demand, buttressed with

state initiated counter-

cyclical aggregate

7

to stabilizing

aggregate

demand management, would

Keynesian theory regards investment spending

as the

attenuate the volatility of investment.

most

volatile

component of aggregate demand

variety of reasons connected to the uncertainty afflicting the investment process
that

because investment

determined

in

is

full-

largely irreversible and the profitability of any

an unknowable future, investment spending

is

itself.

for a

Keynesians argue

new investment

will be

commitment undertaken on the
stagnate at low levels) according to a

a significant

basis of expectations about the future. Investment can fluctuate (or

host of factors that affect these expectations, including expectations about the future state of aggregate

demand.
8

Activist monetary and fiscal policy might simultaneously pursue additional political objectives such as

income redistribution or

the provision of services to disadvantaged sections of the population

7

With the judicious mix

of policies to both encourage investment spending

and

facilitate

counter-cyclical state economic intervention, Keynesianism
offered the hope that a
capitalist

economy could be

Since the
influenced

New

“fine-tuned” to avoid stagnation and economic instability.

Deal was comprised of a variety of policy interventions

many dimensions

of economic

activity,

that

only a subset of these reforms can be

given thorough consideration in this dissertation. For a variety of reasons, our focus will

be on several of the financial reforms implemented by the
financial crises that characterized the great depression

the reform of finance as a critical priority. In part this

financial reform policies

enhanced the

the popular distrust of financiers.

New

compelled

was

However, the focus on

at the full

Deal.

The

New

catastrophic

Dealers to regard

politically expedient, since

Deal's populist credibility by appealing to

from the logic of Keynesian economic theory. Given
maintain investment spending

New

employment

that

financial reform also follows

Keynesianism sought

level,

it

was obliged

the conditions of existence for vigorous investment spending. Since the

to

to scrutinize

US economy

continued to be organized as a private capitalist economy, the investment decision

remained

in the

hands of private

capitalist firms.

Keynesian reformers were compelled

to

address a variety of factors that influenced the firm’s investment decision in order to

support their investment agenda.

One of the

factors that shape investment spending
,

accessibility and price of external sources of financing for investment projects.

9

Although firms may be able to generate funds internally to finance their investment
here on the role of externally provided funding in the investment process.

8

projects,

is

the

Thus

we

focus

1

1

New

Deal reforms addressed the dramatic disarray of American
finance

in

order to create

conditions in which funds would be forthcoming to promote
investment spending and

thereby enhance aggregate demand.

The

external provision of funding for investment projects

process of financial intermediation, whereby the savings of the

from savers and allocated among many potential users

Keynesian financial reform were compelled

between “production

’

to

10
.

For

is

generated via the

economy

are collected

this reason,

advocates of

pay careful attention

to the relationship

(understood as firms which undertake investment) and “finance”

(understood as firms which engage in financial intermediation). In order to promote

vigorous investment spending, Keynesianism sought

to

ensure that funding for

investment would be readily and cheaply available to the “real” or productive sector of
the

economy. Often

rates, so that

this

was understood

as creating an

environment of low

real interest

prospective investors would pay less to secure borrowed funds and thereby

be encouraged to increase their investment spending

1

.

In

Keynesian parlance,

sometimes articulated as the prescription

that finance should be the “servant”

subordinated to the needs of production

,

10

Savings

in the

economy

that finance should

conduct

itself to

engaged in investment. They may
These uses of the economy’s savings also affects

are not channeled exclusively to private firms

be channeled to consumers, the
the investment decision, as

meaning

this goal is

state or to entities abroad.

when

savings that are channeled to consumers act as a stimulus to aggregate

demand.
1

As

will

be discussed below,

investment

may

may be

their interest rate

is

the

payment made

to secure debt capital.

However,

financed via the issuing of stock, in which case a different sort of payment (dividends)

be paid to secure equity

capital.

However Keynesian analysis
money capital.

usually emphasizes the interest rate

rather than both forms of payment for access to
12

Helleiner (1994, 6) claims that

policies that

would make

“members of this new [Keynesian]

This sort of “servant” relationship of finance to production
discourse, as

when

alliance favored

finance the ‘servant’ rather than the ‘master’

finance

is

is

referred to

depicted as having “second class status".

9

in

more

interventionist

economic and political matters
in other ways in Keynesian

.

provide access

to

money

capital

shaping financial intermediation

on terms favorable
in a

manner

that

to the

compelled finance

of production, Keynesian financial reforms sought

to

how

argument

is

that finance

ought

13

certain domestic

to

stable

economic

for investment.

attempted to shape the process of financial intermediation

Keynesian prescription

to act as the servant

promote rapid and

growth by supporting the availability of cheap funding

This dissertation will explore

promotion of investment. By

in

New

Deal financial reforms

accordance with the

play a servant role vis a vis production. The

presented that a number of financial reforms contained in the Banking Acts

of 1933 and 1935 reflected or were consistent with financial restructuring
of this Keynesian objective. The

first,

in the service

and possibly most famous of these reforms was the

Glass-Steagall Act, which dramatically reorganized financial intermediation in the United
States.

The

restructuring of financial intermediation accomplished

regulation created

some of the

by

New

Deal financial

”
conditions of existence for the so-called “pax financus

(Gart 1994, 4), a long post-war period in which the conduct of financial intermediation

is

often perceived as supportive of the golden age of Keynesian welfare state capitalism.

Yet as time passed, these financial reforms began
that the ultimate subversion

to unravel.

of New Deal financial reforms

The

is

dissertation will argue

a reflection of the

contradictory imperatives that animated the Keynesian agenda, namely the attempt to

promote

capitalist

economic growth and

stability

by compelling finance

to act as servant

to production.

13

We

leave aside international interventions, particularly the later Bretton

Keynesian objectives

in the international arena.

10

Woods

agreement, that pursued

An

Overdeterminist

Mar xia n

Perspective

On The Keynesian Reform Agenda

There are various divergences and convergences between
the Keynesian

economic theory and the overdeterminist Marxian
dissertation.

However, we

will

class analysis

employed

in this

emphasize two important differences between these

theoretical traditions. First, unlike

Keynesian theory, the Marxian focus on the

production, appropriation and distribution of surplus labor emphasizes
exploitation.

Secondly, the overdeterminist theory of causation employed by the Marxian
class
analytic approach differs from the theory of causation

employed by Keynesian

These differences generate differing perspectives on economic growth and

discourse.

crises,

terminological differences, as well as differing attitudes towards the purposes of studying

economic

history.

The Marxian

class analytic character of this dissertation diverges from the

Keynesian analysis outlined above because

its

focus on surplus labor highlights the

exploitative character of the capitalist class process.

The presence or absence of the

concept of exploitation has implications for the terminology employed
theories.

Some Keynesian

Marxian

analysis. In

is

both of these

terms, such as “investment”, do not have an exact equivalent in

Keynesian analysis, investment

plant and machines as well as spending on

“investment”

in

new

refers to

spending by firms on new

housing. Thus the Keynesian term

not equivalent to the Marxian term “accumulation”, which

the purchase of additional

means of production and

labor power.

is

defined as

The Keynesian term

“investment” focuses attention on the creation of physical capital only, and overlooks any

concomitant expansion

in the

scope of exploitation. In addition, the Keynesian term

11

investment

may

does not focus on the class character of the spending.
Investment spending

include the purchase of means of production in
productive and unproductive

capitalist firms

and

in non-capitalist class structures.

conducted using Marxian terminology,

we

Since the dissertation will be

will consider the

Keynesian category of

investment as a rough approximation of the Marxian term accumulation
while

acknowledging the above caveats. Thus the Keynesian goal of promoting economic
growth and

stability via vigorous

as the pursuit of rapid

From

and stable

investment spending can be restated in Marxian terms
capitalist accumulation.

a Marxian perspective, the rapid and stable capitalist accumulation sought

by advocates of Keynesian welfare

state interventionism is fueled

by the exploitation of

workers, and results in the extension of exploitative capitalist class relations to greater

numbers of workers. Given

that

Marxist class analysis condemns the capitalist class

process for this exploitative organization of production,
insulate workers

from the devastating

effects

it

cannot endorse any attempt

of economic stagnation and

to

volatility in

return for exploitation on an ever larger scale (and possibly at a greater rate of

exploitation as well). Moreover, a Marxist perspective regards even this Faustian bargain

as illusory, since

Marxism

relates the exploitative character

to the crisis tendencies that debilitate capitalism.

of the

The production, appropriation and

distribution of surplus labor in an exploitative class structure

fundamental and subsumed class conflicts
instability

14

14

that

capitalist class process

is

afflicted

can generate debilitating economic

and stagnation. Thus the success of any policies designed

The Marxian

class analytic terminology of fundamental class,

are explained in Resnick and

Wolff (1987).

12

by both

subsumed

class,

to

promote

capitalist

and non-class processes

economic growth and

stability will set in

motion

crises that

undermine

this goal.

For

these reasons, Marxists reject Keynesians’ retention
of an exploitative class process in
pursuit of economic growth and stability. This
exploitative class processes

is

is

not to say that the abolition of

ipso facto, any guarantee of rapid and stable economic

growth. Such an assertion would be contrary to the insistence
of overdeterminist Marxian
class analysis that

economic

economic growth creates

stability carries

with

it

its

antithesis,

economic stagnation, while

the germination of economic instability.

class analytic project prefers to confront the incessant possibilities
of

stagnation and instability within a class process that

is

The Marxian

economic

not exploitative, in hopes that such

a non-exploitative class process might generate the conditions of existence for preferable

approaches

to

handling these dilemmas that are inherent

The Marxian

surplus labor perspective

in

condemns

economic

New

life.

Deal reforms

in that

did not challenge capitalist exploitation. Marxists of this theoretical disposition
share others'

“non-class”

demands

15

for diverse

economic and

economic transformations

they

may

well

social transformation, including such

as the creation

of a more egalitarian distribution

of economic power, income, or property, or non-market allocative mechanisms.

However,
the

class analytic Marxists predicate their support of these non-class agendas

demand

In the

that these

agendas be partnered with the opposition

15

to capitalist exploitation.

absence of a critique of exploitation, class analytic Marxists fear

progressive economic changes

may be complied

Where “non-class” economic changes

refers to

on

that these

with exploitation. Instead of creating the

changes that do not address “class” understood as the

production, appropriation and distribution of surplus labor.

13

conditions of existence of the opposition to exploitation,

non-class economic measures serve only to

more
fact

palatable to the exploited.

Under

it

may

make acquiescence

be that these progressive
to capitalist exploitation

certain conditions, capitalist exploitation

may

in

be intensified despite progress made enhancing wages, improving
the distribution of

property or power, or facilitating state economic intervention in
pursuit of various
redistributive measures.

Despite the possibility that non-class economic transformation
with the perpetuation of class exploitation,
class

economic

Marxian

form the conditions of existence

characteristics

class analysis

is

open

to the possibility that

and non-class economic transformation
persuasive case

cycles,

may be made

this is not a necessity.

may have

an alliance

Since a variety of non-

for capitalist exploitation,

among advocates of class

mutually beneficial implications.

who would oppose

that those

may be complied

A

poverty, inequality, business

and a host of other contemptible economic characteristics might be well served by

considering the contextually specific ways in which capitalist exploitation contributes
these travesties.

may be

The

parallel case can be

furthered in specific instances

made

by interventions

(and other) characteristics that have helped
possibility exists for an alliance

that the opposition

of class exploitation

that affect non-class

to perpetuate class exploitation.

between class analytic Marxists and other

concerned with non-class economic change.

14

economic

Thus the

radicals

to

The second way
economic theory
understands

all

is

in

which Marxian

class analysis differs

in its overdeterminist theory

of causation. Overdetermination

aspects of a totality as mutual constitutive. Since

both shape and are shaped by each other, any change

in a part

other parts, and these consequences reflect back to impact the
dialectical theory, overdetermination

relationship with each other.

of the

totality

from Keynesian

The

stabilizing

all

parts of a totality

has repercussions for

initial

views every part as existing

produce a contradictory unity

dynamics among

all

change.

As

a

in a contradictory

and destabilizing dynamics among
in constant

all

all

parts

motion as these complex

of the parts provoke a ceaseless process of interactive

overdeterminist use ot the term "contradiction” differs from

many

effects.

The

non-overdeterminist

usages of that term. Frequently the depiction of an intervention as “contradictory”

is

intended as a rebuke, comparable to depicting that action as flawed or logically

some

inconsistent. This suggests that

preferable course of action could be adopted that

would be absent of contradiction. From an overdeterminist perspective

Any policy

“contradiction” has no pejorative connotation.

economic event)

is

the term

intervention (or other

necessarily contradictory, in that adherence to a mutually constitutive

theory of causation implies that any course of action will both promote and detract from

its

stated objective.

Thus there

not subject to the negative

is

no possibility of crafting some course of action

moment of the

The ceaseless process of mutual

that is

dialectic.

constitutivity depicted

by overdetermination

precludes the possibility of stasis, thus overdeterminist economic theory rejects any

attempt to stabilize an

economy

(or

any other

totality). Instability is

15

not regarded as the

unfortunate result of a defect in one (or several) of
the totality’s parts; overdetermination
regards instability

everything

is

is

the inherent characteristic of any unity in
contradiction. Since

always unstable, the possibility of identifying and correcting
the “causes” of

instability is contrary to the logic

of overdetermination. Remedial action intended

ameliorate one source of instability will have unintended
consequences on

all

to

other

aspects of the mutually constitutive totality of economic relations
in a capitalist class
process. In turn, these ramifications will reflect back upon the source
of instability that
the original intervention sought to correct.

have unintended consequences

that both

Thus even a “successful” intervention

will

enhance and undermine the intended outcome of

that intervention.

This overdeterminist perspective diverges from the Keynesian theory
rejection of the pursuit of

economic

stability via policies intended to stabilize aggregate

demand. Because Marxism shares Keynesianism’s

rejection of Say’s

economy, there are considerable points of similarity between
insufficient aggregate

overdeterminist

may

demand and

Marxism regards

in its

the

law

in a non-barter

the Keynesian analysis of

Marxian analysis of realization

crises.

However,

the realization crisis as only one of multiple crises that

afflict the capitalist class process.

From an

overdeterminist perspective,

it

is

misleading to elevate one crises tendency as the singular or most important form of crisis.

It

may be

that at a given historical juncture a realization crisis develops, but

any

attenuation of this crisis tendency does not produce a capitalism free of contradiction.

The attenuation of a

realization crisis

reason, overdeterminist

Marxism

may

insists

exacerbate other crisis tendencies. For this

on seeing the interaction among multiple causes

16

of instability. This

is

not to say that a program for economic change
informed by

overdetermimsm may not include
to stimulate

policies that are consistent with the Keynesian
attempt

aggregate demand. However, from an overdetermini st
perspective,

intervention could not be perceived as creating economic
stability, but
strategy to advance a

program

for

economic transformation

that

is

would

this

instead be a

cognizant of its

inevitable role in unleashing forces that will have both stabilizing
and destabilizing

implications.

The Contradictory Implications Of “Finance As Servant”: The Class Analytics Of The
Subsumed Class Struggle Between Productive And Financial Capital

Using the perspective of overdetenninist Marxism,
critical reflection

In

doing

so,

on the Keynesian motivations of the

Marxian

class analysis of financial capital

this dissertation presents a

New
is

Deal financial reform agenda.

extended

to a variety

of issues

concerning financial intermediation. In Marxian class analytic categories, financial
intermediaries are understood as financial capitalist firms. Financial capitalist Finns

engage

in the

process of financial intennediation in order to gather together funds and

expand value by advancing these funds

subsumed

class revenue),

and other

return for a non-class revenue).

16

to productive capitalist firms (in return for a

capitalist finns, individuals

The saver provides

and other

the savings to financial

intermediaries in hopes of both preserving their principal and earning

16

In addition to this

subsumed

class activity

dividends, the second chapter expands on

and non-class revenue

some

entities (in

in the

some

rate

of return.

form of interest payments and

additional non-class dimensions of financial capitalist

activity.

17

Thus

the financial capitalist

form of return

subsumed

also frequently (although not always)
obliged to pay

to the saver for access to the funds with

class

examine the Keynesian agenda

on the subsumed

financial capitalist earns

for financial reform, the dissertation

class role of financial capital and the

struggles that animate this role. However,

subsumed

which the

some

and non-class revenues.

In order to

will focus

is

it

is

subsumed

class

important to acknowledge that these

class issues are overdetermined. Chapter two, for example, will
consider the

non-class value expansion pursued by financial capital as one overdeterminant
of

subsumed

class role of financial capital.

Another overdeterminant of financial

capitalist

activity that will play a recurring role throughout the dissertation concerns the risks

inherent in financial intermediation.

rate

It

of return on their savings, or they

various difficulties that

may

financial capitalist activity

extent to

which the

funds or

some

always possible that the saver will not receive a

may

lose their initial savings entirely, because of

arise in the process

is

of financial intermediation. Thus

constantly overdetermined by struggles concerning the

financial intermediary (or intermediaries), the saver, the user of the

fourth party

The Keynesian agenda

(i.e.

the state) will bear this risks.

that finance should

restated in class analytic terms

relationship

is

by

be the servant of production can be

referring to the

between productive and

facilitate

accumulation

is

class

financial capital concerning the provision of money

capital to the capitalist fundamental class process.

can

Marxian analysis of the subsumed

One of the ways

that financial capital

via the provision of money capital to productive capital in

18

return for a

low subsumed

in part, in the process

class

payment

17
.

This subsumed class payment

payments

determined,

of subsumed class struggle between productive
and financial

Thus, to the extent that capitalist accumulation

capital.

is

for access to

money

capital, the

is

assisted

Keynesian desire

by low subsumed

class

that finance should be the

servant of production can be reinterpreted in Marxian class
analytic terms as the desire to
favor productive capital in

its

subsumed

the financial reforms ushered in

the

subsumed

class struggle

by the

class struggle with financial capital. In this light,

New

between productive and

the ability of productive capital to access

To foreshadow
reform,

we

provide

money

subsumed

Deal are seen as an attempt

money

to intervene in

financial capital in order to support

capital cheaply.

the contradictions that afflicted the Keynesian agenda for financial

consider the difficulties implied

attempt to oblige financial capital to

in the

capital to the capitalist fundamental class process in return for a

class payment. Despite the desirability of this

accumulation perspective,

this situation

outcome from

a Keynesian pro-

poses a problem for financial capitalist firms. As

unproductive capitalists, financial capitalists are motivated to
role in the attempt to

low

fulfill their

expand value. Downward pressure on the subsumed

subsumed

class

class revenue

received in return for the provision of a given amount of money capital reduces the
incentive of financial capitalists to pursue profits by fulfilling this subsumed class role,

and, as

we

shall discuss in chapter two, they

disposal. Ironically,

low subsumed

class

may

find other uses for the funds at their

payments

for access to

money

capital

may

jeopardize accumulation, in the sense that this situation squeezes the profitability of

17

A

low subsumed

class

payment

money capital means that a given subsumed class
more money capital and thereby enables increased accumulation.

for access to

distribution to financial capitalists secures

19

financial capitalist firms,

of money capital

compelled

to

and

in

response financial capitalists

fund further accumulation

18
.

may

Thus Keynesian

reduce their provision
financial reforms

balance the desire to promote accumulation with the
possibility

to

were

that the

success of this goal might inadvertently undermine
accumulation by causing financial
capitalist firms to rebel

As

from

their

subsumed

a result of this contradiction in the

architects of

New

class role.

Keynesian agenda

for accumulation, the

Deal financial reform legislation were obliged

unmanageable dilemma. They sought

to

to address a

seemingly

pursue a pro-accumulation agenda which was

potentially injurious to the profitability of financial capital, yet they were obliged
to

intervene to insure that financial capitalist firms were sufficiently profitable that they

would

fulfill their

subsumed

class responsibilities in a

manner

consistent with vigorous

accumulation.

To make

imperatives

a time of profound crisis for both productive and financial capital. During

at

matters worse, they were attempting to

was experiencing

the great depression, financial capital

profitability that threatened to

be returned to

profitability, they

responsibilities of channeling

commercial banks, as

would be unable

money

these divergent

a devastating crisis of

slow financial intermediation

financial capitalist firms (in particular

manage

to a glacial pace.

will

to fulfill their

capital to the capitalist

Unless

be argued below) could

subsumed

class

fundamental class process,

and the prospects for renewed accumulation would be further compromised. Thus the

18

Other factors as well contribute

to the profitability

of financial

capitalist firms.

For example, low

money capital advanced) might be consistent with higher profits for
financial capitalist firms if the volume of money capital advanced increases. This argument leaves this
possibility aside to concentrate on the downward pressure on the profitability of financial capitalist turns
when the subsumed class payment required to secure access to a given amount of money capital is reduced.
subsumed

class revenues (per unit of

20

architects of

Keynesian financial reform were obliged

to introduce a pastiche

of

regulatory provisions that attempted to both compromise
the profitability of financial
capital (by supporting the ability

of productive capital

to access

while attempting to protect the profitability of financial

I he Subsumed C lass

Struggle

Among

money

capital cheaply)

capital.

Financial Capitalist Finns:

New

Deal Financial

Reforms From The Perspective Of Commercial Banks

In their desire to

make

financial capital the servant of productive capital,

Keynesian financial reformers contended with a second form of subsumed

The subsumed
by

the

among

class struggle

subsumed

money

to secure

money

this

class struggle

among

financial capital

financial capitalists.

Subsumed

is

overdetermined

class struggle

financial capitalists over the division of that portion of surplus value allocated to

securing

is in

between productive and

class struggle.

capital puts

capital.

downward

Thus

this

pressure on the

class

form of competition among financial

some ways supportive of the Keynesian agenda
same competition may

subsumed

to

payment required
capitalists firms

promote accumulation. However,

also squeeze the profitability of financial capitalist firms, thus

overdetermining the contradiction of financial capitalist profitability discussed above. For
these reasons, Keynesian financial reforms grappled with a complex and contradictory set

of goals

vis

The

a

vis

subsumed

class struggle

dissertation will consider

advantages and disadvantages
attempt to

manage

financial capital.

among

how

among

the

financial capitalist firms.

New

Deal financial reforms conferred both

different types of financial capitalist firms in an

the diverse requirements of the Keynesian reform agenda vis a vis

The emergence of pax financus was enabled,

21

in part,

because of the

remarkable dexterity with which the

New

Deal financial reforms managed these
complex

and sometimes entropic imperatives. However, the
contradictions inherent
financial regulatory

reforms.

framework

To explore how

in this

also contributed to the subversion of these
financial

these contradictions ultimately thwarted the intentions

Keynesian financial reform, we pay particular attention

to the evolution

class struggles involving financial capital over time.

the overdetermined context

changed,

this differential regulatory treatment

evolution of subsumed class struggles

subsumed
the

in

class struggles

subsumed

among

class relationship

among

As

of financial

of subsumed

capitalist firms

financial capitalist firms.

shaped the

As

these

financial capitalist firms unfolded, this in turn reshaped

between productive and financial

capital.

These changes

both types of subsumed class struggles involving financial capital contributed

undermining the

New

Deal financial reforms that supported Keynesian welfare

to

state

capitalism.

The

dissertation explores these contradictions in the

New

Deal financial reform

from the perspective of commercial banks. While commercial banks are only one among
several types of financial capitalist firms (including investment banks, pension funds

insurance companies and so on), for a variety of historically and institutionally specific

reasons commercial banks were a prominent concern for

banks they are the oldest (Roussakis 1997, 3)

US

financial capitalist firm.

assets held

19

19

New

Dealers.

and arguably the most prominent type of

At the beginning of the

New

Deal

era, the total financial

by commercial banks dwarfed those held by any other

However banking

Commercial

financial capitalist

functions were performed prior to this by colonizing companies, merchants and

colonial governments that were engaged in the provision of credit, (see

22

Hammond

1941, 5)

and

firm,

this

private and

dominance continued

unique among financial

when

the total financial assets of both

).

It

In addition

of debt capital and other lending, commercial banks are

capitalist firms for other institutional characteristics
(as a

prominent Federal Reserve

the

1991

government pension funds surpassed those of commercial
banks.

to their role in the provision

special

until

official

has famously quipped, commercial banks are

has evolved historically that commercial banks play an important
role

payments system whereby transactions

are cleared, and via their lending activities

they act as the transmission mechanism for monetary policy. Because of their

important roles

in the

US economy,

in

the Federal Reserve

many

System has been organized

to

support and oversee commercial banking, and to provide the commercial banking system

with unique forms of assistance, including lender of last resort support.

In addition to these unique characteristics of commercial banks,

financial regulation

was obliged

to focus

New

Deal

on commercial banks because of the acute

crisis

they faced in the early 1930s. Between 1930 and 1933, about a third of US commercial

banks

failed or

were forced

commercial bank
chapter

banks

20

5,

stood

who had

into distressed mergers.

profitability, the return

at

One

conventional measure of

on assets (ROA)

about negative .77 percent

in

1934

for

21
,

depicted in Figure 14,

FDIC member commercial

survived the waves of bank failures. This profound

crisis in the

banks are unique among financial capitalist firms is articulated most famously from a
non-Marxian perspective by E. Gerald Corrigan in his “Are Bank’s Special?”. (1982)
21

The argument

that

The

assets

return

on

is

measured

as the net

income divided by

23

total assets.

commercial banking system compromised
ability to execute transactions,

monetary policy.

upon assuming
bank holiday

The

and

situation

its

ability to act as a provider

its

had reached such urgent proportions

banking

crisis. In

was compelled

priority for the architects

for the transmission

of the

New

,

its

Deal

to

to

that

immediately

announce

a national

order that commercial banks could resume

their vital role as financial intermediaries, as well
as

system and act as an agent

22

effectiveness channel for the transmission
of

office the Roosevelt administration

to contain the

of loans

resume

their role in the

of monetary policy,

stem the

crisis in the

it

payments

was an urgent

commercial banking

system.

As we
required that

shall

New

argue below, the resolution of the

Thus the
bank

22

money

capital, implied a further

architects of

New

In 1929,

class

entails

low subsumed

class

squeeze on commercial bank

payment

profitability.

Deal financial reform were obliged to restore commercial

profitability while at the

subsumed

commercial banking

Deal financial reforms support the profitability of commercial banks.

Yet the Keynesian pro-accumulation agenda, which
for access to

crisis in

same time attempting

payment made

to

avoid exerting upward pressure on

to acquire debt capital. In their attempt to reconcile these

commercial banks held $36.

1

billion in loans,

which constituted 57.9% of their

total assets.

By

1934, total loans held by commercial banks had dropped to $15.7 billion, or 34.9% of total commercial

bank
23

assets.

(Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 450)

The Federal Reserve was unable

money because of the

to increase the

money supply

despite increments to high powered-

disarray of the commercial banking system. Friedman and Schwartz estimate that the

amount of high powered money made available to the commercial banking system should
have produced a rise in the stock of money of 17.5% in the absence of a commercial banking crisis. (1963,
332-333) However, the crisis in the commercial banking system reduced the money stock by one third
despite this increase in high powered-money. (352)
increase in the

24

potentially divergent imperatives, Keynesian
financial reforms contained contradictory

provisions that supported commercial bank profitability

in

some

respects and impeded

it

in others.

Given the delicate task facing

New

Deal financial reforms, they achieved

considerable success to the extent they supported several decades
of relative economic

growth and

stability

while also presiding over a period of high commercial bank profits

and low numbers of bank

failures.

to create this fortuitous situation

bank

profitability

on a smaller scale

However,

as time passed the reforms that

were increasingly blamed

of commercial

problems and a renewed occurrence of commercial bank
of the 1930s). In response

that those

increasingly engaged in activities that undermined the

had been originally designed

The

for the return

dissertation

is

to

enhance

to this crisis,

New

had helped

failures (albeit

commercial banks

Deal financial reforms

that

their profitability.

organized as eight chapters. In addition to the introduction

(chapter one) and the conclusion (chapter eight) the dissertation can be viewed in three

major sections, each of which

is

composed of two

chapters.

The

(chapters two and three) are devoted to class analytic concerns.

analysis of the

subsumed

of two chapters

They consider

the general

class struggle involving financial capital, and the specific class

analysis of the commercial bank.

The second

present a class analytic account of the

New

issues concerning financial capital that

chapter five details the

first set

New

set

of two chapters (chapters four and

Deal financial reforms. Chapter four presents

emerged prior

Deal response

five)

to the great depression, while

to those issues.
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The

final set

of two chapters

(chapters six and seven) consider the

subsumed

firms that provoked the unraveling of the

New

class struggle

among

financial capitalist

Deal financial reforms toward the

later

phases of Keynesian welfare state capitalism. Chapter
six presents the competitive
icsponse of non-bank financial capitalist firms to the
restrictions contained
financial reforms, while chapter seven details the
response of the

these competitive threats. Chapter eight concludes with

in

New

Deal

commercial banks

to

some comments concerning some

of the contributions offered by an overdeterminist and class analytic
treatment of the

economic history of New Deal

financial reforms.
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CHAPTER 2

A CLASS ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CAPITAL-

AN INITIAL LOOK AT THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE KEYNESIAN
FINANCIAL REFORM AGENDA

Introduction

As chapter one
to

argued, the Keynesian agenda for financial reform was motivated

encourage financial capital

access to

money

to act as a “servant “ to productive capital

capital in return for a

by providing

low subsumed class payment. Chapter two

elaborates on the overdeterminist class analytic framework that will be used in

subsequent chapters

accomplish

to

analyze the

this goal. In

New

Deal regulatory intervention designed

order to discern what sort of conditions might promote a low

subsumed

class

subsumed

class struggles involving financial capital.

payment

required to obtain

money

for access to

capital

is

money

capital, the current chapter focuses

The subsumed

developing the class analytic tools with which

among

to analyze these

struggles involving financial capital, this chapter begins to outline

complexities confronted by the

payment

shaped by both the subsumed class struggle between

productive and financial capital and subsumed class struggles

By

class

on the

New

Deal financial refonns

financial capital to act as servant to productive capital.
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financial capitalists.

subsumed

class

some of the

in their

attempt to compel

The chapter begins by analyzing

subsumed

the

and financial capital over the payment made

to secure

class struggle

money

capital.

of the chapter explores subsumed class struggles among
financial

examine the ways

subsumed

in

which

class struggle

this

between productive

The second

section

capitalists in order to

type of subsumed class struggle overdetermines the

between productive and financial

process of financial intermediation

is

examined

in

more

capital.

Following

detail in order to

this, the

develop a

generic class analytic equation for a financial capitalist firm. This class
analytic equation
highlights the diverse effects of the various forms of competition
capitalist firms

capital.

The

on the Keynesian agenda

forth section

expands the

for

subsumed

may expand

money

value via the

class revenue. This facilitates the

analysis of how these non-class roles of financial capitalist firms

A

for

analytic equation for a financial

capitalist firm to consider the possibility that financial capital

subsumed

financial

low subsumed class payments

initial class

receipt of non-class revenue as well as

among

may

overdetermine the

class struggles involving financial capital.

Subsumed Class Struggles Between Productive And Financial Capital:
View Of The Contradictions Of Keynesian Agenda For Financial Reform

Preliminary

In order to set production in motion, a productive capitalist firm requires

capital.

Money capital

is

value in

money fonn

productive capitalist firm employs

money

that is

used to expand value.

capital to initiate production,

hopes of expanding value via the appropriation of surplus value
production process. Although

money

it

is

at

it

money

When

does so

a

in the

the conclusion of the

possible that a productive capitalist firm has sufficient

capital internally to initiate production,
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we

shall

assume

that the productive

1

capitalist firm requires access to external
sources

firm

may

step in to supply the

money

capital

the circuit of productive capital in motion."

firms

employ

all

of money capital

A

.

needed by a productive

We

further

assume

financial capitalist

capitalist firm to set

that productive capitalist

inflows of funds received from financial capitalist firms
as
3

capital to initiate production

financial capitalist firms are

.

By

supplying

engaged

in a

money

capital

subsumed

used to

money

initiate production,

class process since they help to

secure one of the conditions of existence of productive capital.

In

keeping with our focus on the provision of money capital

fundamental class process, a financial

capitalist firm is initially defined as

unproductive capitalist firm that provides

money

return for the provision of money capital,

it

is

1

To

subsumed

assumed

The

autonomy

Money

money

will in turn overdetermine the

capital

might be provided

class processes, could provide

subsumed

by

the productive capitalist

financial capitalist firm initially

is

forthcoming

expand the production

financial capitalist firms. This greater

class struggle

entities,

money

between productive and

financial capital.

such as the

to the capitalist

state, individuals,

or participants in non-capitalist

capital directly to productive capitalist firms without the

intermediating presence of a financial capitalist firm.
capital

by

To

simplify the analysis,

we assume

that

money

fundamental class process only via the financial intermediation of a

financial capitalist firm.
3

However,

the possibility exists that a productive capitalist firm might obtain funds

capitalist firm
4

The

class
5

and use them

is

in

which financial

it

will

be considered

in the

might expand value.

capitalist firms

capitalist firms without receiving a distribution

excluded, but

a financial

enlarged later in the chapter to consider some of the non-

a financial capitalist firm

There are circumstances

from

for other purposes.

definition of a financial capitalist firm

means by which

In

productive capitalist firms by entities that are not ordinarily thought

to

of as financial capitalist firms. These

capital supplied

4
.

that the financial capitalist firm

the extent that productive capitalist firms can generate funds internally to

process, they will be less reliant on

2

5

class revenue ).

an

capital to productive capitalist firms

receives a distribution from the surplus value appropriated
firm (referred to as a

to the capitalist

may provide money

of surplus value

in return.

At

discussion of equity capital below.
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capital to productive

present, this possibility

is

begins with some quantity of value (M), which
firms,

and

later the financial capitalist firm

meets the Marxian definition of a

advanced

expands value

of the subsumed class revenue. The financial
it

is

to surplus value appropriating

(to

M') as a result of the receipt

capitalist firm has

expanded value, therefore

However, the

capitalist firm.

financial capitalist firm

has expanded value in a manner other than the appropriation
of surplus value, thus the
financial capitalist firm

In the third

is

referred to as an unproductive capitalist firm.

volume of Capital Marx points out
,

payment made by productive
is

that the size

of this subsumed class

capital to financial capital to secure access to

indeterminate/ The size of the subsumed class payment for access to

overdetermined by a large variety of political,

These

political

cultural, natural

money

money

capital

capital

is

and economic processes.

and cultural processes can include domestic and international

legal

and

regulatory constraints, electoral pressures, the historically specific evolution of
institutional structures, as well as religious beliefs

proclivities concerning risk

and psychological and emotional

and liquidity preference. Numerous economic

factors,

such as

the impact of the business cycle, the pace of technological change and the level of

indebtedness of productive capitalist firms also exert diverse influences on the payment

money

required to secure

capital.

All of these overdeterminants shape the struggle between productive and financial

capitalist firms to

determine the size of the subsumed class payment. Because

struggle concerns the distribution of appropriated surplus value,

b

Marx

itself,

explains that the

while

minimum

maximum subsumed

limit

is

class

payment would be

is

referred to as a

the entire “profit”(surplus value)

“altogether indeterminable”. (1967, 358)
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it

this

subsumed

class struggle

7
.

This struggle

is

antagonistic, in that productive capital seeks
to

minimize the required distribution of surplus value, while

maximize

it.

However, the relationship between productive and

animated by cooperation as well as

of money

financial capital seeks to

capital,

conflict.

financial capital

is

Productive capitalist firms rely on providers

given that (under current assumptions) the productive capitalist
firm

requires access to external

capitalist firms also rely

money

capital as a condition

on productive

capitalist firms,

of its existence. Financial
given that (under current

assumptions) financial capitalist firms expand value by receiving a distribution of the
surplus value appropriated by the productive capitalist firm

between productive and
their relationship

and productive

9
.

Thus

8
.

This mutual dependence

financial capitalist firms confers a cooperative dimension

the

subsumed

class struggle

capitalist firms is a contradictory

between

on

financial capitalist firms

dynamic shaped by both antagonism and

cooperation.

In light

of our analysis of the subsumed class struggle between financial and

productive capital, the Keynesian agenda vis a vis financial capital can be reexamined

from a class analytic perspective. As was mentioned

7

In addition to the struggles over the size of the

subsumed

class

in chapter one, the

Keynesian

payment, productive and financial

capital

engaged in struggles over other dimensions of their relationship, such as conflict over the terms
under which money capital is provided (these may include struggles over what information is to be
disclosed by either party in the course of negotiating the transaction, the legal recourses if one party fails
fulfil its contractual obligations, and questions of conditions that may be attached to the procurement of
money capital and so on).
are also

8

Further on in the chapter

we

will introduce non-class

avenues through which financial

to

capitalist firms

expand value.
of the subsumed class payment made to secure money
tempered because neither party wants to dramatically undermine the conditions of existence of the
other, for to do so would jeopardize their own conditions of existence.
9

Thus

capital

their antagonistic struggle over the size
is
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agenda

to

compel

financial capital to act as the “servant” of
productive capital can be

interpreted as the attempt to encourage a

and productive capital
capital.

that

subsumed

class relationship

promotes a low subsumed class payment

However, the success of this Keynesian agenda

financial capitalist firms

capitalist firms are

qua

motivated

subsumed

value via the receipt of subsumed class revenues.

for access to

class role in the attempt to

Downward

subsumed

cease engaging in financial capitalist activity, or they

advancing

money

capital to the capitalist

for the funds at their disposal (for

Thus the Keynesian agenda
productive capital by providing
in return for a

low subsumed

following contradiction.

A

to

pressure on their subsumed

class

subsumed

class revenue squeezed

may respond by refraining

may

from

may engage

in financial capitalist

discussed below).

is

compel

money

expand

fundamental class process and find other uses

example, they

activities that earn non-class revenues, as

money

capitalists, financial

class revenue reduces the incentive of financial capitalist firms
to fulfill this

class role. Financial capitalist firms finding their

financial

potentially injurious to

As unproductive

capitalist firms.

to fulfill their

is

between

financial capital to act as the servant to

capital to the capitalist fundamental class process

payment

low subsumed

for access to

class

payment

money

capital wrestles with the

for access to

money

capital

supports accumulation by making inflows of money capital less expensive to obtain. Yet

ironically,

low subsumed

class

accumulation, in the sense that

capitalist firms. In

money

payments

for access to

this situation

money

capital

may jeopardize

squeezes the profitability of financial

response financial capitalist firms

may

reduce their provision of

capital to fund further accumulation. Since this contradiction
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between the

Keynesian agenda

to

lower the subsumed class payment for access

financial capitalist profitability will be the focus
of

it

merits a

way of referring

to

it

succinctly.

It

to

much of attention

money

capital

and

in the dissertation,

will be referred to in the remainder of the

dissertation as the “master/servant contradiction’' of
the Keynesian agenda. This

terminology acknowledges

its

debt to Hegel’s master/slave dialectic, as the present

analysis seeks to reflect the Hegelian insight that the act
of compelling the servitude of

one entity

entails setting in

motion negation of that servitude.

This master/servant contradiction of the Keynesian agenda varies dramatically
its

implications depending on the overdetermined context.

reduction in the subsumed class payment for
capitalist profitability varies

supply of money capital.

money

It

according

may be

money

to a host

that the

capital detracts

of factors

payment

The degree

that

to

which the

from financial

shape the demand and

amount of

for access to a given

capital decreases, but productive capitalist firms foreseeing vigorous

their output increase the total

amount of money

capital

in

demanded.

demand

In this event,

it

for

may be

possible that the total value inflow received by the financial capitalist firm increases. This

would be

a situation in

stimulation in the

profitability.

which the success of the Keynesian accumulation agenda (and

demand

for

money

capital) alleviates the pressure

Moreover, the response of financial

profitability will

be shaped by the options open

ways of earning revenues

from

is

financial capitalist

capitalist firms to pressure

to

them.

apart from the receipt of

provision of money capital, then there

on

If there are

subsumed

its

many

on

their

alternative

class revenue for the

greater potential that financial capital will rebel

their “servant” status to pursue value

expansion by other means.

33

The master/servant
complex challenges

contradiction of the Keynesian financial agenda
implied

development of New Deal financial reforms.

for the

financial reforms attempted to privilege productive
capital in

with financial capital, while
profitability

at the

was not impaired

financial capital that

same time ensuring

to the extent that

it

its

New

subsumed

Deal

class struggle

that financial capitalist

might provoke responses on the

might sabotage the Keynesian agenda. At some junctures the

Deal regulatory framework dealt

startling

blows

to the profitability

of financial

part of

New

capital,

while other regulatory provisions attempted to insulate financial capital from the
ramifications of these blows. However, the coherence of these diverse regulatory
interventions can be discerned

by appreciating

animated Keynesian financial reform. What
in

the contradictory imperatives that

may

appear as irreconcilable inconsistencies

Keynesian financial regulation are the consequences,

in part,

of the struggle among the

conflicting imperatives of the Keynesian financial reform agenda.

The Keynesian Financial Reform Agenda

And The

Question

Of Competition Among

One overdeterminant of the subsumed
the competitive struggles

far in the analysis,

each financial

expand value, thus each
capitalist firms to

among

class

payment

for access to

financial capitalist firms.

capitalist firm is reliant

financial capitalist firm

maximize

Financial Capitalist Firms

their share

money

capital

is

Given assumptions made thus

on subsumed class revenue

must compete with

all

to

other financial

of the distributions of surplus value allocated by

productive capitalist finns for securing access to
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money

capital.

Because

this

competitive

1

1

struggle

among

referred to as a

1

financial capitalist firms concerns distributions
of surplus value,

subsumed

capitalist firms is in turn

class struggle. This

mobility of money capital

among

class struggle

overdetermined by a great variety of

and relative size of financial

class struggle

subsumed

factors,

capitalist firms, the existence (or not)

among

it is

also

financial

such as the number

of barriers

to the

1

and so on. Like

all

financial capitalist firms

subsumed
is

class struggles, the

subsumed

animated by contradictory impulses.

It is

an antagonistic struggle, in that financial capitalist firms compete
with one another over
the division of that portion of surplus value that

capital.

However, the subsumed

class struggle

animated by cooperation as well as

wish
to

to

maximize

earmark

the

allocated to securing access to

among

financial capitalist firms

money

is

conflict. Financial capitalist firms are allied in their

amount of surplus value

for securing access to

is

money

that productive capitalist firms are obliged

capital generally.

To some

extent, they

may

cooperate in attempting to enhance the political, cultural, natural and economic
conditions that enhance the importance of (and payment
externally provided

From

money

to secure access to)

1

capital.

the perspective of Keynesian agenda for financial capital, the competitive

dimension of subsumed class struggle among financial

Keynesian agenda of a low subsumed class payment

10

made

capitalist firms supports the

for access to

Barriers to capital mobility, such as legal or regulatory obstacles to the

money

capital.

movement of funds

As

across

national or sub-national borders, will shape the degree to which financial capitalist firms of a given
jurisdiction face competition

from

financial capitalist firms of other jurisdictions.

However, as providers of a subsumed class process, financial capitalist firms are constrained by their
dependence on productive capital. If financial capital is so successful in enhancing the subsumed class
1

payment made to secure money capital that the ability of productive capital to secure its other conditions ot
existence are compromised, financial capital will have unintentionally undermined their own conditions ot
existence.
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financial capitalist firms

capitalist

compete

in the process

fundamental class process,

subsumed

class

payment required

of providing

money

capital to the

competition exerts downward pressure on the

this

to secure access to

agenda of promoting low subsumed class payments

money

capital.

for access to

Thus

money

the Keynesian

capital

is

consistent with a policy of intensifying this

subsumed

class struggle

among

financial

However,

subsumed

class struggle

among

financial

capitalist firms.

to the extent that

downward

capitalist firms puts

pressure on this subsumed class payment,

it

may

also

exacerbate the previously mentioned master/servant contradiction
of the Keynesian

agenda. Vigorous subsumed class struggle
the

subsumed

class

payment required

to

among

secure

financial capitalist firms that reduces

money

capital

may undermine

capitalist profitability to the extent that financial capitalists rebel

class role,

which

in turn

While subsumed

may jeopardize

class struggle

competitive struggles

among

among

financial capitalist firms

to

money

class analysis of financial capitalist firms

providing

money

capital, the

among

in

the financial capitalist secures the funds

funds for this purpose,

supportive of a

same cannot be

said for

is

which

in

more

detail.

Thus

far

terms of their expansion of value by

capital to productive capitalist firms.

it

is

financial capitalist firms, the

must be developed

have been analyzed

must now be addressed. While

subsumed

financial capitalist firms. In order to discern these

various and opposing implications of competition

financial capitalist firms

this

access to funds to support accumulation.

lower subsumed class payment for access
all

from

financial

However, the question of where

are used to earn

subsumed

class revenues

possible that financial capitalist firms use their

in general financial capitalist firms secure their initial
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own

money

capital via the process

of financial intermediation. As financial
intermediaries,

capitalist firms gather together the savings in
the

constitute the initial

money

financial

economy, and these amassed savings

capital that financial capitalists use to

expand value (under

present assumptions, via the receipt of subsumed class
revenues).

Financial intermediation can be analyzed by breaking this
process into two
interrelated phases: the gathering together

of savings

to

form the money

disposal of the financial capitalist firms, and the provision of this

money

capital at the

capital to

productive capitalist firms in order to secure subsumed class revenue. 12 To

two moments of financial intermediation,

the “generic”

capitalist firm is depicted in Figure

1

consists of accessing savings in the

economy

below. The

Associated with this non-class revenue
in the

economy

is

first

in the

typically

12

In

non-Marxian parlance,

phase
13
It is

is

13

class analysis of a financial

moment of financial

this is first

phase

is

intermediation

form of non-class revenues.

some

sort

14

of Y expense, as the savers

are usually compensated for the provision of their savings

of return (such as the interest paid funds deposited

illustrate these

in a savings account).

1

'^

by some form
In addition,

often referred to as the “sources of funds” while the second

described as the “uses of funds”.

we are not explicit about the particular way in which
way in which the financial capitalist firm provides these

referred to as “generic” because, at this stage,

the financial capitalist firm gathers savings or the

savings to productive capitalist firms.
14

If the initial savers

chose

to

withdraw

their savings

from the financial capitalist firm, this would be
withdrawn from a financial capitalist firm

reflected as a reduction in this non-class revenue. If savings

exceeded the inflow of new funds,
15

Below we extend

this

non-class revenue would

for

negative.

the class analysis of financial capital to consider the possibility that capital gains (a

may compensate the provider of money
access to money capital is reduced to zero.

non-class revenue)

payment

become
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capital to the extent that the

subsumed

class

non-class revenues

may be

generated

capital to the financial capitalist firm,

advances of money capital

to

if a recipient

of money capital repays

and these funds are then available

is

distinguished

expenses and revenues associated with the disbursement of savings

incurred

when

capitalist firm,

subsumed

to support

by a

new

the financial capitalist firm advances

and the financial

capitalist firm has

payment

for the use

money

variety of other

to productive

and the subsequent earning of subsumed class revenue.

class revenue as

money

productive capitalists.

The second moment of financial intermediation

capitalist firms

this

An X

is

capital to the productive

expanded value when

of the

expense

money

it

receives

capital. Further

X expenses

include the costs associated with research, monitoring and collection that accompanies
the receipt of

subsumed

class revenue. Additional expenses include

all

of the costs

associated with the operation of a financial capitalist firm, such as occupancy costs,
salaries

it

is

and so on

assumed

that

may be

difficult to categorize as

X

that costs that are debatable in this respect,

Y

or

and

1

expenses.

all

*'

remaining

For simplicity,

costs, are

Y

expenses.

Figure

1:

Value Inflows and Expenditures of a Generic Financial

Capitalist

Firm

Value Inflows:

NCR inflow of savings obtained ~^SSCR payment from productive
+NCR repayment of money

capital

advanced

capitalist firm for access to

money

capital

to productive capitalist firm

Value Expenditures:

Y expenses associated with securing savings inflows + x money

capital

advanced

expenses associated with advancing money capital to surplus value appropriators

to surplus value appropriators

+

X other

+Y any additional expenses
'

*

For example the salary of a bank employee may be partially an X expense (to the extent that this
employee in involved in securing the receipt of subsumed class revenue) and partly a Y expense (to
extent that this employee is involved in securing deposits for the bank).
1(1
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the

In the first

engaged
can

moment of financial

intermediation,

in a competitive struggle with

from savers, while seeking

attract

To

attracting savings.

in the first

in order to

Y

minimize the

refine the analysis of competition

moment of financial

grouped according

one another

to

financial capitalist firms are

all

to the

maximize

the funds they

expenses associated with

among

financial capitalist firms

intermediation, financial capitalist firms are often

avenues through which they typically access the savings of an

economy. For example, depository

institutions such as

commercial banks are

distinguished because they secure funds by accepting deposits, while
pension fund

companies

collect funds via pension fund contributions, and insurance

companies receive

funds via insurance premiums. These groupings of financial capitalist firms according
the

manner

in

which funds

will be referred to

below

are accessed in the first

moment of financial

to

intermediation

as the “types” or “categories” of financial capitalist firms.

Competition among financial

and across categories. In the

capitalist firms occurs

first

both within a particular category,

moment of financial

intermediation, the competition

across categories will be animated by the efforts of financial capitalist of each different

category to compel savers to hold their savings

in the

particular category. This in turn will be shaped

by

particular advantages

form corresponding

to their

the particular expenses as well as the

related to each category, as financial capitalist of each category

seek to minimize the expenses and expand the advantages pertaining to their category.

17

For example, savings held

in the

form of deposits are

attractive

from a financial

capitalist firm’s point

of

however this
view because is relatively easy for savers to open bank accounts and
complex
for savers
more
somewhat
quickly.
It
is
withdrawn
also
means
that
the
funds
can
be
ease of access
to initiate holding their savings in pensions (they may, for example, need to be employees of a certain
company to participate in the pension fund). However savings held in pension funds are attractive from the
store savings in them,

financial capitalist firm’s point of

view because these savings are often

time.

39

left in

place for long periods ot

Unlike competition among financial
financial intermediation, competition

of financial intermediation

not a

is

capitalist firms in the

among

second moment of

financial capitalist firms in this

subsumed

class struggle, in that

it

is

first

not a struggle

concerning distributions from surplus value. Is However,
competition for access
savings

of course, a condition of existence

is,

moment of financial
first

intermediation. Competition

moment of financial

subsumed

class

for

payment

intermediation

for access to

may be

money

subsumed

among

moment

to

class struggle in the second

financial capitalist firms in the

contrary to a Keynesian agenda for low

capital, in that this

competition

may

increase the rate of return that financial capitalist firms are obliged
to pay to attract
savings. If circumstances permit, financial capitalist firms
to

may pass

productive capitalist firms by increasing the cost of securing

this cost increase

money

capital.

Even

on

if

financial capitalist firms are not in a position to pass these increased costs along to

productive capitalists via an subsumed class payment required to secure

competition over access to savings

of the Keynesian agenda.

18

We

assume

and

this

that the savings

still

in

may

capital,

exacerbate the master/servant contradiction

If financial capitalist firms

any corresponding increase
capitalist firms,

may

money

absorb these cost increases without

revenues, this will squeeze the profitability of financial

in turn subvert

come from

accumulation.

a variety of sources, such as savings

from workers’ wages,

savings from the state’s tax collection and other revenue generating activities, and savings from a variety of
participants in non-capitalist class processes and unproductive capitalists. However, it may be that savings
are the retained earnings of productive capitalist firm, in

which case competition among

financial capitalist

firms for the opportunity to intermediate these savings might arguably be considered a subsumed class
struggle. For simplicity

we

leave this possibility aside.
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}

Competition among financial

capitalist firms in the

second moment of financial

intermediation takes the form of a subsumed class
struggle over distributions of surplus
value.

that

it

Each

financial capitalist firm

receives, while

class revenues. This

is

would

X

minimizing the

subsumed

like to

capital.

financial capital vis

a

the

subsumed

form of competition among financial

class

it

may

exert

downward

However, the benefits of this subsumed

vis the size

class revenue

expenses associated with earning these subsumed

beneficial to the Keynesian agenda, in that

of securing money

maximize

capitalist firms

pressure on the costs

class struggle

of this subsumed class payment must be viewed

of the master/servant contradiction, since

it

is

possible that very vigorous

competition might impair the profitability of financial capitalist firms

among
in light

subsumed

class

to the extent that

they might take actions that are inconsistent with the Keynesian agenda for financial
capital.

second moment of financial intermediation, the financial

In the

provide

money

capital to the productive capitalist firms in

provision of money capital

debt capital, or by the

capital."

may take

the form of a loan, in

capitalist firm

may

one of two forms. The

which case

it

is

referred to as

1

initial

purchase of stock,

These two forms of money

in

which case

it is

referred to as equity

capital are related to the provision of different

conditions of existence for the productive capitalist firm, and they carry with them

19

The term

“initial” indicates that the stock

is

purchased directly from the productive

capitalist firm, thus

from the sale of the stock can be employed as money capital by the productive capitalist
Purchases of stock on the secondary market do not provide revenue for the productive capitalist firm.

the revenues

20

To

simplify the analysis in

its

preliminary stages,

we

will

capitalist firm directly provides loans or purchases the stock

relax this assumption
capital

below

by arranging loans or

to consider

how

assume in this section that the
from the productive capitalist

financial capitalist firms

the stock purchases

by

may

financial
firm.

facilitate access to

We
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will

money

third parties through activities such as securities

underwriting.

firm.

different implications.

Debt

the necessity of making

capital (the condition

subsumed

of existence of credit) carries with

payment referred

class

to as interest

payment

21
,

it

and

the repayment of the principal of the loan.
Equity capital (the condition of existence

ownership) does not carry with
although firms

may

choose

The advance of money

to

it

the necessity of making a

subsumed

class payment,

pay the subsumed class payment referred

capital in equity

to as a dividend.

form does not require repayment, however the

receipt of equity capital does entail other obligations
(such as the entitlement of

stockholders to vote in the election of the board of directors) and
opportunities (such as
the opportunity for capital gains, as will be discussed below).

One of these forms of subsumed

class struggle

among

financial capitalist firms can be

competition between providers of debt and equity capital. Debt and equity capital
providers are engaged subsumed class struggle with each other as each attempts to

maximize

the distribution of surplus value allocated to secure the particular condition of

existence that they provide. Because productive capitalist firms have two alternative

means through which

to secure access to

may benefit from subsumed
capital to reduce the

generally.

From

21

In practice,

money

class struggles

subsumed

class

capital, the productive capitalist firm

among

payment required

two types of providers of money

to secure access to

money

capital

the point of view of a productive capitalist firm in need of money capital,

some providers of debt

capital also charge fees in addition to interest. In this event, such fees

could be treated as additional subsumed class revenues,

if

able to compel borrowers to pay in order to have access to

they are fees that the financial capitalist firm

money

such fees could be considered surplus value, as when the fee
statements or automatic account debiting) which
really a

these

component of the

interest

payment, but

it

is

is

capital.

However,

it

may

is

be argued that

paid in return for something (say monthly

arguably a service.

It

may

also be the case that a “fee"

is

has been presented as two separate payments (perhaps in

order to disguise the costs of a loan from a potential borrower).
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debt and equity capital are often close substitutes.
Thus the productive capitalist
able to alter their

the size of the

mix of debt and equity

subsumed

class

payment required

capital. Alternatively, providers

enhancing their
firms must

struggles

among

to secure

enhance

their ability to bargain over

to secure access to

of both types of money capital

ability to increase the

make

capital to

money

subsumed

class

may be

payment

capital in either form. In this

both types of money

may

ally in the

hopes of

that productive capitalist

way, the subsumed

class

providers of debt and equity capital overdetermine (and are

overdetermined by) subsumed class struggle between productive

capitalist firms

and

providers of money capital.

By

analyzing the two distinct moments of financial intermediation

varying effects of competition

payment required

to secure

promote low subsumed

among

money

class

financial capitalist firms

capital.

payment

The Keynesian

for access to

with these diverse implications of competition

financial capitalist firms in the second

moderating competition among financial
intermediation.

However,

on the subsumed

capital

agenda

was obliged

subsumed

moment of financial

capitalist firms in the first

this general orientation

class

to

to deal

financial capitalist firms. In

general, Keynesian financial reform sought to intensify the

among

can see the

financial reform

money

among

we

class competition

intermediation, while

moment of financial

of Keynesian financial agenda was

subject to the proviso that financial capitalist firms needed to maintain adequate

profitability in order that they

would behave

Keynesian financial agenda. As we
competition

among

in a

manner

consistent with the overall

shall see, this divergent

financial capitalist firms

agenda with respect

to

compelled the architects of New Deal
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financial reform to create regulatory
interventions that sought to simultaneously

encourage competition among financial
discouraging

it

capitalist firms in

some

respects, while

in other respects.

Non-Class Elements Of Financial Capitalist Activity:
A_Further Overdet e rminant Of Subsumed Class Struggles Involving
Financial Cap ital

Thus

far in

our analysis

capitalist firm that

we have

defined a financial capitalist firm as an unproductive

expands value by providing money

capital to productive capitalist

firms. In order to proceed further with our analysis of the
contradictory imperatives

animating Keynesian financial reform,
consider

some of the ways

their receipt

subsumed

we must

extend our class analytic framework

that financial capitalist firms

may expand

to

value in addition to

of subsumed class revenue. These non-class revenues interact with the

class revenues analyzed

above

to

overdetermine the subsumed class struggles

involving financial capital. This more complex picture of both the subsumed class
struggle between productive and financial capital and the

subsumed

class struggle

among

financial capitalist firms illuminates further challenges for the design of Keynesian

financial reforms.

We begin with the generic
presented in Figure

1

class analytic equation of a financial capitalist firm

above. At that point, non-class revenues entered into the class

analysis of financial capitalist activity only as inflows of savings gathered in the

moment of financial
advanced

first

intermediation, or the repayment of money capital previously

to productive capitalist firms.

However,

44

financial capitalist firms have other

ways of earning non-class revenues

in the second

moment of financial

facilitate this discussion, financial
capitalist firms that

and those

that

more

By

will

be analyzed

specific class analytic equation for both types
of

financial capitalist firms can be derived

relevant to each group.

To

advance funds by means of loans

advance funds by means of purchasing equities

separately. In this manner, a

intermediation.

by considering

the non-class revenues that are

discerning the impact of non-class revenue on both types
of

financial capitalist firms, further nuances animating the

subsumed

class struggle

among

financial capitalist firms are highlighted.

A

financial capitalist firm that lends funds

may

elect to

make

loans to entities that are

not productive capitalist firms. These entities can include workers or other
individuals,

unproductive capitalist firms, states or other domestic or international organizations. 22

When

a financial capitalist firm lends funds to

receives

is

a non-class revenue.

financial capitalist firms

we

borrowers of funds,

the form of a

Y

income

it

funds to both productive capitalist firms and other

derive a general class analysis of money-lending financial

Now

loans advanced

loans (to others).

subsumed

entities, the interest

incorporating the possibility that money-lending

may advance

capitalist firms (Figure 2).

appropriators) or

By

one of these

The

may be

interest

either

X

loans (to surplus value

income earned on these loans

will take

class revenue (on a loan to surplus value appropriators) or non-

class revenue (on a loan to others), and the expenses associated with earning interest

income may be

22
It is

X

or

Y

expenses accordingly. The varied costs associated with earning

also possible that a money-lending financial capitalist firm might

make

loans to surplus labor

appropriators in non-capitalist class process. In that event, the interest income from the loans would not be
a non-class revenue, but rather a

subsumed

class

payment from

possibility aside in the class analytic equations below.
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a non-capitalist class process.

We

leave this

interest

income are

either

X

or

Y

expenses, depending on the type of loans
advanced, and

these costs are depicted in the term

“(X+Y)

However,

expenses associated with advancing .cans”.

the

additional dimension of non-class revenues from
lending has not directly affected the

moment of financial

intermediation, in that the financial capitalist firm

class revenue in the form of savings inflows and

must bear some

still

Y costs

first

requires non-

associated with

securing these savings inflows.

Figure

2.

Class Analysis

Of A Money-Lending

Financial Capitalist Firm

Value Inflows:

NCR inflow of savings obtained SSCR
from non-surplus value appropriators

interest

payment from surplus value appropriators

TNCR repayment of loans

+ NCR interest payment

Value Expenditures:
expenses associated with securing savings inflows

advanced

to

non-surplus value appropriators

+(X+Y)

X money

capital

advanced

to surplus value appropriators

expenses associated with advancing loans

+Y

Y

i

oan s

any additional

expense

The
subsumed

possibility that a

class

money-lending financial

capitalist firm

both

and non-class revenue generation overdetermines the subsumed

struggle between productive and financial capital. Conditions

subsumed

may mix

class revenues obtained

may be

from supplying money capital

to

class

such that the

productive capitalist

firms are overshadowed by non-class revenues. In this event, the conditions of existence

of the financial

capitalist firm

may become more

tenuously related productive capitalist

firms’ success in securing their conditions of existence.

23

2

'

It is

possible that the capacity

which derives its revenues principally through non-class
be concerned about the wellbeing of productive capitalist firms. A condition of existence
of non-class revenue may be the continued prosperity of productive capitalist firms, as occurs when a
financial capitalist firm makes loans to workers of productive capitalist firms.

However, even

revenues

may

a financial capitalist firm

still
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of the financial

capitalist firm to rely

on non-class revenues

may put

it

in a better position

to

demand

to

productive capitalist firms. However, the pursuit
of non-class revenue by financial

capital

a higher

may also

subsumed

assist

class

payment

in return for the provision

of money capital

productive capital. The productive capitalist firm has
various

condition of existence in addition to access to
firm’s non-class lending

may

money

aid in the provision of

and a financial

capital,

capitalist

some of these conditions of

existence. For example, the provision of funds to
consumers, states and unproductive
capitalist firms

are used to

buy

may
the

ameliorate realization problems for productive capital

commodities produced by productive

if

these funds

capitalist firms.

Financial capitalist firms that provide equity capital to productive capital also have
the opportunity to earn non-class revenue.

may

equity capital

may

able to resell the stock

capital gain

also resell their stock

at a

price higher than

a non-class revenue."

is

far that providers

of

earn a subsumed class revenue in the form of dividends. However, a

financial capitalist firm

it is

We have assumed thus

provides equity capital

is

4

A class

depicted in Figure

on the secondary stock market, and

what was originally

if

paid, the resulting

analysis of a financial capitalist firm that

3. In

the

first

moment of financial

intermediation, a financial capitalist firm that provides equity capital continues to be

similar to

money

class revenue

lending financial capitalist firms, in that they obtain savings as a non-

and they incur

capitalist firms that

24

expenses associated with

this.

However, now

financial

provide equity capital have two ways of expanding value. They

Money-lending financial

bond, appreciates

Y

capitalist firms

may

also realize capital gains

in price.
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when

a debt security,

may

such as a

receive dividends (a

corresponding
that carries

X

with

subsumed

class revenue that obligates the firm
to incur

expenditures) or they

it

corresponding

tiansaction fees etc).

The

initial

Y expenses

is

issued

by

capital

gams

(a non-class

revenue

involved with stock market research,

purchase of the stock subsequently earns subsumed
class

revenues as dividends constitutes an
the stock purchased

may receive

X

expense, since

we have assumed

throughout that

a productive capitalist firm. 25

Figure 3: Class Analysis Of Financial Capitalist Firm That
Provides Equity Capital To
Productive Capitalist Firms

Value Inflows:

NCR inflow of savings obtained +SSCR dividends +NCR cap

j

t al

gains

Value Expenditure:

Y expenses associated with securing savings inflows + X

initial

purchases of stock

+

X other expenses associated with

purchasing stock ~^~Y expenses associated with securing capital gains ~^~Y any additional
expense

The

possibility of capital gains also overdetermines the

between productive and financial

capital.

subsumed

class struggle

This increased diversity of revenue sources

increases the flexibility of financial capital. Such a financial capitalist firm

from channeling money
in the pursuit

and elect instead

on

capital also gains greater flexibility as a result

stocks.

The

possibility of capital gains

on the

sale

productive capitalist firms to reduce the subsumed class payments

25

For completeness,

it

should be acknowledged that financial capitalist firms

firms that are not productive capitalist firms, as

merchant

refrain

to

engage

of capital gains by buying and selling stock on secondary markets.

However, productive
capital gains

capital to productive capitalist firms

may

when they buy

48

of equities

made

may

enable

as dividends in

may advance

equity capital to

the stock of other financial capitalist firms,

capitalist firms, or firms involved in non-capitalist class processes.

aside.

of the possibility of

These

possibilities will

be

left

order to attract equity capital, since stockholders

by

may be compensated

the receipt of capital gains. This possibility
in turn shapes the

between financial

capitalist firms

and productive

overdetermining factors, such as a differences
equity capital inflows,

we assume

that debt

capital. In the

Thus

absence of other

between debt and

to the extent that possibility

capital gains enables productive capitalist firms to reduce
the

form of dividends,

class struggle

and equity capital are close substitutes from
.

in the

low dividends

subsumed

in the tax treatment

the point of view of a productive capitalist firm 26

made

for

this situation affords

subsumed

class

of

payment

productive capitalist firms the

opportunity to intensify subsumed class struggle between the providers of
debt and equity
capital

and thereby put downward pressure on the subsumed class payment made

to

secure both forms of money capital.

One

final

complication

in the class analysis

of a financial

possibility that a firm involved in financial capitalist activity

capitalist firm

may pursue

concerns the

the expansion of

value via the appropriation surplus value. In addition to the financial capitalist

activities

analyzed above, financial capitalist firms often provide financial advice, record keeping,
the safekeeping of securities, automatic

bill

payment and so

on.

These

activities

must be

scrutinized to discern whether they might constitute the production of a commodity, and

so the income generated from these activities would be appropriated surplus value.

if

firm that appropriates surplus value in addition to the financial capitalist activities

26

This principle was articulated in mainstream economic literature by Modigliani and Miller (1958).
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A

previously analyzed would occupy multiple
class positions as both a financial
capitalist

and productive

capitalist firm.

To make

the subsequent analysis

more manageable, we

omit surplus value appropriation in the analysis for
the remainder of this chapter.

Ca pitalist Responses To Support Their Profitability
The Face Of The Keynesian Financial Reform Agenda

Potential Financial
In

Now that we have examined
capitalist firms

some of the

ways

additional

can expand value through non-class revenues,

we

in

which

financial

can anticipate some of

the potential responses on the part of financial capital to the
Keynesian pro-accumulation

agenda. If financial capitalist firms experience pressure on their profitability
as a

consequence of downward pressure on the subsumed class payment required

money

may be

capital, they

may

intensify their pursuit of non-class revenues. In

supportive of accumulation, as

when funds advanced

for

some ways

However, the orientation towards non-class revenues may pose

Keynesian pro-accumulation agenda

away from

The

to the extent that this

this

purposes other than

accumulation support demand for the commodities produced by productive
firms.

to secure

response

a

capitalist

problem

may

for the

siphon funds

the provision of money capital the capitalist fundamental class process.

pursuit of non-class revenues to support financial capitalist profitability can

have further implications

that

may jeopardize

the Keynesian accumulation agenda.

non-class revenues pursued by financial capitalists

capital gains. This

capital gains in the

may

occur

when

may be

financial capitalists

secondary markets for
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predicated on the pursuit of

engage

securities, or this

The

in the direct pursuit

may occur

of

less directly, as

when

financial capitalists

securities

engage

on secondary markets

of view of Keynesian theory,
pursuit of capital gains

in

money-lending designed

for the

to support the purchase

purpose of securing capital gains. From the
point

this

increased orientation of financial capitalists
to the

may have

negative consequences for the stable and vigorous

accumulation that Keynesians wish

to

of

promote.

Switching briefly into Keynesian terminology, the Keynesian
analysis of the

of investment spending

volatility

uncertainty

.

Keynes argues

is

informed by the concept of “fundamental

that investors

must commit

to

long-term investment projects

despite their inability to foresee the future outcome of their investment
decisions.
Investors are compelled to

are informed

by

An

"7

movements

environment characterized by the aggressive pursuit of

can exacerbate the

instability in expectations

decisions

decisions on the basis of expectations, which

a variety of social conventions, including perceptions about

in financial asset prices.

capital gains

make investment

volatility

of financial asset prices, thereby provoking

and further intensifying the

perils

of embarking on investment
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Unlike Neoclassical, Keynesians appeal to no underlying “fundamentals” that govern financial asset

While both theories concur that investors consider the future rate of return on a proposed investment
Keynesians believe that investors have no possibility of even probabilistic information about the
future rates of return on so-called “momentous investment decisions. Thus for Keynesians, arbitrage in

prices.

project,

11

financial assets does not have the stabilizing properties of establishing the correct price reflecting

underlying fundamentals (a

la

neoclassical economic theory), but instead the attempt to profit from short

term price fluctuations can exacerbate price

instability

process. (See Crotty, 1994)
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and thereby

distort the expectations formation

From

a

Marxian

class analytic perspective, the

Keynesian analysis of fundamental

uncertainty and the expectations formations
process implies a contradictory attitude

towards the pursuit of capital gains. The possibility
of realizing capital gains can put

downward

pressure on the subsumed class payment
required to secure

However, Keynesians do not wish

money

the pursuit of capital gains to dominate the
conduct of

financial intermediation to the extent that
productive capital

is

made hostage

vagaries of speculation in financial assets. Although
Keynesians do not

themselves on the precise point
the

subsumed

at

capital.

to the

commit

which the pursuit of capital gains begins

to

undermine

class role of financial intermediaries, the laudable situation
(financial

intermediation geared primarily towards the promotion of
accumulation)

is

usually

distinguished from the undesirable situation (financial intermediation
geared toward
capital gains in financial assets)

speculation

and

enterprise

’.

by reference

to

In the General

Keynes' distinction between

Theory Keynes contrasts
.

“enterprise”, or

the “activity of long term investment concerned with the yield of assets over their
whole

(Keynes, 1973, 158) with “speculation,” or the attempt to garner profits by

life”

anticipating market psychology to take advantage of short-term fluctuations in prices. 28

is

interesting that the

famous passage condemning speculation

in the

General Theory

It

is

followed by a less frequently quoted condemnation of the speculative proclivities of Wall
Street:

Speculators
position

is

may do no harm

serious

when

as bubbles

enterprise

on a steady stream of enterprise. But the

becomes

the bubble on a whirlpool of

Grabel quotes a useful definition of speculation devised by Nicholas Kaldor: “’[speculation
purchase (or sale) of goods with a view
such action
use, or

is

to re-sale (or repurchase) at a later date,

the expectation of a change in the relevant prices

any kind of transformation effected

in

them or

...

,
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the

and not a gain accruing through

their transfer

1999 1076 - 1077 )

is]

where the motive behind

between different markets.’”

their

(in

Grabel

When the capital development of a country becomes
a by-product of
the act i v ie s of a casino, the job is
likely to be ill-done. The measure
Jt
of success
attained by Wall Street, regarded as an
institution of which the proper social
purpose is to direct new investment into the
most profitable channels in terms of
uture yield, cannot be claimed as one of
the outstanding triumphs
speculation.

capitahsm - which

Wads

Street

Keynes

not surprising, if

have been

also

economic growth

is

in fact directed

acknowledged

I

am

of laissez-faire
right in thinking that the best brains
of

towards a different object. (Keynes 1973,

that speculation

for other reasons.

may have damaging

Keynes’ Treatise on

included references that pointed out that a central bank

Money

may

consequences

for

published in 1930,

seek to deter excessive

speculation on financial markets by increasing interest
rates in the attempt reduce the

flow of funds into speculative purposes. Such a policy also
increases the subsumed Alass

payment required
Reserve had taken
sufficient

money

to secure

this

capital.

Keynes was persuaded

course of action during the

upward pressure on

late

that the Federal

1920s, and that this had put

the costs of investment that

it

provoked the subsequent

economic downturn:
Nevertheless, the high market-rate of interest which, prior to the collapse, the
Federal Reserve System in their effort to control the enthusiasm of the speculative

crowd, caused to be enforced

in the

United States — and as a result of sympathetic

self-protective action, in the rest of the world

— played an

essential part in bringing

about the rapid collapse. For this punitive rate of interest could not be prevented
from having its repercussion on the rate of new investment both in the United
States and throughout the world, and was bound, therefore, to prelude an era of

and business losses everywhere.
Thus I attribute the slump of 1930 primarily to the deterrent effects on
investment of the long period of dear money which preceded the stock-market
falling prices

collapse,

and only secondarily

The question of the

to the collapse itself.

(Keynes 1930, 196)

actual orientation of monetary policy prior to the stock market crash

is

29

somewhat

contentious, with authors such as Friedman and Schwartz claiming that monetary restraint was actually

eased after 1927. Our purpose

be

true,

and thus

this

is

not to resolve this debate, but rather to suggest that Keynes believed this to

perception was likely influential

among Keynesians.
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A third

potential response of financial capitalist
firms to pressure on their

profitability concerns a migration
towards the

financial capitalist activities. This

method of increasing value inflows

discussed in the previous paragraphs since
financial capitalist firms conduct their

lending.

The

interest

wheie the perceived

by engaging

in

When

can concern a change

differs

in the

from those

way that

a financial capitalist firm increases in
instances

of money capital increases. Thus

lending to borrowers that seek to undertake activities
that are perceived as

risk

may enhance

comes

their profitability.

borrower defaults

However, with the

the increased likelihood that the borrower

required interest payment, or the

a

risk in their

class lending as well as their non-class

risk associated with the provision

assumption of greater

make

it

subsumed

income received by

risky, financial capitalist firms

able to

assumption of increased

money

entirely, there

capital

may be

may be some

may not

be

lost in its entirety.

collateral that the

bank can

use to defray the loss of the principal ot the loan. However, the conditions
that

culminated in the inability of the borrower

to

meet

its

interest

payment obligations (say

the inability to appropriate surplus value in their productive capitalist firm)

depreciate the value of the collateral backing the loan. For example,

been unable

to appropriate surplus value

any means ot production or
less for the

because of a

if the

may

also

borrower has

crisis in a particular industry, then

securities related to the industry in distress are likely to fetch

commercial bank seeking

to recover its losses

on the defaulted

loan. In a

general economic downturn, the liquidation of all of the forms of collateral backing bank
loans in default creates a general asset deflation, and increases the likelihood that the

solvency of commercial banking system will be jeopardized.
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Defaults by borrowers have the potential
to plunge the financial capitalist
firm
into a crisis. If

many

financial capitalist firms face defaults
simultaneously, this has the

potential to destabilize financial intermediation
generally, as losses of this kind can

persuade savers to regard financial capitalist firms
as insecure places
savings.

Thus

which

in

to

hold

the migration to riskier activities implies a
further contradiction. Because

enables financial capitalist firms to earn greater
subsumed class revenues,

it

may be

it

that

migration toward greater risk will enable financial
capitalist firms to enhance their
profitability.

However,

capitalist firms, this

in the

event that greater risk leads to crisis

among

can destabilize financial intermediation, which

financial

in turn threatens

capital accumulation.

Financial capital

For example, loans

The degree

to

may

which

influence on the

may

also blend various avenues of non-class revenue generation.

be made for the purchase of securities on secondary markets.

financial capitalist

demand

engage

in this

form of lending will exert

conditions on securities markets, which in turn

the volatility of financial asset prices. Financial capitalists

may migrate

may

accentuate

towards making

these loans for increasingly risky attempts to secure capital gains. Securities

may

even be

offered as collateral to support loans to purchase additional securities, which renders
financial capitalists (and the conduct of financial intermediation in general) vulnerable

should securities prices drop and destabilize loan portfolios. The synergies amongst these
strategies can culminate in a situation that

If financial intermediation

is

is

an anathema for Keynesian financial reform.

increasingly conducted in a
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manner

that exacerbates the

volatility in financial

Keynesians fear

markets and compromises the

that the conditions

of existence

stability

for stable

of financial intermediaries,

and vigorous investment

spending will be compromised. While not
opposing the pursuit of capital gains outright
(since

may be

it

money

a condition

capital) or the

of existence

for

low subsumed class payment

assumption of risk on the part of financial

inherent in the provision of money capital),
Keynesians tend to

to secure

capitalists (since risk is

condemn

financial

environments that they perceive have become overly
speculative.

The

potential for financial capitalists to engage in

all

of these avenues of earning

non-class revenues further overdetermines the Keynesian
pro-accumulation agenda. In
the event that this Keynesian agenda exacerbates the
Keynesian master/servant

contradiction, financial capitalists could respond to pressure

engaging

in the pursuit

these responses

on

of capital gains and the assumption of heightened

may undennine

the Keynesian accumulation agenda.

intervention on the part of Keynesian financial regulators that
financial capitalist profitability has the potential to set in

undennine the accumulation agenda
support.

The Marxian

attempting to

manage

their profitability

that

is

risk. In turn,

Thus each

potentially injurious to

motion actions

that

might

Keynesian financial refonners intended

class analytic perspective appreciates the

by

to

enonnous complexity of

these sometimes entropic contradictions. Without the perspective

of overdetermination, Keynesian financial refonns
incongruent regulatory impulses. Indeed, as the

may

New

appear as a pastiche of

Deal financial refonns were being

unraveled in the 1990s, opponents of this Keynesian financial regulatory framework
portrayed themselves as advocates of “financial modernization”, thus positioning
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themselves in opposition to a regulatory
structure that was implied
perhaps even perversely
not surprising the

New

irrational.

to

be archaic or

However, from an overdeterminist point of
view,

Deal financial reforms had multiple objectives
as

it

attempted to

cope with both the positive and negative moments
of the Keynesian master/servant
contradiction.
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it is

CHAPTER

3

THE CLASS ANALYTICS OF COMMERCIAL BANKINGFURTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN THE SUBSUMED CLASS
STRUGGLES
INVOLVING FINANCIAL CAPITAL

Introduction

The second chapter presented
to describe the

New

a generic class analysis of financial capital
in order

Keynesian master/servant contradiction and some of its
implications

for

Deal financial reforms. The third chapter develops the
class analytics of a particular

type of financial capitalist Finn, the commercial bank, to
refine the analysis of subsumed
class struggles involving financial capital that overdetermined
the

As

reforms.

activity

is

Deal financial

chapter two argued, the terms “types” or “categories” of financial capitalist

used

savings in the

distinguished

to refer to the characteristic

first

by

moment of financial

way

in

which a

intermediation.

financial capitalist gathers

Thus a commercial bank

acceptance of deposits, a pension fund by

its

contributions and so on.

The

assumption that financial
activity.

New

Thus a firm

its

is

receipt of pension fund

class analysis undertaken in this chapter begins with the

capitalist firms

conduct only one type of financial

capitalist

called a “commercial bank” engages only gathering savings via

deposits, and refrains from engaging in other types of financial capitalist activities

connected with investment banking, the provision of insurance
Later this assumption

meaning a

is

,

pensions and so on.

relaxed to consider the “diversified financial capitalist firm”,

financial capitalist firm that engages in multiple types of financial capitalist

activities.

1

1

The insurance provision

referred to

is

insurance with a savings element.
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Commercial banks have been selected

as a particular focus of this
dissertation for

a variety of reasons. Historically the
money-lending activities of commercial banks
have

been an important condition of existence
a variety of historically

commercial banks also

and

for the capitalist

fundamental class process. For

institutionally specific reasons,

facilitate transactions in a

has evolved that

it

market economy, and

act as the

transmission mechanism for monetary policy. Because
of the multiple conditions of
existence that commercial banks provide for contemporary
surplus value appropriation,

and because of the vulnerability of commercial banks
inherent
it

in a partial reserve system,

has evolved that the state has a unique relationship with the
commercial banking

system.

By exploring

the peculiarities of commercial banking as a unique type of

financial capitalist activity,

class struggles

subsumed

among

class

we

arrive at a

more nuanced understanding of the subsumed

financial capitalist firms,

payment required

to secure

which

money

in turn

overdetermines the

capital.

The Class Analysis Of Commercial Banking

Commercial banks acquire funds

The inflow of funds
non-class revenue.

that

for subsequent re-lending

The majority of these new

such as individuals, unproductive

For simplicity,

we omit

deposits.

commercial banks receive when they obtain new deposits

surplus value appropriators (in which case the

'

by accepting

deposits are used to

new

loan

capitalist firms or states

the possibility that the

bank makes
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an

is

make

(in

a

loans, either to

X payment)

2

is

or to others

which case the new loan

is

a loan to non-capitalist surplus appropriators.

3

a

Y

payment). However, the "partial reserve
system” employed

legally obliges

reserves.

commercial banks

to

withhold a portion of their

Required reserves constitute a

Y payment

funds must be held in non-interest bearing
accounts

income

that is received

subsumed

by commercial banks when

class revenue (if the

borrower

is

in the

new

deposits as required

commercial banks, and these

for

at the

Federal Reserve. 5 The interest

on loans

interest is paid

associated with acquiring loanable funds. Since

we assume

funds only via deposits, the interest paid on deposits

Y

commercial bank,

to the

Figure

is

a

Y

that

4:

either a

“Y

other expenses”

may

incur expenses

banks acquire loanable

expense. In addition, there are

expenses associated with occupancy costs, salaries and so

other residual expenses comprise the term

is

an appropriator of surplus value), or a non-

class revenue (if not). Banks, like other financial
capitalist finns, also

other

United States

Finally,

forth,

and these and

when

a loan

is

repaid

this constitutes a non-class revenue.

Commercial Banking Value Inflows and Expenditures

Value Inflows:
Abank deposits

F SSCR

interest

loans to non-surplus value appropriators

income from loans

FNCR

to surplus value appropriators

F

NCR

interest

income from

oan repayment

i

Value Expenditures:

Y

interest paid to secure

appropriators

bank deposits

F

X

loans to surplus value appropriators

F(X+Y) expenses associated with advancing loans FY

F

Y loans

to non-surplus value

Arequired reserves

FY

other expenses

1

The partial reserve system is the traditional manner in which depository banking has been conducted.
However, recently some jurisdictions have excused depository institutions from the necessity of holding
required reserves. Chapter six will discuss
to

4

This

is

in

which depository

an approximation of how required reserves are created. In

acquired by trading
portion of each

new

among commercial banks
deposit.

However,

of the banking process and the
5

some of the ways

institutions

have been able

reduce and in some cases eliminate required reserves.

Cash held on

money

this

in the

fact,

required reserves are generally

Federal Funds market, rather than by holding aback

approximation

is

employed

in

multiplier.

the premises of commercial banks (vault cash)
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is

a

standard texts as an explanation

also counted as required reserves.

To

derive a statement of commercial bank
profits, the relevant value inflows
and

expenditures connected to value expansion
are extracted from Figure 4 to
create Figure 5

below.

Figure

5:

Commercial Banking

Commercial Banking

[SSCR

interest

appropriators

]

Profits

Profit

income from loans

[Y interest paid

to surplus value appropriators

to

secure bank deposits

+

NCR

interest

income from loans

to non-surplus value

+(X+Y) expenses associated with advancing loans +Y

ot h er

expenses]

The preceding

class analysis of commercial banking

assumptions concerning both the
is

assumed

that

first

makes

several important

and second moments of financial intermediation.

It

banks access savings exclusively by accepting deposits. This precludes

the possibility that commercial banks might issue certificates of
deposit or commercial

paper, and use these so-called “purchased

make

deposit liabilities used by commercial banks to fund loans
financial capitalists. In order to focus

types of non-depository activities

loans.

These forms of non-

may be

used by

many types of

on the unique activity of commercial banking, these

common

to all financial capitalists

have been

eliminated from the class analytic definition of commercial banking. In terms of the

second

moment of financial

intermediation,

exclusively engaged in making loans.

capital gains

are

made

to

may be

we assume

We thus

that

commercial banks

disallow the possibility dividends or

earned in commercial banking. Furthermore,

both productive capitalist firms and others, so by
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are

we assume

this definition

that loans

we

exclude

any specialized depository
designed

make

to

institutions,

such as savings and loan associations,

that

were

loans for solely non-class purposes
(such as loans to individuals for

residential housing purchases).

The preceding

analysis of commercial banking

is

highly simplified in order to

highlight the unique properties of this particular
type of financial capitalist activity.

However,

seeking to analyze the commercial bank as a firm,

in

we must

confront other

value inflow and expenditures that typically occur
inside this type of financial capitalist
firm.

(i.e.

For example, the preceding class analysis assumed

that all funds

However,
that

it is

extending

on deposit are

either directed to

possible that commercial banks

new

loans

event, the commercial

is

bank

new

may

that

banks are

fully

“loaned up”

loans or required reserves).

leave funds idle if conditions are such

not perceived as lucrative for the commercial bank. In that
is

deemed

to

have “excess reserves”. Since required reserves

bear no interest, holding funds as reserves in excess of the legal requirement
represents

forgone income for a commercial bank. In order to earn income on funds that are not in
use as either required reserves or

new

the form of government securities.

deemed permissible by banking
banks

to earn

having
in a

little

banking

some

risk

interest

crisis the

same

may hold

these funds in

has evolved that holding funds in this form

regulators, since

government

securities allow

is

commercial

income, yet they are regarded as being highly liquid and
for required reserves, since

holding of government securities offers less effective protection
6
).

In the event that a

Required reserves are always accessible

liquidated at the

commercial banks

of default (although they are not a substitute

than do required reserves

6

It

loans,

time, this

may

at face value,

commercial bank holds government

but

if large

amounts of government

reduce the amount that these securities fetch
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in the

securities are

market

for

securities in this

manner, the class analysis of commercial
banks presented above would

be amended. Interest earned on government
securities would be a non-class
revenue, as

would be any

capital gains

made on

the sale of these securities. Another
non-class

revenue would be any repayment of the
principal of the government security.
value outflow side, the

Y

On

the

costs associated with purchasing these
securities constitutes an

additional expense.

A

second consideration

in the class analysis

activities that are typically incidental to

definitional limits

interest

of commercial banks are the various

commercial banking but are outside of the

of commercial banking imposed above. Revenues which are
not

payments on loans advanced by the commercial bank

are

deemed

non-interest

income. For example, any gains realized because of fluctuating
exchange rates
foreign currency transactions

would be recorded

as non-interest income.

that affect

Within the

category of non-interest income are various revenues typically referred to
as “fee

income". Fee income

is

generated by a great range of activities, from fees levied on

deposit accounts (say for the use of an automatic banking machine) to fees earned in
return for the provision of a safety deposit box.

also earned

on a host of activities

As

chapter seven explains, fee income

that are increasingly peripheral to the traditional

commercial bank role of taking deposits and making
class analysis

of each fee-generating activity

production of a commodity. This analysis
fee

income should be considered

government

securities.

Thus

is

loans.

It

would require

to see if that activity constitutes the

forgone here, and

a non-class revenue.

Any

we

commercial banks.
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shall

assume

that all

such non-class revenue will

in the event of a banking panic, funds held in the

securities offer less certain liquidity for

a detailed

form of government

is

entail expenses, but in practice

income they generate. 7
the term

it

is difficult to

We simplify this

issue

match commercial bank expenses

by recording

all

to the

of these expenses under

“Y other expenses

The

class analysis of the profits of a

commercial bank can be created by taking

the class analytic statement of the profits
of commercial banking (depicted in Figure
5)

and adding these additional forms of value expansion

commercial bank. Figure 6 presents

bank

profits.

Whereas Figure

that typically

this as the class analytic

5 represented the profits

financial capitalist activity (that

is

occur within a

statement of commercial

of commercial banking as a

the strictly defined activity of taking deposits and

using those deposits to fund loans), Figure 6 includes the
other forms of revenues and

expenses that are incidental

to the practice

of commercial banking

the profits of the financial capitalist firm referred to as a

Figure

6:

commercial bank.

Class Analysis of Commercial Bank Profits

Commercial Bank
interest

in order to represent

income from loans

gains on securities

Profits
to

~t”NCR

— [SSCR

interest

income from loans

non-surplus value appropriators
non-interest income]

associated with advancing loans

“

[Y

NCR

to surplus value appropriators

interest

income from

interest paid to secure

Y purchase of government

7

securities

securities

bank deposits

+ NCR

NCR

"F(X+ Y)

capital

expenses

other expenses]

For example, a bank employee may be involved in multiple activities during the workday that include
both activities associated with securing the traditional subsumed class and non-class revenue from loans

and

activities associated with earning fee

income.
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Us ing Conventional Banking Data To Conduct

The

A

class analytic statement of commercial

Class Analy sis

bank

Of Commerriai R»nio

profits presented in Figure 6

provides the framework for our analysis in
subsequent chapters of New Deal financial

reforms and their impacts on commercial
bank profitability.
this class analytic

framework requires data with which

An

empirical application of

to assess the

developments

in the

various value inflow and outflow categories.
However, the non-Marxian format in which

banking data

is

collected does not immediately lend itself to class
analytic concerns. This

section confronts this problem

by dissecting

available data in order to reconstitute

them

the

in a

non-Marxian categories used

manner

that

to

format

can address class analytic

concerns more directly.

The

Historical Statistics

on Banking (HSOB) published by the Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has been selected as the primary source of data
used
create a class analytic account of commercial

bank

profitability.

an authoritative source of the aggregate information contained

and balance sheets of FDIC-member commercial banks, and
relatively consistent fashion since the inception of the

this

in the

data

FDIC

data

Of course,

is

the

proxy

for all

US

is

has been collected in a

in 1934.

8

All data used from

chartered commercial banks. In

this

some

not appropriate for a particular discussion, and in that event data

FDIC

has adapted the ways in which

it

considered

income statements

source pertains to commercial banks that are members of the FDIC, but

constitutes a reasonable

8

FDIC

it

FDIC

to

arguably

instances,

is

used

categorizes and presents bank data as commercial

FDIC statistics there
way in which particular items are classified over time. A very detailed
account of the various changes made in the presentation of data contained in the Historical Statistics on
Banking is presented on the FIDC website at www2.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBNotes
banking, accounting protocols and public policy concerns have evolved. Thus within
are

some

inconsistencies in the
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from the flow
of data that

is

Of Funds

published by the Federal Reserve.
Prior to 1934 the availability

commensurate with both

the

Flow of Funds and

Chapters four and five will rely on the Banking
and Monetary

the

HSOB

Statistics

is

more

limited.

published by the

Federal Reserve for this purpose.

The

reconstitution of non-Marxian banking data
into class analytic categories

divided into the revenue and expenditure
components. Table

1

is

summarizes the ways

which the four non-Marxian revenue categories of
commercial banks

in

decomposed

are

and rearranged as the five class analytic value inflow
categories. The aggregated FDIC
data

makes

it

impossible to determine the extent to which loans are

of surplus value versus other
categories

SSCR mterest income from loans

non-surpius value appropriators

and the majority of “other

income from subsumed

“total interest

interest

to a subset

class

and

two Marxian

‘NCR

of the

interest

FIDC

Interest

interest

we have

interest

income”

9

as the approximation of the

and non-class loans. The

final

elements of FDIC’s

income”, namely “interest income on investment securities” and “other

income on trading account

SSCR

interest

assets are not included as interest

income from loans

to surplus value appropriators

appropriators.

66

to

extracted “interest income loans

income: trading account assets”, has been displayed separately

analytic category

income from loans

categories that constitute “total

non-class revenue earned as interest income on investment securities.

'

to appropriators

combined subsumed and non-class

income”. From “total interest income”

and leases
interest

for present purposes, the

to surplus value appropriators

are combined. This

income category corresponds
interest

Thus

entities.

made

NCR

to illustrate the

“NCR non-interest

income from loans
interest

income from loans

to

in the class
non-surplus value

income” is

composed of both

from the FDIC

FIDC

“total non-interest

classifications. Finally

“NCR
in

category “securities gains/losses”.
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income” and “net extraordinary items”
•,

»

•

capita!, gains

on securities

•

is

•

,

...

considered to be the

Table

1:

A

Comparison Of FDIC Revenue Categories And
Class Analytic Value Inflow
To Commercial Bank Profit

Categories Related

FDIC CATEGORIES

CLASS ANALYTIC CATFGORTFQ

Income
Total

•

Interest

Value Tnflnwc

SSCR interest

income loans

Interest

and leases

Income

•

income from loans

income

Interest

surplus value

investment securities
•

Other

interest

Interest

•

Other

income
loans and leases

income

T

federal funds,

NCR

from depository

interest

income from loans

balances due from

non-surplus value

depository institutions)

appropriators

NCR
from

(federal

funds, balances due

10
,

interest

income

appropriators

(trading account
assets

•
to

interest

to

institutions)

income

•

Interest

income

investment securities

securities

Other

•

interest

income(trading
account assets)
Total noninterest

income

•
•

Fee income"

NCR

Other non-interest

income

income

non-interest

•

Fee income

•

Other non-interest

•

Net extraordinary

12

income
items

Securities

•

gains/losses

Net Extraordinary items

NCR

Securities

gains/losses
•

Any

capital gains

on

•

Securities

13

gains/losses

securities

additional

income

14

This statistic was not collected until 1983. Prior to
was included under “non-interest income- all other”.

that,

any

interest

income from trading account

assets

" Fee income includes “service
charges on deposit accounts in domestic offices such as maintenance fees,
activity charges, administrative charges, overdraft charges, and check certification charges”.

(www2.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBNotes)
Other non-interest income includes “income from fiduciary

activities; gains, losses

and fees relating

to

foreign currency or foreign exchange transactions; gains, losses and fees from assets held in trading
accounts; net gains from the sale or disposition of loans, premises (including branches and offices) and
fixed assets, and other real estate

owned;

all

service charges, fees and commissions (other than those

relating to deposits in domestic offices); fees charged

on bank issued

credit cards; net gains

on futures and

forward contracts; and other miscellaneous income”. (www2.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBNotes)
13

This category represents “the net value of profits on securities sold or redeemed

sold”.

less losses

on securities

(www2.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBNotes)

14

Net extraordinary items represents “the results of material events and transactions
and infrequent, net of income taxes”. (www2.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBNotes)
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that are both unusual

The comparison of FD1C expense
categories

is

presented in Table

consists of one of the

deposits”.

The

2.

On

categories and class analytic value
outflow

the expense
side
^

two elements of total

class analytic
category
J
5 J

of the other subcategory ot

Other interest expenses” consists of the

have borrowed, including borrowings

interest expense,

“CX+Yt
1
V Y
y

total interest

to

“YY interest paid to secure bank deposits
namely

expenses associateda with advancing loans

it

on
»>

Consists

expense, namely “other interest expenses”.
interest

expense on funds

that

commercial banks

support their lending activities. Since this

non-deposit source of funds for commercial banks, this
constitutes a

from commercial banking as

“interest

is

a

movement away

has been defined in this dissertation. Thus this category

separated out to facilitate the discussion in chapter seven of
changes in the roles of

commercial banks. The class analytic category “Y
other expenses.
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other expenses”

acts as a residual for

all

is

Tabte

2:

A Comparison Of FDIC Expense Categories And

Categories Related

To Commercial Bank

Class Analytic Value Outflow

Profit

FDIC CATEGORIES

CLASS ANALY'l

Expenses
Total interest

•

expense

•

1C

CATEGORIES

Value outflows

Interest

Other

Y interest paid

on deposits

interest

expenses

to secure

bank

•

Interest

•

Other

on deposits

deposits

15

(^"*"^0 expenses

interest

expenses

associated with advancing

loans

Total noninterest

•

expense

Employee

Y other expenses

Salaries

•

and Benefits
•

Occupancy

•

All other noninterest

Employee

Salaries

and Benefits

costs

expenses

•

Occupancy

•

All other non-

16

interest
•

costs

expenses

Total applicable
taxes

Total applicable

•

taxes

Total applicable
taxes

By

dismantling the

FDIC

categories and rearranging

approximation of class analytic categories,

mainstream data
Marxists to use

to

it is

possible to

pursue class analytic concerns. This

many of the

conventional banking

Other interest expense consists of

interest

to create an

work within
convenient

the confines of

in that

it

enables

statistics for class analytic concerns.

For example, conventional measures of profitability

l?

is

them

in

banking

literature include the

expenses on federal funds purchased, borrowed money,

subordinated notes and debentures.
16

Non-interest expense includes “fees paid to directors, trustees and advisory board members; premiums on

fidelity insurance

and deposit insurance; retainer and

legal fees; net losses from the sale or disposition of
owned, and branches; management fees assessed by
parent bank holding companies; advertising, public relations, and promotional expenses; amortization
expense of intangible assets; charitable contributions; net losses on futures and forward contracts; office

loans, premises

and fixed

assets, other real estate

supplies; telephone expenses; examination and audit fees; charge-offs and writedowns of securities prior to
sale;

and other miscellaneous expenses”. (www2.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBNotes)
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Return on Assets (ROA), the
Equity (ROE), the

ratio

FDIC

reconstituting

numerator of these

ROE

of net income

ratio

of net income

to

to average total assets,

average equity

capital.

and Return on

Since this method of

data preserves the overall totals of revenues
and expenditures, the

ratios

remains unchanged

in

our Marxian analysis. Thus the

ROA and

can also be employed as a class analytic depiction
of commercial bank profitability

(expressed relative to the size of assets or the
equity of commercial banks). This

advantageous

in that

it

allows us to use the indicator of profitability
familiar to

mainstream banking analysis, yet re-present
the class analytic

dynamics

that

U nique Aspects O f Co mmercial

Commercial banks

is

shape

this profitability indicator in order to
discern

it.

Banks And Their Impacts On Subsumed Class Struggles

are unique

among

financial capitalist firms in that they provide

several conditions of existence for surplus value appropriation in
a contemporary market

economy. Like other money-lending
credit to productive capitalist firms

financial capitalist firms,

and others, but

in addition

commercial banks provide
commercial banks also

help to execute transactions and implement monetary policy. While commercial banks

have the capacity

to

be immensely supportive

they also have the capacity to threaten
capital

and by

partial reserve

difficulties

system

in

stemming from

which deposits

commercial banks are vulnerable
entire

to

economy

to

it,

profound

to a

crisis.

to the capitalist

fundamental class process,

both by refraining from providing

money

the other roles of commercial banks. In a

are payable

on demand

to facilitate transactions,

contagion of bank failures, which can expose the

Because of the unique capacity of commercial banks

both support and devastate economic activity,
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it

has evolved that commercial banks

have a relationship with the
firms. This section presents

how

to analyze

state that is unlike that

some of these unique

of other types of financial

qualities

these considerations overdetermine the

capitalist

of commercial banks

subsumed

class struggles

in

order

among

the various types of financial capitalist
firms.

Savings held as deposits play a role that savings
held
not played.

It

in other

has evolved that checkable “transactions” deposits

forms have traditionally

may

be used to execute

purchases. Thus in addition to providing credit,
commercial banks also facilitate the

payments system

in a

contemporary market economy. To enable deposits

means of payment, these

to serve as a

so-called checking deposits are payable on demand.
This

requirement that checking deposits be payable on demand exacerbates
the mismatch

between the potentially short-term longevity of the

liabilities (deposits)

and the longer-

term longevity of assets (loans) of commercial banks. In a partial reserve
system
possible that a bank

may

fail if

it

does not have sufficient funds available

withdrawals of depositors. Moreover, the
interconnection

among commercial banks

partial reserve

failures

may

spread

if the

is

meet the

system creates a web of

since the loans

made by one bank become

deposits held by other banks, which fund further lending and deposits in

Thus bank

to

it

still

the

more banks.

contraction in the deposits of a failed bank puts

pressure on otherwise solvent banks to contract their deposits. The ensuing contagion of

bank

failures

compromises both

the

subsumed

class role of commercial banks (since

it

contracts lending) and the ability of deposits to execute transactions (since checks

may

not be honored if the capacity of banks to settle their accounts with one another

put

into question).
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is

In addition to the provision

of credit and the

facilitation

of transactions, commercial

banks are also involved

in the

contemporary

capitalist

economy. The

in the creation

of money, since any new money acquired by
commercial banks

provision of a third condition of existence
for a
partial reserve

required reserves (so-called high powered

times the

initial

by affecting the
multiplier also

increment
ability

works

in reserves.

loans to be called

in,

economic

by contracting

activity

money) can expand

Thus

of commercial banks

in reverse to

destroy

to access reserves.

for use as

money supply by many

the state can manipulate the

money

supply

However, the money
failures force

thus potentially provoking further bank failures that can
depress
the

money

supply. Since a banking sector in distress

for

cause the state to lose control over the

Since the state

the

money when commercial bank

no longer a reliable transmission mechanism
failures

system involves commercial banks

s ability to allect

is

monetary policy, widespread bank

money

the level of the

supply.

money supply

is

only discharged via

the lending activities of commercial banks, the state and commercial banks have a
principal agent relationship. This principal agent relationship inherent in monetary policy

transmission under these institutional arrangements reinforces the unusual characteristics

of the state's relationship

to

commercial banks. The

state’s

subsumed

class

responsibilities include safeguarding the general conditions of existence of the capitalist

class process, including the availability of credit, the capacity to execute transactions, as

well as control over the

special

among

money

supply.

Thus

the state regards commercial banks as

financial capitalist firms because of the multiple roles they play in
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supporting the capitalist fundamental
class process. Hence commercial
banks are
distinguished

among

financial capitalist finns because the
state has a unique incentive
to

promote the solvency of commercial banks,
since insolvent commercial banks
may
provoke the contagion of bank

failures that

commercial banks. Since commercial bank
state has

compromises

all

three of the roles of

profitability helps to deter

failures, the

an incentive to ensure that commercial banks
on the whole are adequately

profitable lest insolvencies

among commercial banks provoke

a crisis in commercial

banking. While the failure of other types of
financial capitalist finns

of various

may produce

crises

sorts, other financial capitalist activities
lack the particular institutional

mechanisms

that

quotes a recent

banks

bank

compel the

OECD report

state to regard their failure as a

systemic threat.

17

Shutt

explanation of the unique importance of commercial

:

Because of the banks role in the creating money in this institutional context,
it
of utmost importance to the state that banks be sound. A continuous supervisory
role for the state in the area of commercial banking occurs because
banks and their
is

liabilities are

seen as special. They are special because they have the attributes of

Money is the means of payment in a capitalist economy .... And in
order to preserve systemic stability confidence in the institutions that hold these
liabilities is a public policy necessity. (1998, 69)
public goods.

This unique incentive on the part of the state to promote commercial bank
profitability overdetermines the master/servant contradiction

The Keynesian agenda

17

To

state

to secure a

of the Keynesian agenda.

low subsumed class payment

for access to

money

the extent that the provision of money capital is a condition of existence of capitalist exploitation, the
has an interest in the continued functioning of all financial capitalist firms. However, these additional

conditions of existence provided by commercial banking give the state additional incentive to enable

commercial banks
iH

to

continue to

fulfil their

various roles.

Regulatory Reform In The Financial Services Industry: Where Have

No. 67, June 1997.
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We

Been? Where Are

We

Going?

capital potentially jeopardizes the
profitability
to

provide

money

capital

on terms

argued that financial capitalists

of the financial

capitalists that are obliged

that are attractive to productive
capital.

may resist

this

squeeze on their profitability by finding

alternative avenues for value expansion
rather than fulfilling their

providing

money

capital to surplus value appropriators.

to obtain

accumulation. This master/servant contradiction

is

intermediaries in question are commercial banks.

money

capital

it

banking system

that

is

subvert

A profitability squeeze on commercial

state

institutional characteristics

contemplating the implementation of
characteristics

assure that financial intermediaries are

sufficiently profitable that they continue to fulfill their

must also insure

to support

may

Keynesian agenda faces additional complications because of the
unique

of commercial banking. Not only must

class role of

further overdetermined if the financial

banks potentially has additional disruptive impacts given
the

a

subsumed

Thus the attempt

accumulation via low subsumed class payments

of contemporary commercial banking. Thus a

Chapter two

subsumed

commercial banks are sufficiently profitable

protected from the potentially far-ranging

failures.
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class responsibilities;

that the

commercial

damage generate by bank

it

Ih e

Stale

And Regulation Of Commercial Banking Further
S ubsumed Class Struggle Among
Financial
I

O verdeterminanu t»

Capitalists;

Given the unique relationship between commercial
banks and the
that the state has

assumed

state,

it

has evolved

the authority to regulate commercial
banks in an effort to

safeguard the stability of the commercial banking
system. Regulators seek to prevent

behavior on the part of commercial banks that

and the
stability

state also has

some

may

induce commercial banking

crisis,

extraordinary powers that are designed to safeguard
the

of the banking system should

difficulties arise. In the course

of exerting

their

regulatory authority to shape commercial bank
behavior, the state provides commercial

banks with certain privileges
firms.

that are not available to other types

At the same time commercial banks are also subject

of financial

capitalist

to various constraints that

do

not affect other financial capitalist firms. This assortment
of both privileges and
constraints entailed

by

further overdetermines

In an effort to

this

unique relationship between the

subsumed

enhance the

class struggle involving

stability

of a

where deposits are payable on demand, the

partial reserve

state often

state

and commercial banks

commercial banks.

commercial banking system

imposes required reserves

to

protect commercial banks from so-called “liquidity risk”. Required reserves were

conceived as a source of funds

that

would be

readily accessible to meet the

demand of

depositors for cash and thereby deter bank failures. Thus the solvency and stability of the

commercial banking system as a whole

is

enhanced
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to the extent that required reserves

are held.

19

However

required reserves also overdetermine
commercial bank profitability.

Required reserves are funds

that are

made

unavailable to create

requirements constrain the profitability of
commercial banks.

new

By

loans, thus reserve

enforcing required

reserves, banking regulators face the
contradictory consequences of both detracting
from

commercial bank

profitability

(which

is

a condition of existence for the solvency
of the

banking system), and paradoxically enhancing the
solvency of the banking system (which
is

a condition

of existence

for

commercial bank

profitability).

Other financial

capitalist

firms are not subject to this constraint on their ability
to generate income with the funds

they attract in the

first

moment of financial

intermediation, therefore required reserves

put commercial banks

at

firms. For this reason,

commercial bankers derisively refer

a competitive disadvantage vis a vis other financial
capitalist

to required reserves are as a

“tax” on commercial banking.

State banking regulators constrain commercial banking activity in other
to

compel commercial banks

conducive

to the stability

to preserve the stability

to

conduct themselves

in a

manner which

is

ways

in

order

seen as

of the commercial banking system. In keeping with

of the commercial banking system, regulators seek

this desire

to constrain

the risks that commercial banks incur, since higher risk activities are associated with a

greater likelihood of failure (as well as an increased payoff if they are successful). In each

case that regulators constrain the risks undertaken by commercial banks, they also affect

commercial bank

19

profitability

(which reacts back

Paradoxically, the existence of sizable required reserves

to

overdetennine the

may

may

render them
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of the

render them unnecessary, since awareness

of the sufficiency of required reserves dissuades depositors from instigating
diminution or removal of required reserves

stability

vital.

a nin

on the bank, while

the

commercial banking system), and they put
commercial banks
their

non-bank competitors. For example, commercial
banks

at a

disadvantage vis a

vis

are often prevented from

extending a large percentage of their lending
to a single borrower (or even
a single sector

of the economy, such as mining,

This restriction

oil etc.).

is

intended to shield banks from

a crisis that emanates from a single firm
(or sector), however

banks from participating
in that

fully in the profitable opportunities

prevents commercial

when

a

boom

is

experienced

firm (or sector). Restrictions are also placed
on the types of securities commercial

banks are

entitled to hold.

Commercial banks

government

securities that

regulators

that there securities provide

to

it

manage

is

incidental

were judged

to

are often permitted to purchase only those

be of very high quality. The intention of

banks with modest income while enabling them

mismatches between inflows of funds, lending opportunities, and

the potential withdrawals of depositors. Regulators wish
to dissuade commercial banks

from using

their securities portfolio to speculate in pursuit

deemed excessively
bank

failures.

of capital gains, since

is

risky and likely to expose the banking system to heightened risk of

However,

to the extent that the state constrains the profit generating

options of commercial banks, this creates a dilemma for commercial banks

cjuci

capitalist

firms and further overdetermines the master/servant contradiction. Thus the state

perpetually engaged in discerning

how

to

is

balance the risk-aversion inherent in

maintaining the stability of the banking system, with the desires of commercial banks

enhance

their profitability, possibly via the pursuit

risk.
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to

of activities associated with increased

In the event

state is legally

example, the

banks

of a serious threat

empowered

state,

to prevent a

its

of the commercial banking system,
the

to take certain actions

central bank,

may

designed to prevent bank panics. For

act as “lender

of last resort”

banking panic. Since the central bank stands
ready

commercial banks
to lender

via

to the stability

in crisis, depositors are

to

commercial

to supply funds to

dissuaded from instigating bank runs.
Access

of last resort support further distinguishes commercial
banks from other

financial capitalist firms, since

no other type of financial

enshrined mechanism of state support in the event of a
support overdetermines the subsumed class struggle

capitalist firm enjoys a legally

crisis

among

20
.

Thus lender of last

resort

financial capitalists, in that

it

constitutes a competitive advantage of commercial banks
over their non-bank financial
capitalist competitors.

From
banks

But

is

the point of view of the state, the regulation and support of commercial

intended to reduce the vulnerability of the commercial banking system

ironically, the existence

banks

of state support

to increase the risks they take

among commercial
commercial banks

in the

fail.

Of course, many

may

explicitly

a crisis

migrate towards taking more risk in hopes of enhancing their

Thus banking regulators face

capitalist enterprises (including

receive state support

induce commercial

banks. Comforted by the possibility of lender of last resort support,

hope

to

be assisted by the

a perpetual contradiction

inherent in the principal agent relationship between banks and the

20

may

and thus increase the possibility of inducing

profitability if risky activities succeed, while they

risky activities

event of crisis

to crisis.

when they

face a crisis. But

state.

non-commercial bank financial

it is

state if these

which

The

is

state is

capitalist firms)

may

rare that a private capitalist firm has access to an

acknowledged and formalized mechanism through which an agency of the government

central bank) provides liquidity in times of crisis.
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(the

obliged to stand ready to assist
commercial banks to avoid the possibility
of widespread

banking

may

crisis,

but the possibility of this assistance
has the unintended consequence
that

induce commercial bank behavior that

moral hazard

may provoke commercial

crisis.

This

contradiction implies that the particular
principal agent relationship

between commercial banks and the

state

has the perverse result of creating incentives
that

encourage behavior on the part of commercial
banks

The

banking

it

that the state seeks to avoid.

principal agent relationship between commercial
banks and the state creates

the possibility, but not the necessity, that the state
will intervene to prevent a commercial

banking
in the

crisis.

Banking regulators exercise discretion

event of a commercial bank

especially

when they judge

damaging ramifications
to intervene to avert or

by many

factors as

crisis.

Regulators

that a particular

for the

in their decision to offer assistance

may

let

commercial banks

commercial bank

commercial banking system as a whole. Thus the decision

moderate any given commercial banking

crisis is

banking regulators consider the multiple implications

failure, the

at risk,

the

economic climate

makeup of the

in

which the

overdetermined

(the

it

is

that

crisis, in

that state assistance will

provoke very large

who

crisis.

number of

in crisis, the

stand to be affected by bank

before deciding whether to

Although the context of each

particular

important in determining whether state authorities will

crisis is

provide assistance to avert

depositors

crisis erupts, etc.)

intervene in any given commercial banking

commercial banking

have unduly

failure will not

commercial banks involved, the geographic dispersion of commercial banks

amount of deposits

fail,

general the larger the potential

crisis, the

more

likely

be forthcoming. Ironically, prominent commercial banks

crises

may be more

assured of state protection, for the very
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magnitude of the

crisis that their failure

Thus the moral hazard dilemma

might generate makes them “too
big

implicit in state support for

to fail”.

commercial banking may

tend to predispose commercial banks
to increase risk in ways that are
most disruptive for
the commercial banking system, since

any commercial bank

receive support if their failure will provoke
widespread

The moral hazard contradiction
banking system creates the

in crisis is

more

likely to

crisis.

implicit in state support for the commercial

possibility, but not the necessity, that

commercial banks

will

migrate into increasingly risky behavior. Since commercial
banks cannot be assured that
the state will intervene in any given commercial
bank crisis, each commercial bank must

weigh the possible benefits of increasing the

risk they

assume against

their assessment

the likelihood that state support will be forthcoming if
the risky activity
state support is forthcoming, a

commercial bank

fails.

in crisis will face costs in

Even

of

if

terms of the

reputation of the bank and increased regulatory scrutiny (so-called “frown
costs”).

Moreover, an individual commercial bank
than

its

competitors

may be

that

assumes

risks that are appreciably higher

less likely to receive state support,

perceived as pathological by regulators, and because

it

is

both because

it

likely that a crisis generated

an individual bank will not be of sufficient magnitude to compel the regulators
the safety of the commercial banking system ."

is

21

considered in this dissertation

Unless the individual bank

in

is

question

1

sufficiently large that
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its

it

is

as

encouragement of maverick

deemed “too

big to

fail”.

by

to fear for

Thus the moral hazard contradiction

not emphasized for

is

is

it

behavior on the part of anomalous
commercial banks. From the point of
view of state
regulators, the moral hazard
to

problem

is

more ominous

migrate collectively towards more risky

Commercial Banking

The preceding

analysis has

A nd

it

encourages commercial banks

activities.

The Diversified Financial

assumed

in a financial capitalist firm called
a

if

Capitalist Finn

commercial banking takes place exclusively

that

commercial bank, and

that

such a firm engages

in

no

other form of financial capitalist activity.
This type of specialized commercial banking

was recommended by generations of banking

firm

century.

Banking

best insured

theorists held that the stability

theorists in the 19

th

and early 20 th

of the commercial banking system was

by preventing commercial banks from engaging

in

non-banking financial

capitalist activity, especially activities associated
with securities markets.

commercial bank was developed

deposits to fund self-liquidating short term loans

needs ol trade

A

the investment bank,

itself with the

securities

:

(d Arista 1993, 63-64).““

was views

much more

the term

to refer to a financial capitalist firm that facilitated

commerce by using
the

Thus

made

to support

separate type of financial capitalist firm,

as the appropriate financial capitalist firm to involve

risky financial capitalist activity associated with dealing in

“Recognized banking authorities

[in

England] considered] investment

Much of this lending took the form of bridging the time period between the sale of goods and the receipt
of payment, or the facilitation of payment for international trade. Until the great depression, when medium
term lending became more common on the part of commercial banks, this orientation of commercial banks
towards short term lending remained in force. Thus commercial banks were often engaged in the provision
of so-called '‘working capital”, rather than the promotion of long term accumulation.
“3

As

funds

other types of financial capitalist activity have proliferated (associated with pension funds, mutual
,

the provision of insurance and so on) this principal has been extended to argue that commercial

banks ought

to

be precluded from any financial capitalist activity other than commercial banking.
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banking an inherently risky and
speculative venture and, for

that reason, considered

any

dealings in stocks and bonds an
improper business pursuit for financial
institutions
entrusted with the savings of the
general public.” (Perkins 1971.
485)

In order to appreciate the rationale
for prohibiting
in

commercial banks from engaging

investment banking activity, the class
analysis of investment banking

considered.

in that

it

An

investment bank

facilitates the ability

is

somewhat

of productive

distinctive

among

is

briefly

financial capitalist firms

capitalist firms to access

money

from

capital

third parties. Productive capitalist firms
seeking an infusion of debt or equity capital

issue securities and sell

them

to a variety

of financial capitalist firms (pension funds,

insurance companies and so on) or to individuals
and other
firm

may prefer

to obtain the assistance

delays associated with selling
securities underwriting, in

productive capitalist firm
sold to the public.

its

24

below what the

securities

capitalist firm receives its

money

securities

is

when

capital initially

amount of value,

from

plus

between the

forthcoming in part because of conditions

"4

in

from the

securities are expected to fetch

reselling the securities to the public. This differential

buying and selling price of the

the issuing

reduce the risks and

which case the underwriter purchases the

The productive

by

to

However,

Investment banks typically engage

the securities underwriter, and the underwriter recovers this

additional value,

entities.

of an investment bank

stock or bonds.

at a price

may

in

For simplicity, we leave aside the possibility that investment banks underwrite securities of non-surplus
value appropriating capitalist firms or the securities of non-capitalist surplus appropriating firms.
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securities markets, but also
because the issuing firm sells the
securities initially at a price

below the expected market

price. Since the underwriter

selling high, this value inflow

An

investment bank

is

is

expands value by buying low and

considered a non-class revenue from
capital gains

25
.

a financial capitalist firm that conducts
securities underwriting,

together with earning various commissions
and fees for dealing in securities in both

primary and secondary markets,

(as well as earning

on mergers and acquisitions, research
securities for safekeeping

and so on). While

investment bank profitability,
profitability

is

reliant

to investors,

it

is

we

revenues from the provision of advice

supplying margin

will forgo a detailed class analysis of

apparent that in

many ways

on the likelihood of capital gams.

capital gains are easily forthcoming, the

credit, storing

demand

In an

investment bank

environment

in

for securities is stimulated

which

and thus

productive capitalist firms will be encouraged to select
this means of accessing
capital. In addition, since securities underwriters bear
a risk that they

sell securities to

diminished

in a

many of the

may not

the public at a price higher than they acquired them, this
risk

money

be able

to

is

climate in which capital gains are more easily forthcoming. Moreover,

other forms of income that an investment bank typically generates are

indirectly connected to likelihood of achieving capital gains (for example, the

Unfortunately, the non-class categorization of this revenue obscures the security underwriter’s role in
money capital to the productive capitalist firm. In a manner somewhat reminiscent of the class

providing

analysis of merchant capital,

sense that

it

However, even from
payment,

we can view

forgoes a portion of

in the

this

payment

this perspective, the

sense that

it

the

as

coming from

the productive capitalist firm, in the

inflow of money capital which instead

is retained by the underwriter.
payment for securities underwr iting is not a subsumed class
funds come from forgone inflows of money capital and not appropriated

its

surplus value.
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commissions earned via

facilitating trading

degree of mergers and acquisition activity

on secondary

may

all

securities markets and the

be enhanced

in a

context in which

capital gains earnings are vigorous).

This close affiliation of investment bank
profitability and capital gains made
an
important impression on theorists of commercial
banking regulation. Since the existence

of capital gains depends on the vagaries of
securities markets, these revenues are
subject
to considerable volatility. In the

retail sale, the

conditions that

investment bank

may reduce

bank becomes involved

time interval between the purchase of securities
and
is

particularly vulnerable to

the market price of the securities

in securities underwriting,

funds to carry inventories of securities,
securities portfolio

any change

may undermine

commercial bank regulators seek

to

it

is

and

if that

it

in

their

market

holds. If a commercial

commercial bank uses

its

possible that changes in the value of the

the solvency of the

commercial bank. Given

that

prevent commercial bank failures, they sought to

shield the commercial banking system from disturbances
emanating from securities

markets by prohibiting commercial banks from engaging

in

investment banking.

While the prohibition on blending commercial banking with other
capitalist activities is intended to support the stability

financial

of the commercial banking system,

financial capitalists resent having to forgo the profit-enhancing aspects of diversified

financial capitalist firms. Diversified financial capitalist firms can vary their revenue

according to prevailing economic,

political, or cultural conditions that

may,

in a

given

context, advantage one of the various financial capitalist activities over the others.
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mix

Financial capitalist activity involves
information costs, and a diversified
financial
capitalist firm

may be

capitalist activities.

able to benefit

by spreading

these costs over multiple
financial

The administration of bank accounts can
give commercial banks

informational advantages (such as details
about the financial affairs of their
26
depositors )
that

first

may

prove helpful

in the

moment of financial

conduct of other financial

may benefit from

capitalist firms face the perpetual possibility

to

in these

add insurance or pension

Since depository financial

of instant withdrawals of savings, they

may

Of course,

there are disadvantages that

diversification. Financial capitalist firms that specialize
in only one subset of

financial capitalist activities

mote

this diversity.

activities to their firm, since savers tend to
leave funds

forms for long periods of time.

accompany

of the

intermediation, diversified financial capitalist
firms that gather

funds in a variety of ways

wish

capitalist activity. In terms

may

acquire specific expertise or other advantages that

is

diluted in diversified firms. Diversified financial capitalist
Finns are exposed to the

crises that erupt in

any form of financial

capitalist firm is obliged to

compromise the

be vigilant

capitalist activity.

lest

Thus

a diversified financial

a crisis in one aspect of its activities

entire firm.

There are some distinctive advantages

to

blending of commercial banking and

investment banking in a diversified financial capitalist firm. The capacity

to

make

loans

often assists the ability of an investment bank to attract underwriting revenue, since

Lenin remarks that by having access

to the confidential transactions information

of the bank’s

it

clients, the

financial capitalist firm gains informational advantages: “the running of a current account for a given firm

enables the bank - and this is what happens - to obtain fuller and more detailed information about the
economic position of its client, the result is that the productive capitalist becomes more completely
dependent on the bank.’’ (Lenin 1975, 45) Thus these informational advantages may assist financial
capitalist firms in their

subsumed

class struggle with productive capitalist firms.
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enables the financial capitalist firm
to provide debt financing
in the period before a

productive capitalist firm

is

able to issue securities. In their
eagerness to participate in

future lucrative investment banking
revenues, a diversified financial
capitalist firm

even be enticed
itself

to

make

at

high risk of default

with loans

elsewhere

may

questionable loans. Conversely, a
commercial bank that finds

m the diversified

may be

able to use the underwriting
capabilities

financial capitalist firm to enable

issue securities and thereby repay the
troubled

bank

loans.

its

problem borrowers

to

Such synergies between

commercial banking and investment banking are
made more compelling by the existence
oflender of last resort support for commercial
banking. Given the moral hazard dilemma
implicit in lender of last resort support,

commercial banks may migrate

to riskier lending

opportunities, particularly those connected with securities,
if they are comforted with the
possibility oflender of last resort support.

to

only commercial banking

firm

may impose upon

banking

crisis.

activity,

it

is

While lender of last

may

is

intended to apply

possible that a diversified financial capitalist

these supports to assist them in the event of a non-commercial

During the tumultuous unfolding of a

a diversified firm

resort

succeed

in misrepresenting a

one emanating from commercial banking

crisis in financial capitalist activity,

non-commercial banking

activities, or regulators

may judge

crisis as

that the

implications of a crisis in the non-commercial banking aspects of a diversified financial
capitalist firm are likely to

provoke a

crisis in the

commercial banking system. The

possibility that a diversified financial capitalist firm

support via

its

may

access lender of last resort

commercial banking arm can enhance the perceived security of the

diversified financial capitalist firm as a whole, thus reducing costs for the diversified

financial capitalist firm in

its

non-commercial banking
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activities.

The Diversified Financial Capitalist Firm
And The Keynesian Agenda For Financial Reform

From

a class analytic point of view,
the

capital the servant

of productive capital

may be

Keynesian agenda
at

to

make

financial

odds with the organization of
financial

capitalist activity within diversified
financial capitalist firms. If a
diversified financial

capitalist firm is sufficiently large,

it

may

enjoy a degree of monopsonistic
power over

the access to savings, and/or a
degree of monopoly

power over

the provision of funds to

productive capitalist firms. In a situation
characterized by a small number of large
diversified financial capitalist firms that
enjoy considerable market power, financial
capital

may be

able to shift the

capital to the detriment

money

of productive

capital generally, a

extract a higher

outcome

is

subsumed

class struggle

capital.

Thanks

between productive and

to their

class

payment

financial

domination of access

few large diversified financial firms
for assess to both debt

may be

to

in a position to

and equity capital

27
.

This

precisely the opposite of that desired by Keynesian
financial reformers.

Within the Marxian
capitalist firms

power

subsumed

in the

tradition, Hilferding considered the possibility that financial

might dominate productive

capitalist firms

by

virtue of their market

second moment of financial intermediation. His Finance Capital described

conditions in which large and diversified financial capitalist firms grew to dominate

productive capitalist firms that were facing an acute need for large inflows of money

Of course,

such a situation also carries with it its own negation. To the degree that a group of financial
may hold market power in these respects, the incentive exists for new financial capitalist

capitalist firms

firms to enter in order to compete

away

this

advantage.
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28

capita !.

While the sources of funds were arguably
not so

financial capitalist firms in
Hilferding’s

shares

30
.

To

productive capital, they were

money

In the

to

they are today 2 ’, the

both provide loans and purchase

the extent that these large financial
capitalist firms were able to
parlay their

position as the gatekeepers to

access to

day were able

d, verse as

capital

money

capital into a position

in a position to

of dominance

demand high subsumed

class

vis

payment

for

31

in the financial enterprises

described as the

epitomized by

capital provision.

a

.

United States, Hilferding’s concept of finance
capital found

capitalist firms,

vis

J.P.

“money

trust”.

expression

its

These diversified

Morgan and Company, blended debt and

financial

equity

The House of Morgan was one of the leading investment banks

supported the development of the railroads 32 and the
Morgan empire grew
,

to

that

had

have

28

Hilferding argued that years of bitter competitive struggles
and vigorous technological change produced
Germany at that time. The creation of cartels shielded productive
capitalist firms somewhat from this ruinous competition,
but these mergers and acquisitions required large
infusions of money capital. Faced with these exorbitant financing
demands, productive capital became
increasingly reliant on financial capitalist firms, particularly large
banks, while at the same time financial
capitalist firms became increasingly concentrated in order to
mobilize more financial resources.
a rapid concentration of capital in

'’Many of the vehicles in which savings are held today, such as pension funds, mutual funds and
even
widespread use of insurance were not present in the early part of the 20th century.

the

At this time, the lack of a well-developed stock market meant that finance capital often acted as
shareholders in these productive capitalist firms rather than as underwriters that sold stock
in these
productive capitalist firms to a third party.
11

Another possibility that Hilferding considers is that finance capital constitutes not just the ascendancy of
productive capital over financial capital, but the merger of the two under the dominance of financial capital.
For example, he considers circumstances in which financial capital is able to demand seats on the board of
directors of the productive capitalist firms and exerts profound control over
32

its

distribution of surplus value.

_

Morgan’s investment banking activity originally took the form of underwriting securities to select group
of European investors, rather than acting as underwriters for public offerings made widely available. In
addition,

Morgan used

its

own

funds to buy and hold securities. Hence Morgan’s activities represent an

older form of investment banking that gave

engaged

in

way to new types of investment banking in the 1920s that were
underwriting securities for wider distribution.
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significant influence in

commercial banking. 33 Morgan parlayed

ownership and loan portfolio

into 72 directorships in

47 of the

its

extensive stock

largest

US

corporations,

and thereby exerted considerable
influence over both the path of
development of
productive capital 34 and on the
determination of the subsumed class
payments reverting
to

Morgan and Company. Money

was evidenced

in the

trusts

were an increasing object of public

1912 Pujo commission analysis

that

money

hostility, as

trusts constituted:

C0lllmuni ty of interests between a few
leaders of finance, created and
held together through stock ownership,
interlocking directorates, partnerships and
joint account transactions, and other
forms of domination over banks,
'

.

.

,

'

f

trust

companies, railroads and public searches and
industrial corporations, which has
resulted in great and rapidly growing
concentration of the control of money and
credit in the hands of these few men.
(in Meerschwam 1987, 68)

In addition to the possibility that
diversified financial capitalist firms

upward pressure on the subsumed
direct opposition to the

to

class

payment required

to secure

may

money

exert

capital in

Keynesian agenda for a “servant” relationship of financial

capital

productive capital, Keynesians have additional reasons to
disapprove of diversified

financial conglomerates.

To

the extent that diversified financial capitalist firms blend

commercial and investment banking, commercial banking may become
increasingly
animated by concerns related

to securities markets.

For example,

it

may

be

that the

earnings related to the pursuit of capital gains within a diversified financial
capitalist firm

The House

of Morgan did not necessarily operate as a commercial bank. At that historical time, personal
relationships and informal agreements were often sufficient to create alliances between
Morgan and
commercial banks. The partners of J.P. Morgan and Company owned stock (directly or indirectly) and/or
had interlocking directorships in many large banks, trust companies, insurance companies and savings
banks. In this manner, Morgan’s

was aligned with the First National Bank of New York, and by 1912,
Morgan and Company and the First National Bank of New York controlled Banker’s Trust, Guarantee
Trust and the National Bank of Commerce, (see Kotz 1978, 36-37)
4

When the money trust was investigated by the Pujo Committee in 1912, they found that “tightly held bank
control had been instrumental in bringing about large corporate mergers at the turn of the century and that
these mergers had resulted in furthering the strength of the bank’s responsible for bringing these about.”(de
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overshadows the commercial banking
revenues earned by providing
the commercial banking system

may become

gains rather than lending

capital.

To

money

increasingly organized to facilitate
capital

the extent that diversified financial
capitalist firms create opportunities
for

commercial banking

to

become

increasingly oriented to the promotion of
speculation, the

diversified financial capitalist firm

is

an anathema from a Keynesian point of view.
Such

a situation threatens to harness the deposit
base of the
capital

loans. In this event.

gams. Worse

still,

economy towards

given the unique institutional characteristics of
commercial

banking, any crisis that follows a period of speculative
excess
activities

the pursuit of

may be

intensified if the

undertaken during the period of vigorous speculation compromise
commercial

bank solvency. As subsequent chapters point

out, difficulties associated with the crash

of

the stock market in 1929 put additional pressure on the
commercial banking system, in
part

because commercial banking activity had become increasingly oriented towards
the

needs of the securities markets

in the context

capitalist firms.

Morgan’s is credited with encouraging the consolidation of the
and the promotion of the mergers that produced General Electric and United States Steel.

Saint Phalle 1985, 52) In particular,
railroads

of diversified financial
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CHAPTER 4

™

AND SUBSEQUENT REPUDIATION OF THE
NANCIAL CAPITALIST FIRM IN THE 1920s AND DIVERSIFIED
EARLY 1930s
RISE

Introduction

During the

1

920s, the organization of financial capitalist
firms underwent

dramatic transformation as commercial
banks created diversified financial
that

branched into investment banking. While

these

new

subsumed

many

factors

shaped the development of

diversified financial capitalist firms, chapter
four will focus on
class pressures that contributed to this

competitive struggles

among commercial banks

compelled commercial banks

to search for value

phenomenon.

in a

commercial banks

to search out

in the context

First, the

two

particular

pressure of

crowded commercial banking

sector

expansion outside of traditional

commercial banking. Secondly, the intensification of subsumed
commercial and investment banks

capitalist firms

class struggle

between

of the flourishing stock market provoked

ways of earning revenues connected with investment

banking. These subsumed class conditions interacted to compel
commercial banks to

expand

into investment banking,

and by 1927 significant legal barriers

commercial and investment banking within a diversified

to the blending

financial capitalist firm

were

removed.

The

current chapter discusses these

capitalists that contributed to the

subsumed

class struggles

among

development of diversified financial

financial

capitalist firms

during this time period, and explores some of the ramifications of the development of
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of

these diversified financial
capitalist firms on the subsumed
class struggle between

productive and financial capital.
Because the development of these
diversified financial
capitalist firms coincided

with the acceleration of the stock
market

1920s, the chapter considers

how

boom

in the later

the blending of commercial and
investment banking

within diversified financial capitalist
firms in this historical context had
implications for

commercial bank solvency during the great
depression. By the time of the Roosevelt
presidency, recurring commercial banking
crises represented a debilitating
obstacle for

economic recovery. Thus because of their association
with speculative excesses

compromised

that

had

the stability of financial intermediation
in the United States, the architects

of New Deal financial reforms came

to regard the abolition

capitalist firms as a prerequisite for the

of these diversified financial

Keynesian agenda for economic

stability

and

growth.

Com petition

One of the

in

distinctive aspects

the relatively large

in

that

in the

in operation.

in part, a reaction against the

1700s and early 1800s. At

engage

of commercial banking

numbers of commercial banks

commercial banks was,

to

Commercial Banking: The Legacy of “Free Banking”

United States has been
This profusion of

bank chartering process of the

time a special legislative act was required

commercial banking. This element of discretion afforded

to

late

enable a firm

officials the

opportunity to grant entry into commercial banking in return for financial or political
favors. Strenuous

arguments were made

to “'destroy

monopoly"’(in Klebaner 1990, 13) by attenuating the
right

...

the odious features of bank

ability

of officials to manipulate the

of entry into commercial banking. Critics of this chartering system embraced “free
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banking”, meaning the ability of
any firm to enter commercial
banking so long as
satisfied certain general conditions
that

were uniformly applied

to all

market

it

entrants. In

1838, the state of New York passed the Free
Banking Act, and ultimately the
principle of
tree

banking was enshrined by

Until free banking

was

of relative ease of entry

officially

into

commercial banking firms

However,

free

many

states

and

abandoned by

in the National

New

Deal financial reforms,

commercial banking helped

that has characterized

US

Banking Act of 1863.

to create the large

this policy

number of

commercial banking (see Figure

banking often was accompanied by low

initial capital

requirements

7),

in

order to encourage market entry. Thus free
banking also contributed to the proliferation

of commercial banks of dubious solvency and notorious
banking

1

practices.

Following the adoption of free banking, many small banks emerged that were engaged in all sorts of
unsound and fraudulent banking practices. As Hammond describes “ Notes were issued by banks with no
known place of business, and no regular office hours; and kegs of nails with coin lying on top were moved
overnight from ‘bank’ to 'bank’ to show up as cash reserves just ahead of the bank examiners. ”(194 1,9)
The term “wildcat” banking emerged in this period to describe the tendency of these dubious banks to
locate their headquarters in rural areas.
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Figure

7:

Numbers Of Commercial Banks

Prior

Source: Banking Studies 418

In addition to free

large

at the state

Great repression
Depression

banking, a number of regulatory peculiarities also promoted the

numbers of relatively

The United

To The

leniently regulated commercial banks in the United States.

States has a dual banking system, in that commercial banks

may be

organized

or national level. This creates multiple regulatory structures, as the Office of

the Comptroller of the Currency regulates national commercial banks, while
various state
authorities (and later the Federal Reserve to various extents over time) regulates state

commercial banks. Under these circumstances, regulatory agencies compete with each
other to charter and regulate commercial banks. This context of competitive chartering

provides commercial banks the opportunity to threaten to change the jurisdiction
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in

which

they are chartered in order to compel
regulators to match the
permissiveness of rival
jurisdictions.

As Arthur Bums, former Chair of the Board
of Governors of the

Reserve observed in a
laxity’"

later context, multiple
jurisdictions

among banking

regulators, (in

Federal

produced a “’competition

Sinkey 2002, 572) To the extent

that regulatory

competition and the dilution of regulatory
standards facilitated new market
entrants,

fragmented regulatory environment contributed
This competition in laxity also contributed

to the proliferation

to the

in

this

of commercial banks. 2

questionable banking practices that

culminated in the banking panics that were a
familiar feature of the American finance
prior to the

New

Between

Deal.

3

the turn of the century and 1920, the

accelerated rapidly until the total

number of commercial banks

number of commercial banks reached

4

a highpoint of

29,41 7 or a ratio of approximately one bank for every
3,500 Americans. (Klebaner

1990,124) In the tace ol
to the intense

this

competition

dramatic growth, the term “overbanking” was coined to refer

in a

crowded commercial banking market. 3

In their

retrospective examinations of events that contributed to the crisis in
commercial banking

2

For example,

months tollowing the March 1900 decision of the Comptroller of the Currency to
fiom nationally chartered commercial banks to reduce capital requirements for
commercial banks in smaller communities (in order that they could compete with state chartered
commercial banks in those communities), 509 new commercial banks were approved, which represents a
tespond

14%

in the six

to pressure

increase in the

number of nationally chartered commercial banks.

(Fischer 1968, 192 and author’s

calculation)

After the passage of the National Banking act in 1863, there were four major banking panics
(1873, 1884,
1893, and 1907) as well as numerous regional and local panics.

Bank failures, particularly in agricultural areas hard hit by depressed agricultural prices, as well as
mergers and acquisitions among commercial banks, reduced the number of commercial banks during the
1920s.

Of course

among commercial banks varied
banking was enforced.

the degree of competition

jurisdictions

where

unit
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in

each

state

and even by

city in

during the great depression,

overbanking had resulted

in

many banking

authorities

excessive competition

became convinced

among commercial

that

banks, which had

both squeezed the profitability of
commercial banks and enticed commercial
banks

to

incur heightened risks to enhance
their profitability. For example,
state regulators in

Indiana issued a report in 1932 that
examined “indiscriminate” chartering, and
they came
to the

inescapable conclusion that

directly caused

result

of too

by

many

many of the

practices leading to bank failures
were

cut-throat competition which sprang

up

in various

banks”, (in Fischer 1968, 207) The architects
of New Deal financial

reform were particularly persuaded that overbanking
had contributed

banking

in the great depression. In 1938,
J.F.T.

of the banking

crisis

of the 1930s

in

commercial banking had created a precarious
It

was simple

money

to

New

Deal era

which he claimed

6
,

initial capital,

financial

produced an

that the ease

of entry

into

situation:

be a banker. Charters were comparatively easy

necessary for

to the crisis in

O’Connor, a prominent

regulator privy to the high level policy debates
of the
analysis

communities as a

the depository

to obtain.

With

money was

anxious to find a
resting place in return for the privilege of safekeeping
and check drawing. Banks
became too numerous; competition too great; necessity for profit too urgent.

(O’Connor 1938,

7)

While data on commercial bank

FDIC

statistics

on which

profitability is limited prior to the publication of the

this dissertation relies,

some

indications can be found that

confirm that the period of overbanking in the 1920s was exerting pressure on commercial

bank

profitability. In the first

moment of financial

intermediation, fierce competition to

O Connor was Comptroller of the Currency between 1933-1938, as well as a member of the Federal
Reserve Board between 1933-1935 and the first vice-chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.
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attract deposits

depositors.

can exert upward pressure on the

Thus

attracting a given

commercial bank, and
to its

its

Y

Y costs associated with

volume of deposits

is

more expensive

interest paid to

for a

expenses associated with attracting
deposits increases relative

income earned. This trend

is

illustrated in Figure 8. This chart
is prepared using

information published by the Federal Reserve,
and applies only to those commercial

banks

that

were members of the Federal Reserve System
during

numerator corresponds closely
deposits

,

however

to

this

time period. The

our class analytic category of Y expenses
paid

the denominator

is

to attract

only an approximation of the subsumed
class and

non-class revenue earned by making loans on
the basis of deposits. 8 Despite the
difficulties in finding data that corresponds
exactly to class analytic categories. Figure 8
illustrates a

downward

pressure on the profitability of Federal Reserve

the extent that the expense of attracting deposits

those deposits help to produce in the second

was increasing

member banks

to

relative to earnings that

moment of financial

intermediation.

The numerator consists of interest paid on time deposits, interest paid on demand deposits, and interest
paid on interbank deposits. The numerator excludes interest paid on borrowed money.
8

Prior to 1927, the Banking and Monetary Statistics did not distinguish between interest and discounts on
loans versus interest and dividends on securities. Thus denominator used in Figure 8 overestimates the

value of interest income on subsumed class and non-class loans, since
securities.
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it

includes interest and dividends on

Figure 8: Interest Paid By Commercial
Banks On Deposits
Related Earnings From Loans And
Securities
Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics:
262.

As

A

Percentage

Of Interest-

,

Vigorous competition among commercial banks also
profitability in the

to

commercial banks can

result in

provide loans,

this intensified

downward

demand from borrowers. While

downward

cost of securing loans

is

subsumed

class struggle

among

pressure on the interest rate that banks are able

interest rates are

pressure that subsumed class struggle

Specifically, the

commercial bank

second moment of financial intermediation. As large numbers of

commercial banks vie

to

affects

overdetermined by

many

among commercial banks

factors, this

exerts on the

consistent with the behavior of interest rates charged by

denominator consists of interest and discounts on loans plus

securities.
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interest

and dividends on

commercial banks between 1920 and 1927.
Figure 9

illustrates the

behavior of the

average interest rates that banks charged
on loans to “customers” 10 of Federal
Reserve

member banks

Figure

leading cities during this time period.

in

9: Interest

Charged on Customer Loans

in

Leading Cities

Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics
463.
.

Thus overbanking
banks both directly and

intensified the

subsumed

class struggle

indirectly. Intensified competition

the provision of loans constitutes increased pressure in the

among commercial

among commercial

among commercial banks over
subsumed

class struggle

banks. In addition the increased competition to access deposits

overdetermines the subsumed class struggle among commercial banks by augmenting the

10

These “customer” loans are described

as

“commercial loans and time and demand security loans”

notes provided on page 426 of the Banking and Monetary Statistics
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.

in

the

1

costs

of commercial banks

accessing funds in the

first

in the first

moment of financial

moment of financial

intermediation. Since

intermediation

is

of earning subsumed class revenue,
the competition over access
the

subsumed

class struggle

among commercial

a condition of existence

to funds overdetermines

banks. Thus the intensity of
competition

facing commercial banks undermined
commercial bank profitability in both

moments of

financial intermediation.

Commercial B an king and

the Stock

Market

Boom

of the 1920s

Alongside the phenomenon of overbanking,
subsumed class struggles between

commercial and investment banks were also being
transformed by the rapid development
of the stock market. With the conclusion of the

economic prosperity

in the 1920s, the

purchasers of securities.

US

first

public

World War and

the arrival of

became increasingly

enthusiastic

1

Corporate securities offerings mushroomed during the
1920s

(see Figure 10) as public offerings of securities
gained in importance as a

productive capitalist firms to raise

money

capital.

financial capitalist activities that benefited

booming stock market, and

for

This development provoked entry into

from the opportunities associated with the

in particular there

230) to enter investment banking

way

emerged

a

“mad scramble” (Edwards

1967,

activities.

The increased stock market participation of the US public is credited to various factors including the
popularity of wartime Liberty bonds and the increasing availability of securities issued in smaller
denominations, (see Carrosso 1970, 249-250) Carroso states that the total number of shares traded on the
Stock Exchange grew from 227 million in 1920 to 1125 million by 1929.

New York
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Figure 10: Corporate Securities
Offerings, 1919-1941
Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics
487.

As productive
access to

demand
that the

money

for

could secure

made

use of securities markets as

capital during the 1920s,

money

demand

capital

capital during the

for loans

money

new avenues

to secure

commercial banks suffered. Despite the brisk

economic growth of the 1920s, many scholars claim

was undermined

as productive capitalist firms found that they

capital via the sale securities (d’ Arista 1993, 64) or via retained

earnings:

After 1919, corporations of all types, not just railroads and heavy industries,
discovered an American public, now committed to the investing habit, were
receptive to

As

new

securities issues

a consequence of this

new

companies found they were

of unprecedented frequency and dollar volume.

access to the supply of long-term capital,

far less reliant

financing. In addition, high profits gave
that outside

on banks

many

to

corporations such a large cash flow

borrowing was unnecessary. (Perkins 1971, 493)

102

many

provide short-term, seasonal

Substantiation of this claim

is

somewhat sparse

in the literature.

Peach speaks

issue by considering the declining
importance of “commercial” 12 loans

commercial bank

assets.

Currency, he finds that

By examining

among

annual reports of the Comptroller of
the

1920 commercial loans consisted of
almost

in

60%

earning assets of nationally chartered
commercial banks, while by 1925
declined to about

45%

and by 1930

it

to this

of the

total

this figure

had stood near 35%. (Peach 1941, 23-24)

An

attempt to illustrate the degree to which
securities issues vied with commercial
bank
loans as a

means of productive

11. Ideally, a

with the dollar volume of loans advanced

would

illustrate the relative

money

capital.

The former

in

Figure 10.

refer only to loans

I

by

category, securities issued

is

made

in

Figure

to

productive capitalist firms

by productive

is

Flowever, assessing the dollar volume of commercial bank
is

highly problematic. Thus

advanced by Federal Reserve member banks

in securities.

capitalist firms,

13

for purposes

we

will

unconnected

14

Figure

1
1

provides the comparison between the dollar

have not been able to get clarification as to the definition of a
the Comptroller of the Currency during the period.

It

capital

importance of loans versus securities issuance as sources
of

loans to productive capitalist firms over this period

with dealings

money

comparison of the dollar volume of securities issued
by productive

capitalist finns

approximated

capital firms accessing

consists of all corporate securities issued, thus

it

will include

“commercial “ loan

some

in statistics

securities issued

prepared

by unproductive

capitalist firms.

The first difficulty is that data provided by the Federal Reserve does not include commercial bank
by banks that were not members of the Federal Reserve system during this period, and thereby
underestimates the amount of loans
assess the percentage of total loans
total

made by all American commercial
made to productive capitalist firms

amount of commercial bank loans

loans

banks. Secondly, the attempt to
is

impossible. Information on the

made to productive and
unproductive capitalist firms, to other entities, and loans made related to securities markets. The best
approximation of loans made to productive capitalist firms is derived by taking the total loans made and
is

available, but this includes both loans

subtracting loans connected to securities markets.

The

definition of loans
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made “on

securities” also varies

volume of security

member banks

issues relative to the dollar

volume of loans made by Federal
Reserve

for purposes other than dealing
in securities.

As

the dollar

securities issuance increased
relative to the non-securities
related loans

amount of

made,

this

represents an increased reliance on
securities markets and a decreased
reliance on

commercial banks as a source of funding.

Securities

1

f

0rp0rate Securities Issued vs. Commercial

Bank Loans Unconnected

to

Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics
487, 132-163.

Bank Loans Unconnected

to

Securites

“

“ Corporate

Securities Issued

over the time during which this data was collected by the Federal Reserve (loans made “on securities are
defined as loans on stocks and bonds” between 1919 and 1928, defined as “loans to [securities] brokers
and dealers plus “[securities] loans to others” from 1929 to 1937 and defined as “loans for purchasing or
carrying securities “ until 1941).
securities

market

firms, since

it

This figure

By

presenting loans that were not categorized as being connected to

activities, this figure is

an overestimate of the loans actually made

will include non-class loans

is

Federal Reserve

prepared using yearly

member banks

made

to

productive capitalist

to entities other than productive capitalist firms.

totals for corporate security issuance (487)

in 101 leading cities as

of year end. (132-163)
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and loans on the books of

To

the extent that securities issuance

preferred

was

means of accessing money capital,

intensification

displacing commercial bank loans
as a

this

of subsumed class struggle among

debt capital provided

by commercial banks

is

development represents an
financial capitalist firms.

Assuming

that

a close substitute to debt and equity
capital

garnered by issuing securities, the flourishing
securities markets provide an
opportunity
for

productive capital to

through which the

money

process. This intensified

downward

commercial banks against investment banks

capital

was provided

subsumed

to the capitalist

class struggle

among

as the avenues

fundamental class

financial capitalist firms exerts

pressure on the subsumed class payment required
to secure access to

capital generally,

command

pit

and

for their

in particular

subsumed

Comm ercial

it

money

squeezes the interest rate that commercial banks can

class loans to productive capitalist firms.

Bank Expansion
In

Into Diversified Financial Capitalist

Firms

The Late 1920s

The changing context of subsumed

class struggles

among

financial capitalist in the

1920s exerted considerable pressure on commercial banks. The combination both
competition

create

among commercial banks and

subsumed

competition with investment banks helped

class conditions that put pressure

While the assessment of commercial bank
data, Figure 12 illustrates this

on commercial bank

profitability

is

difficult

profitability.

given the available

problem via the Return on Assets of Federal Reserve

member banks between 1919-1929.
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to

Figure 12: Return on Assets of
Federal Reserve Member Banks,
1919-1929
^ ource: Banking and Monetary
Statistics 263-4.

One of the ways

that

commercial banks responded

to this pressure

was by

creating

diveisified financial capitalist firms that entered into investment
banking activities.

The

creation of diversified financial capitalist firms responded to both the
pressures of

overbanking and the intensified subsumed class struggle between commercial and
investment banks. In the context of an accelerating
capitalist activity

boom

in the stock

market, financial

connected with securities markets was particularly lucrative. Thus

commercial banks could respond
financial capitalist firms that

to the pressures

supplemented

of overbanking by forming diversified

their profitability with investment

banking

revenues. Moreover, commercial banks that were being squeezed out of the provision of
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money

capital

struggle

by

securities issuance

by entering

had an opportunity to respond

to this

subsumed

class

the terrain of their financial
capitalist rivals:

seTd

" lreatened ,he eanlin
S P 0WCT of commercial banks and

encouraged
Jncoura^ed'them
them to seek other opportunities
banking functions to offset the reduction

for profit.

An

expansion of investment
a course chosen by
more and more large urban institutions.
(Perkins 1971, 493)
in

loan revenues

Commercial banks had previously attempted

to

expand

was

into securities

underwriting via their bond departments,
but these attempts were curtailed by the
regulator of nationally chartered
commercial banks, the Comptroller of the Currency.

(Carosso 1970, 97) 1(1 To circumvent these
restrictions, commercial banks attempted
organize securities

affiliates,

however

the growth of these security affiliates

constrained because of disputes about their legality
and anti-trust concerns.

1920s

many

state jurisdictions

were becoming increasingly permissive

to

was

By

the

mid

in allowing state-

charteied commercial banks to migrate into investment
banking activities, but these
activities

were

still

prohibited for nationally chartered commercial banks.

commercial banks successfully lobbied

for the passage

By

1927, large

of the McFadden Act, which

enabled nationally chartered banks to fully engage in securities underwriting
via the
creation of securities affiliates.

The passage of the McFadden Act marked

the full-scale

regulatory embrace of diversified financial capitalist firms that blended
commercial and

investment banking.

16

Kaufman and Mote

A

surge of mergers

claim, contra

many

among commercial banks and

free-standing

authorities in the field, that the Comptroller of the Currency

issued no formal ruling in 1902 specifically prohibiting nationally chartered commercial banks from
dealing in securities. However, they claim that nationally chartered commercial banks could only engage in

investment banking activities via the “incidental powers provision” of the National Bank act, while state
chartered commercial banks often had explicit authorization to engage in investment banking. Thus the

more permissive regulatory climate enjoyed by
engage

in

investment banking

activities,

state chartered commercial banks enhanced their ability
and the Mcfadden act was demanded to equalize the status of

national and state commercial banks in this respect.

(Kaufman and Mote 1992)
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to

8

investment banks followed, and by

one or more securities

affiliates.

1

929 nearly every large urban
commercial bank had

(Carosso 1970, 278) These

quickly grew to a formidable presence
this

among

investment banking

securities affiliates

field.

nationally chartered commercial banks
with respect to their

share of bond underwriting.

issued

in the

new

22%

He

of all new bonds

underwriters had

reports that

in 1927,

45.5% of the

Peach

illustrates

mushrooming

commercial bank- related underwriters 17

while by 1929, commercial bank-related

share of total bond issues. (109)

These diversified financial

capitalist firms, or

“department store” banks as the

18
business press of the day called them(Carosso
1970, 276)
have the potential to reshape
,

subsumed

class conditions that

were detrimental

for

financial capitalist firms could diminish
competition

would attenuate

the

subsumed

class struggle

injurious to commercial

bank

financial capitalist firms

would reshape

and financial

among

To

profitability.

capital, since the ability

financial capitalist firms

among

the

commercial banks.

among

If diversified

financial capitalist firms, this

financial capitalists that

the extent that this

subsumed

is

class struggle

of productive capital

possible, diversified

between productive

to benefit

would be diminished. Thus

in a

was

from competition

manner reminiscent of

finance capital, diversified financial capitalist firms offered the possibility that
financial
capital

Peach

might gain the ascendancy over productive

s

actual terminology

is

“all national

bank

affiliates,

capital.

commercial banks and

trust

1

companies”.

Department store" banks earned this nick-name in reference to their ability to meet all of its customers’
The term “department store banking “ was mimicked in the 1990s, when advocates of a return to the
blending of commercial banking and investment banking claimed that financial capitalist firms would
needs.

provide a “financial supermarket” with the purported advantages of “one stop shopping”.
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Diversified financial capitalist firms

evolution

was

cut short

somewhat premature

to

by

fully legal in 1927, but
their

the devastating stock market
crash in 1929.

Thus

would be

it

conclude that the emergence of
department store financial

enterprises constitutes an
capital reminiscent

became

of the

unambiguous return blending of productive
and

financial

possibilities suggested in Hilferding’s
finance capital.

The

overdetermined context

in

capitalist firms differed

enormously from the context analyzed by
Hilferding. For

which commercial banks created these

diversified financial

example, the possibility of relying on retained
earnings, and the spectacular increase
stock market prices (which
easy), are factors

financial capital.

makes

the acquisition of additional equity capital
relatively

which mitigated against the domination of productive

However,

to the extent that the organizational

financial capitalist firm creates the possibility
of

dominance

vis

a

vis

Keynesian agenda

maneuvering

for the servitude

of financial

into a position of

is

an anathema

to the

capital.

attuned to stock market dynamics via their

securities affiliates, this in turn overdetermined the risk profile

lending. In the context of a stock market

by

capital

form of the diversified

productive capital, this organizational form

As commercial banks became more

in lending

in

boom,

there

of commercial bank

were many opportunities

to

engage

of dubious merits. Since commercial bank profitability had been experiencing

pressure, the migration towards increased risk in lending portfolios

commercial bank

profitability, particularly since a

is

one way

to

enhance

crowded commercial bank market and

the relatively easy availability of money capital via securities issuance in the late 1920s

produced intensified competition

for

more conservative lending
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opportunities. Moreover,

the organizational

form of the diversified financial

capitalist firm facilitated
the

opportunities for commercial banks
to incur greater risks in
their lending portfolios.
For

example, commercial banks could use
their lending prowess
investment banking

1

3 illustrates the

affiliates to

borrow money

to

to assist the clients

fund their securities purchases. 19
Figure

degree to which commercial bank lending
portfolios became

increasingly oriented to securities-related
lending as the 1920s wore on.

market crashed, these loans were highly
compromised, particularly
securities themselves had

that

the

19

of their

been presented as

Even commercial banks

that

to

late

the stock

in situations in

collateral for the initial loan.

commercial banks had assumed during the

commercial banking system

When

Thus

which

the risks

1920s increased the vulnerability of

widespread banking

failures.

had no

securities affiliates were not immune from involvement in lending
Funds from smaller banks could often earn a higher interest rate when
on the call market than they could earn by making loans locally. This

related to the securities markets.

funneled to New York and lent
development was viewed in retrospect as pathological by New Deal financial reformers who regarded this
behavior on the part of regional commercial banks was draining money capital from productive capitalist
firms around the country.
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Figure 13: Commercial Bank
Loans

Commercial Bank Loans 20
Source; Banking and Monetary

Made On

Statistics

As

A

Percentage

Of Total

132-163.

The Commercial Banking

The 1929 stock market crash and

Securities

Crisis In

The Early 1930s

the persistence of the subsequent

economic

stagnation proved disastrous for commercial banks. Given
that the loan portfolios of

commercial banks were increasingly affected by the fortunes of the stock market,

the

precipitous drops in securities prices had important implications for
commercial banking.

Defaults on loans (especially those connected with securities), together with the

devaluation of the collateral backing those loans (often the securities themselves),
contributed to an acute crisis in commercial banking. Moreover, the great depression that

All data from this source pertains to banks that are Federal Reserve

Ill

System members.

followed the stock market crash
intensified the problems faced
by commercial banks.
Defaults on loans unconnected to
securities rose as general
economic stagnation
continued, and

demand

banks from earning
culminated

in

for

their

new

way

loans

slack, thus further preventing

commercial

out of their difficulties. These
disastrous circumstances

an acute profitability

Assets hovered between .99% and

by 1933 (see Figure

was

crisis for

1

.

1

9

commercial banks. While the Return on

% throughout the

1

920s,

it

had dipped

to -1

.07%

14).

Figure 14. Return on Assets of Federal
Reserve Member Banks 1929-39
Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics 263-4.
.

The

crisis

among commercial banks culminated

of financial intermediation, which

downward

spiral

was generated

in general

in turn intensified the

in the process

economic depression.

as depositor nervousness
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breakdown

A

provoked bank runs, which

in

tun,

produced bank

failures,

which

further

undermined depositor confidence.
State and

nationally chartered commercial
banks in operation dropped from
29,258 in 1929 to
1

5,021 by

1

934.

As bank

failures destroyed deposits 21

,

this

depressed the

money

supply,

thus further exacerbating the
economic downturn. In addition, the
instability of the

banking sector compromised transactions
the economy, which further
inflamed depositor
panic. This process culminated in
the decline in the deposit base of
commercial banks
until the

passage of the

of this cascading

New

Deal financial reforms

in

1933 (see Figure

crisis in financial intermediation,
surviving

15). In the

midst

commercial banks

increasingly began to hold excess reserves
as protection against bank runs. This
in turn
further

for

compromised

the ability of commercial banks to act
as a transmission

monetary policy. Despite attempts on the

high powered

money

About

of the Federal Reserve

to increase the

available in the banking system, the increased
holdings of excess

reserves had devastating impacts on the

7 billion in deposits

Glass-Steagall Act.

part

mechanism

were

lost

(Compton 1987,

due

to

money multiplier. 22

bank

failures in the five year prior to the passage

of the

11)

In the event that

commercial banks hold excess reserves, the money multiplier is compromised, and
the Federal Reserve has reduced impact on the money supply,
d’ Arista notes the prevalence of this problem in 1932. (d’ Arista
1993, 163) Friedman and Schwartz argue
that from August ot 1929 to March ot 1933, the change in High powered-money
should have produced a
rise in the stock of money of 17.5%. However, as the widely used formula for the
money multiplier (see
below) illustrates, a rise in the currency deposit ratio (reflecting withdrawals of currency from bank
additional high

powered money provided by

accounts) and a rise in the excess reserve to deposit ratio (reflecting increased commercial bank holding of
excess reserves during a time of banking panics) produced a drop in the money stock of 35% despite the
increase in high powered-money. (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 332-333)

money

multiplier

where c/d

is

= [1+

c/d]/ [rr

currency deposit

+

er/d

+

c/d]

ratio, rr is the

required reserve ratio and er/d

reserve deposit ratio
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is

the excess

F UreS 0f Federal Reserve Member
Commercial Banks
Tn^iVn
Total
Federal Reserve Member Commercial
1

^

Banks, 1919-1933

Source: Banking Studies 418-419.
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As

A

Percentage

Of

Figure 16: Bank Deposits, Federal
Reserve
(deposits measured at year-end call
date)
Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics

Member Banks

1920-1941

72-75.

As

this situation spiraled

downward, the perverse implications of this

crisis in

commercial bank

profitability mitigated against the use

for other reasons.

Before the Banking Act of 1933, commercial banks paid

demand

of expansionary monetary policy
interest

deposits. This represented a serious burden to commercial banks at a time

substantial loan losses and a dearth of new lending opportunities

revenues to pay interest to depositors. In response
liquidity in the event

term government

comprised

50%

to this

made

dilemma, and

of banking panics, banks had increasingly shifted

securities.

By

it

on

when

difficult to earn

to

enhance

their

into holding short-

1932, “investments” (mostly in government securities)

of bank earning portfolios among members of the Federal Reserve
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System. (Epstein and Ferguson
1984, 969) The interest paid on
these securities
represented a non-class revenue that
enabled commercial banks to
pay the interest owing

on

their

demand

deposits.

However,

this situation created

expansionary monetary policy. According
briefly

to Epstein

experimented with open market operations

unintended result of

this policy

was

to further

commercial banks succeeded

to

and Ferguson, the Federal Reserve

to increase the

money

supply, hut the

squeeze bank profits by diminishing banks’

earnings on their government securities. 23
Alarmed
profits,

an important obstacle

at this

in pressuring the

additional burden to their

Federal Reserve to abandon

expansionary monetary policy. Epstein and Ferguson
argue that Keynes was aware of the
desperate reliance of commercial banks on their
earnings from government securities, and
its

perverse implications for monetary policy. They claim
that

Keynes declared

Member Banks

that ”... in the United States the fear

lest

money

of the [Federal Reserve System]

policy. ”(in Epstein

early 1933 the commercial banking system

10% of the

is

an obstacle to the

and Ferguson 1984, 95 7) 24

was undeniably

Runs on commercial banks reached such epidemic proportions
that close to

for this reason that

is

they should be unable to cover their expenses

adoption of a wholehearted cheap

By

it

that

in

profound disarray.

it

has been estimated

nation’s deposits were being withdrawn per week. (Klebaner

23

Epstein and Ferguson state that rates on short term Treasury notes dropped from 3.4% in 1929 to 0.34
%.
1932. (1984, 970) They claim that, as interest rates fell, commercial banks were unable to realize capital
gains from these government securities because of the shortness of the banks’ portfolios, (ibid.)
in

Epstein and Ferguson conclude with a remark on the dilemma faced by the Federal Reserves because it
must insure that the agents of monetary policy, commercial banks, must be profitable to operate in their
capacity as the transmission

mechanism of monetary

“As Keynes alone seems to have recognized,
may fail to drop low enough to revive and
economy because bank earnings might not permit it in an acute Depression. Moreover contemporary
students of money and banking have not reconciled a fundamental problem of the current system of bank
regulation: that the Federal Reserve system is charged with performing two often incompatible tasks - that
policy:

the capitalist organization of finance implies that interest rates

,

of advancing the interests of specific industry while simultaneously overseeing the protection of other
at a large”. (1984, 982-983)

business and the public
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1974, 133)

New

The

York and

unsustainability of this situation
Illinois

was made

explicit

when

the states of

suspended banking operations on the
eve of Roosevelt's

inauguration on Saturday

March

4,

1933. In anticipation of the

domino

effect that this

announcement would have on commercial banking
nationwide, Roosevelt declared
national

bank holiday on March

through March

13.

Faced with

5 until

March

9,

a

which was subsequently extended

this virtual cessation

of financial intermediation, dramatic

banking reform became an urgent priority of the
incoming Roosevelt administration.

— e Emerg ing Critique Of Di versified Financial Capitalist Finns
In

view of the

administration

virtual collapse

was obliged

to devise a regulatory

to take

The Early 930s
1

of the commercial banking system, the Roosevelt

immediate action

framework intended

to

to stabilize

how

in

best to address the devastation of

financial capitalist firm

Senator Carter Glass, a recognized authority

commercial banking, and

prevent the recurrence of such calamities

the future. In the midst of this debate concerning

commercial banking, the diversified

In

came under

in financial matters

owing

intense scrutiny.

to his role in the

creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913, argued that the blending of
commercial

and investment banking within a single financial
activity

on the part of commercial banks, which

capital firm

in turn

promoted speculative

undermined the solvency of the

commercial banking system. Glass had been arguing since the

late

1920s that the

investment banking concerns had contaminated the banking system with “stock

gamblers"

who

diverted commercial banking

away from

the “legitimate needs of

business”. (Perkins 1971, 499) In order to re-orient financial intermediation to the support

of economic growth rather than speculation, Glass became a leading spokesperson
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calling

for the abolition

of diversified financial

capitalist firms as a central

component of the

repair of American finance.

Glass and other

critics

of diversified financial

critique of diversified financial capitalist
firms

on the

capitalist firms often focused their

conflicts

of interest inherent

blending commercial and investment banking
within a single firm. They charged
these conflicts of interest created incentives
for commercial banks to

make

in

that

questionable

loans to enhance the price of securities with
which they (or their securities affiliates) were
involved. This might take the form of advancing
dubious loans to productive capitalist
firms in an attempt to attract underwriting business.
In the context of an euphoric stock

market, productive capitalist firms whose public offerings
of stock might not otherwise

be attractive

to prospective shareholders

were encouraged

to bring issues

securities to market. In these situations, an infusion of debt
capital

enhance the appearance of productive

functions)

often helpful to

capitalist firms prior to the execution

public offering. Despite the doubtful merits of these
lucrative revenues ensuing

is

of their

initial loans,

it

of their

was hoped

that the

from securities underwriting (and other investment banking

would justify the

additional risk taken in the commercial banking arm’s loan

portfolio.

These conflicts of interest between commercial and investment banking had
further implications

emerged

which also undermined commercial bank solvency. For example,

that investment advice given to

enterprises

was highly

suspect.

it

customers of these department store financial

Customers were sometimes persuaded
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to

purchase highly

questionable securities without
adequate disclosure of the
financial enterprise’s
relationship to the securities in
question (as

involvmg the National City Company).

was

If the

the case in

some of the debacles

commercial banking arm of the

financial

enterprise advanced loans to
facilitate the purchase of these
securities, this contributed
to
the further deterioration of the
quality of the

commercial bank’s loan

Furthermore, as stock market difficulties
devastated the securities

banks were often compelled
affiliates. Critics

to

make

questionable loans

in

portfolio.

affiliates,

an attempt

commercial

to rescue their

of the blending of commercial and
investment banking claimed

that

these conflicts of interest culminated in
the increasing riskiness of loan
portfolios which

increased the vulnerability of the commercial
banking system to bank failures.

Condemnation of the blending of commercial and investment
banking was
intensified

by

the

growing public awareness of the notorious

in diversified financial capitalist firms.

failures, that

One of the most

of the Bank of the United States

in

activities that

had occurred

sensational early banking

December 1930, was

attributed to the

nefarious activities which were largely carried on through
the bank’s securities
(Perkins 1971, 496-497)

conduct prevalent

in

The Gray-Pecora hearings (1932-1934) exposed

by

Bank

and predecessor of today’s Citigroup) and
largest investment

dubious and possible

bank

in

the combination of commercial and investment

banking. For example, National City

US’s

the duplicitous

even the largest and most prestigious financial enterprises thanks,

part, to the opportunities created

(the

affiliates.

(the world's

its

second largest bank

at

securities affiliate, National City

in the late 1920s) stood publicly accused of

illegal practices

stemming from
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the time

Company
all

sorts

of

their diversified financial capitalist

activity.

25

At the conclusion of the hearings,
one famous columnist of the
period

declared that “ The only thing that

some of our

great financial institutions
overlooked

during the years of boom was the
installation of a roulette-wheel
for the convenience of
depositors.”, (in Carosso 1970,
330)

C ritiques Of Speculation And The New Dea

The Roosevelt administration came
act

on

growing

this

to

l

Coalition For Financial Reform

power when

critique of financial capital to

it

was

implement an ambitious program of

financial refonns. Diversified financial
capitalist firms, tainted

the reviled money-trust,

heterogeneous group

common

became emblematic of the most

Under these circumstances,

financiers.

to support

New

the

New

was not required
speculation

in

would

An

explicit

order to support

by

their association with

recent examples of the abuses of

Deal could bring together a

Deal financial reform, in part because of their

desire to reap political advantages

animosity towards financiers.

politically feasible to

New

by championing

commitment

the

growing public

to the principles

of Keynesianism

Deal financial refonns, since a

suffice to secure support for the early

vilification

Banking Acts passed by

of

the

Roosevelt administration. Thus proponents of New Deal financial refonns
included those

25

For example, National City

Cuban Sugar

loans

by

Company

rescued the parent bank from the consequences of its disastrous

company to investors who were not apprised of the
dubious quality of these stocks. The proceeds of this public offering allowed National City Bank to avoid a
large loan loss (Pecora 1939, 122), but left stock-holders with next to nothing. Its questionable securities
underwriting included bonds issued by borrowers that were earlier described by bank officials as “lax,
selling stock in the failing sugar

negligent and entirely uninformed about the responsibilities of a long-term borrower”(Carosso 1970, 330),
National City was also suspected of manipulating copper prices to protect itself from losses on the large

amount of Anaconda Copper Company stock

it

held. (Kotz 1978, 51)
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who espoused Keynesianism
commitment

to (or perhaps

as this

body of theory was evolving,
and those with

even awareness

of)

little

Keynesian princtples who nevertheless

found their particular agendas provisionally
26
coinciding with the Keynesian
goals.

Roosevelt offered himself as the public
champion of this denunciation of the
speculative excess of finance, claiming in
his inaugural address that the
‘'unscrupulous

money-changers" have "fled from

Kennedy 1973,
the hearts and

and

now stood

minds of men’”,

crisis affecting

1920s

153),

their high seats in the

(in

temple of our civilization”

“’indicted in the court of public opinion,
rejected by

Carosso 1970, 335) Roosevelt explicitly linked
the

commercial banking with the excessive speculation by
bankers

in his “fireside

(in

in the

chat” of March 12, 1933.

We had

a bad banking situation. Some of our bankers
had shown
themselves either incompetent or dishonest in their handling
of the people’s funds.
They had used the money entrusted to them in speculations and
unwise loans. This
was, of course, not true in the vast majority of our banks, but
it was true in enough
of them to shock the people for a time into sense of insecurity and
to put them into
a frame of mind where they did not differentiate, but
seemed to assume that the acts
ot a comparative tew had tainted them all. It was the
government’s job to
straighten

out this situation and do

Roosevelt

who had
Party

s

it

as quickly as possible, (in

Krooss 1969, 2711)

anti-finance rhetoric also garnered the support of some progressives

longstanding animosity towards financial capital. For example, the Socialist

was publicly demanding

the outright nationalization of American banking” 27 and
,

was thus heartened when rumors abounded

that the nationalization

of banks was a

Carter Glass, for example, dissented from Keynesian theory in many respects, to the extent that he turned
Roosevelt’s offer of the position of Secretary of the Treasury, in part because of Glass’s concerns

down

about the inflationary implications of unbalanced government budgets. (See Burns 1974, 102-104)
~7

Norman Thomas,

in the

New

York Times, 20 August, 1933. (quoted
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in

Kennedy 1973, 168)

possibility being considered

by the Roosevelt administration. 28
Despite

that the nationalization threat

may have been

comply with Roosevelt's reforms
credibility

calculated to persuade the banking
titans to

as the lesser of two evils, officials
of considerable

were making dramatic statements

nationalization. Albert

the possibility

that

Agnew, General Counsel

openly promoted the possibility of
for the Federal

Reserve Bank of San

Francisco, warned ominously from the
pages of a banking periodical. “’Either the

bankers of this country will realize that they
are guardians of the moneys committed
their charge,

and

will

conduct themselves accordingly, or banking will
cease

private enterprise and will

The

become

to

to

be a

a purely government function. ’’’(in Burns
1974, 73)

anti-finance sentiment of the early 1930s created
opportunities for the

Roosevelt administration to intervene in the re-organization
of the financial sector in

ways

that

might have been considered

towards finance. At the same time,

redemption of finance thanks

far too invasive in the

this vilification

to the

absence of public animosity

of finance (and the subsequent

remedial efforts of New Deal financial reforms)

served another political agenda. The American public was provided
with the cathartic
benefits of having a villain to revile.

ills

of the 1930s

By

explicitly or implicitly attributing the

to the speculative proclivities

of diversified financial

of unrestrained financial capital more generally, productive
responsibility for these

economic hardships. Thus

capitalist class process

from any responsibility

New

for the

capital

economic

capitalist firms,

and

was exculpated from

Deal reform could exonerate the

economic misery of the

great

According to Rexford Tugwell’s biography, brain-trusters had briefly considered “[a] new banking
system that would take out of private hands the creation of a nations’ vital medium of exchange.” (in Burns
1974, 112)
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depression by catalyzing publ.c anger
towards the suspicion of financial
capital. The

Deal could claim

to herald the

constrained to perform
subject of debate, the

its

New

dawn of a

better capitalism, provided that
finance

rightful role. Capitalist exploitation
per se

Deal sought only

to

was never

New

was

the

secure the conditions for capitalist

exploitation to proceed.

While

it is

not surprising that the Roosevelt administration
failed to scrutinize the

capitalist class process in its attempt to
deal with the

depression,

it

exploitative

is

another matter that

economic calamity of the

leftists also failed to register the

economic system prominently among

their

great

opposition to an

demands. By focussing on

questions of private ownership of financial capitalist firms,
the concentration of financial

power, or the possibilities of the centralized planning of
credit allocation,
able to occupy the

left

extremes of a spectrum of public debate concerning these

Despite winning some concessions to their demands
nevertheless engaged in a debate

se.

Demands

debate, either

were not portrayed

the spokespeople of the

regarded themselves as

critics

in these debates, leftists

whose terms precluded

for class transformation

by

leftists

New

issues.

were

the critique of exploitation per

as a legitimate part of the public

Deal or by the

leftists

of the prevailing economic system.
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were

who

otherwise

CHAPTER

5

the contradictory imperatives
of new deal financial reforms

T he

Contradictory

I

mp eratives

of New Deal Financial Reform

Faced with the imminent collapse of
the commercial banking system,
and the general

economic devastation of the great depression,

New Dealers

were obliged

to wrestle

with

contradictory imperatives in order to
reorganize American finance to secure
the

conditions of existence for the Keynesian
pursuit of economic growth and
the

one hand, the commercial banks urgently
required supports

stability.

On

to their profitability in

order to alleviate the banking failures
that threatened the conduct of domestic
financial
intermediation.

money
class

On

the other hand, the Keynesian accumulation
agenda required that

capital should

flow

to productive capitalist firms in return for
a

payment. This accumulation agenda, summarized as the
idea

should act as servant to productive capital, was
potentially

of enhancing the profitability of commercial banks. Thus

low subsumed

that financial capital

in conflict

New Deal

with the necessity

financial reformers

were confronted with the urgent necessity of securing two of the
conditions of existence
for stable

money

and vigorous accumulation, namely stable financial intermediation and
cheap

capital,

which were potentially

in diametric opposition to

one another.

This contradiction between the Keynesian accumulation agenda and the necessity

of promoting commercial bank profitability

is

a specific instance of the master/servant

contradiction discussed in chapter two. In chapter two, the master/servant contradiction
implicit in the

Keynesian agenda referred

to the possibility that financial capital,
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when

obliged to provide

from

this

money

subsumed

capital in return for

class role

low subsumed

by finding altemafives uses

class payments,

for the funds a. their
disposal.

In the context of the current
chapter, the master/servant
contradiction

by the devastating banking conditions
during

might rebel

the great depression.

is

overdetermined

The danger of the

collapse of the commercial banking
system meant that the restoration of
commercial bank
profitability

more

was

a condition of existence for the
continuation

of financial intermediation

generally. In this sense, this situation
represents an extreme manifestation
of the

master/servant contradiction. Because of the
possibility that commercial banks might

cease to perform their subsumed class
responsibilities entirely, financial capital
(in this
case commercial banks) could not act as
servant to productive capital unless measures

were taken

to attend to the welfare

of the servant.

New Deal

financial reforms

had

to

contend with the possibility that the domination
of the master by the servant would make
the servant relationship unsustainable, and
thereby

make

the master relationship

unsustainable as well.

Under these circumstances,

New

Deal financial reforms were animated by the

contradictory the necessity of both enhancing commercial bank
profitability (to safeguard
the stability of the commercial banking system) and constraining
commercial bank
profitability (as a

capital).

consequence of securing the conditions of existences of cheap money

This chapter argues that the Glass-Steagall Act, in combination with certain

other regulatory provisions in the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935, attempted to
these contradictory imperatives that animated the

New

Deal financial reform agenda.

re-organizing the class character of financial capitalist firms in the context of a
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manage

new

By

set

of

commercial banking regulations, financial
reformers attempted

to address

both the

imperative of commercial bank
profitability and the imperative
of the availability of

cheap money capital

support accumulation.

to

This chapter provides a Marxian class
analysis of the ways in which
selected
provisions of this

New

agenda. In doing so

Deal financial legislation addressed

we

highlight

financial capitalist films. In

some

financial capitalists in the second

were interventions

how these measures

complex

moment of financial

capitalists. In other respects, these

reshaped competition among

subsumed

class struggle

among

financial

reforms reshaped competition

among

financial

moment of financial

intermediation. In this case, these interventions

were overdeterminants of the conditions of existence of subsumed

The

New Deal

financial reforms constituted a

regulatory provisions that addressed both

attempt to

manage

among

intermediation, thus these reforms

were not directly addressing subsumed class struggle among
financial

financial capitalists.

financial reform

respects these reforms addressed competition

that directly affected

capitalists in the first

this

moments of financial

capitalists, but

class struggle

amons

complex mixture of

intermediation in the

the contradictory imperatives involved in securing the conditions of

existence for both commercial bank profitability and the availability of cheap
capital.
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money

The Banking Act of June

16,

1933 constituted the

first

Roosevelt administration to reform the
conduct of financial
United States.
to

be referred

1

One of the Banking

major

initiative

of the

capitalist activity in the

Act's most prominent provisions
was what has

to as the Glass-Steagall Act. 2

The Glass-Steagall Act

is

come

not an act perse,

but certain subsections of the Banking
Act of 1 933. Section 20 of the Act
required

commercial banks belonging
securities affiliates within

Steagall sections

to the

one

Federal Reserve System to divest themselves
of their
3

year.

This provision,

in

combination with the other Glass-

4
,

effectively ended the combination of
commercial and investment

banking within a financial

capitalist firm in the

prompt dismantling of prominent diversified

United States. 3 Glass-Steagall forced the

financial capitalist firms, such as JP

The Banking Act of 1933 was preceded by the Emergency
Banking Act of March
proclaimed the National Banking Holiday), however that act
was motivated to

9,

1933 (which

contain the banking crisis

rather than to institute structural reforms.

The Glass-Steagall Act discussed below should not be confused by
the earlier Glass-Steagall Act of
February 1932, which instituted some amendments to the Federal
Reserve Act concerning rediscounting
practices at Federal Reserve banks.
{n}o member bank shall be affiliated in any manner... with any corporation,
association, business trust,
or other similar organization engaged principally in the issue,
flotation, underwriting public sale, or
distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation
of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or
other securities.’” (in Kross 1969, 2760)
,

Section

own

6 prohibited commercial banks from purchasing equities and underwriting securities on
behalf (with the exception of US Treasuries and general obligations of states and political
1

their

subdivisions), section 21 prohibited investment banks from accepting deposits, and
section 32 prohibited
interlocking directorates between commercial banks and investment banks.

Glass advocated for the separation of commercial and investment banking, while Steagall supported

The compromise between these agendas allowed both issues to be dealt within the
Banking Act of 1933. However the appellation “Glass-Steagall Act” for the sections of the Act that
separated commercial and investment banking is ironic in that the deposit insurance issues pressed by
deposit insurance.

Steagall are actually dealt with elsewhere in the Act.

127

Morgan's

that

,

th.s attack

were emblematic of the

evils

of finance

in

popular culture. Fortuitously,

on the epitome of financial power
enabled the Roosevelt
administration

to

claim the moral high-ground in
the battle against the evils of
financial speculation and the

abuses of financial capital more generally.
Thus Glass Steagal conferred credibility
upon

New

Dealers ant, -finance rhetoric, which
proved politically convenient given

be argued below,

measures

New

Deal financial reforms were also
simultaneously implementing

enhance the

to

profitability

of financial

capital.

The preamble of the Banking Act of 1933 describes

the

Act as “[a]n

provide for the safer and more effective use
of the assets of banks,
control, to prevent the

purposes
that

.

(in

engaged

shield

undue diversion of funds

into speculative operations,

commercial banking, the architects of this

involvement

way, the Act attempted

in the speculative pursuit

Provisions were also

made

to

and

activities

for other

from firms

financial reform intended to

commercial bankers from the speculative opportunities

securities. In this

act to

to regulate interbank

Kross 1969, 2758) By removing investment banking

in

that, as will

that arise

to protect the deposit

from dealings

base of the economy from

of short-term capital gains on securities markets.

punish commercial banks that directed bank credit toward

the speculative carrying of or trading in securities, real estate, or
commodities, or for

any other purpose inconsistent with the maintenance of sound

J.P

.

Morgan’s

financial empire

investment banking while

J.P.

in

was carved

Morgan

into

credit conditions.’” (in

two separate companies: Morgan Stanley pursued
in commercial banking.

& Company engaged
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Friedman and Schwartz 1963,
443)

’

O'Conner, the comptroller of the
currency from

1933-1938, indicated that the intent
of the Act was that banks were
henceforth prevented

from "acting as a medium or agent

making loans

to

for

non-banking corporations, firms or
individuals

in

brokers on the security of stock, bonds
and other investments.”

(O’Conner 1938, 22)

From

a class analytic point of view, the
Glass-Steagall Act mitigated against

domination of productive capital by financial
capital
Hilferding’s finance capital.

By

in a

maimer reminiscent of

prohibiting the blending of banking and
non-banking

financial capitalist activity within a single
finn, Glass-Steagall limited the
opportunity to

manage subsumed

class struggle

capitalist firms that

among

in the

by creating

large financial

could dominate the provision of money capital.
Commercial banks

had the advantage of having access
en § a ging

financial capitalists

to the deposit base, but

they were prohibited from

provision of equity capital. Investment banks could engage
in the

provision of both debt and equity capital, but they were
denied access to the deposit base.

To

the extent that Glass-Steagall' prohibition of diversified
financial capitalist firms
s

constrained the ability of financial capitalist firms to control access to
both varieties of

money

capital, the

Act was supportive of intensified subsumed class struggle among

financial capitalist firms in the second

Friedman and Schwartz point out
could be suspended from access

that

moment of financial

banks judged

be advancing credit for inappropriate purposes
of the Federal Reserve, and the amount of loans
be subject to a quota imposed in each Federal Reserve district.
to

to the credit facilities

secured by stock or bond collateral were to

intermediation.
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In addition to prohibiting
diversified financial capitalist
firms, the Glass-Steagall
Act

(together with

amendments

to sections

20 and 21 of the Federal Reserve
Act) also

attempted to prevent the establishment
of diversified capitalist firms that
blend

commercial banking with productive

capitalist

and merchant

capitalist activities.

By

constraining the securities that a
commercial bank was entitled to hold,
commercial banks

could not buy equities

in

an effort

to control

productive capitalist or merchant
capitalist

firms (Kramer 2000, 6-17). This
limited the fonnation of diversified
capitalist firms, but
this restriction

control both

was evaded

as

bank and non-bank subsidianes. In time

passage of the Bank Holding
justified as a

[commerce]

commercial banks formed holding companies

Company Act (BHCA) of

measure “to maintain the
in order to prevent

clearly prohibited

this

1956.

traditional separation

bank holding companies from acquiring

company which

is

BHCA was explicitly

between banking and
(in

Hayes 1987, 49)

It

“direct or indirect ownership

not a bank”. (Krainer 2000.

1

in order to establish diversified capitalist

8

Non-bank
shares

The

in a

7)

loophole in the Glass-Steagall provisions was closed,
commercial banks were

prevented from forming holding companies
firm.

loophole was closed with the

abuses of allocation of credit.”

or control of any voting shares of any

Once

this

in order to

financial capitalist firms and productive capitalist firm could acquire up to 25% of voting
bank’s outstanding equity capital. However, any stake in excess of this threshold obliged the

acquiring firm to

become

a

bank holding company. (Krainer 2000, 17)
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Enhanci ng Commercial Bank Profitability

A_Retum To Th e Two

Money

fW

.i-

M om ents Of Financial Intermedia™

Whatever the ments of the Glass-Steagall
regulations concerning

the class

character of firms in promoting
a situation in which financial
capital would act as servant
to productive capital, the

growth and

stability

New Deal’s

Keynesian aspirations of promoting
economic

were unattainable so long

as the

spectacular disarray. Unless commercial
banking

commercial banking system would continue

commercial banking system was

became

in

profitable, instability in the

to disrupt the

process of financial

intermediation and thereby jeopardize the
recovery of aggregate demand. Yet in some
respects the Glass-Steagall Act further
exacerbated commercial bank profitability

problems.

Any

strategy to enhance commercial

bank

profitability via the

commercial banking with non-banking revenue generating

activities firm

combination of

was now

forbidden, thus commercial banks were forced
to rely solely on revenues from

commercial banking

at a

time

when commercial banking was

Thus while the Glass-Steagall Act promoted

in crisis.

a re-organization of finance in

pursuit of one of the conditions of existence of stable and
vigorous accumulation (cheap

money

capital),

it

potentially detracted from a further condition of existence of stable and

vigorous accumulation, namely the profitability of commercial banking.
This presented
the architects of New Deal financial reform with a dilemma.

Any measures

to

enhance

the profitability of the commercial banking system had to be carefully designed, for these

measures would defeat the larger logic of the Keynesian agenda
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if

commercial bank

was

profitability

restored by

making access

to

money

more

capital

costly.

the contradictory imperatives
of the Keynesian financial reform
agenda.
financial reforms sought to design
regulatory interventions that
profitability while attempting to avoid
exerting

payment required

To

to

discern

complicated

feat,

secure

money

how New Deal

we must

We

have argued thus

However, commercial bank

moment of financial

intermediation.

commercial banks are able

far that the

to

money

to access

If,

profitability

in the first

compensated

class

first

moment of financial

for the detrimental pressure

same New Deal reforms imposed on

is

9
.

and second moments

Keynesian economic agenda

capital, thus potentially putting

moment of financial

also affected

moment of financial

funds more cheaply, or

funds, this enhances their potential profitability

profitability in the first

subsumed

the

financial reformers attempted to
perform this

pressure on commercial bank profitability in the
second

intermediation.

Deal

capital.

sought low subsumed class payments for access

downward

New

would enhance bank

upward pressure on

return to the distinction between the

of financial intermediation.

Confronted by

if

by

the

first

intermediation,

they have access to more

By enhancing commercial bank

intermediation, commercial banks could be

on commercial bank

the second

profitability that these

moment of financial

intermediation.

v

If funds are secured

commercial bank

more cheaply

profitability

in the first

moment of financial

intermediation, this enhances

by enhancing the “spread”. The spread,

in mainstream banking parlance,
between the interest rates paid to lenders and the interest rates paid by lenders to secure
funds. The New Deal financial regulation discussed below both increase the spread, and enhance the
volume of funds intermediated by commercial banks. Both of these actions enhance commercial bank

the difference

profitability.
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is

In this

manner.

New

Deal financial reforms sought

contradictions of the Keynesian
financial reform agenda.

to

manage

New

the inherent

Deal financial reforms

acted to constrain the profitability
of commercial banks (and financial
capital in general)

by intensifying subsumed

class struggle

among

profit-constraining intervention in the
second

accompanied with measures
banks

that

moment of financial

were intended

moment of financial

tn the first

financial capitalists.

to

Yet

intermediation was

support the profitability of commercial

intennediation. In this way, the profitability
of

commercial banks might be secured while
moderating the deleterious

commercial bank

profitability

the availability of cheap

profitability

this potentially

effects of increased

on the Keynesian agenda of promoting
accumulation

money

capital. In attempting to

of commercial banks.

New

delicate balance. If commercial banks
crisis in financial intermediation

both constrain and enhance the

Deal financial reforms sought

were not

to sustain a

sufficiently profitable, the continuing

would compromise

shall discuss in chapter six, if commercial

via

the

banks were

to

Keynesian agenda. Yet,

become

as

we

too profitable, the

Keynesian agenda would also be comprised.

New
In

Deal Supports To Commercial Bank Profitability

The

In order to support

First

Moment Of Financial

commercial bank

intermediation, the Glass-Steagall Act

financial reforms.

The

Intennediation

profitability in the first

was implemented alongside other

New

Deal

creation of deposit insurance and interest rate controls were

incorporated into the Banking Act of 1933, and these measures were

by

moment of financial

the termination of free banking in the

later

Banking Act of 1935. Taken
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supplemented

as a group, these

measures enhanced commercial bank
attracting funds in the first

profitability

moment of financial

by

assisting

commercial banks

intermediation, and

in

by creating

conditions that enabled commercial
banks to reduce the costs of attracting
these funds.

To end
Henry

the paralyzing

waves of bank

failures in the

commercial banking system.

Steagall and others incorporated a
national system of deposit insurance
in the

Banking Act of 1933.

A new federal

(FDIC), was established

agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation

to insure deposits (initially

event of bank failure. While the

initial

funds for the

up

maximum

to a

FDIC were

of $5,000)

provided by the United

States Treasury and the twelve Federal
Reserve Banks, commercial banks

henceforth pay premiums to the

new Y expense
briefly)

banks,

for

FDIC

in return for deposit insurance.

commercial banks, and thus deposit insurance was

opposed by many commercial banks, particularly the

who complained

commercial bank

that the

1

profitability.

"

in the

would

This constituted a
initially

(and

large urban commercial

burden of premiums was a further detriment

to

However commercial bankers were quickly convinced of

the merits of deposit insurance as public confidence
in banks increased. After the

prolonged calamity of bank failures

in the early 1930s,

bank

failures

moderated

diamatically after the introduction of deposit insurance. The relatively
modest rates of

bank

failures since the creation

of deposit insurance are a stark contrast

of bank failures that had characterized American banking prior

The
bank

initial

opposition of large commercial banks to deposit insurance

may be

FDIC.

a reflection of the fact that

were particularly acute in rural areas, while large urban banks perceived themselves
weather the banking crisis or saw themselves as “too big to fail” and therefore more likely

failures

able to

to the

to the high rates

given support by the Federal Reserve. (O’Conner 1938, 24)

134

as better
to

be

Figure 17:

(measured

Numbers of FDIC-Member Commercial
Bank
at

Failures

year end)

Source: Historical Statistics on Ranking
CB02.

Deposit insurance gave commercial banks a competitive advantage
over other
financial capitalist firms, in that explicit

government protection was only enjoyed by

savings held in the form of deposits. In the context of the great
depression, in which a

traumatized public placed considerable value on the security of their savings,
deposit
insurance conferred a monopsonistic advantage on commercial banks vis a vis other
financial capitalist firms. This helped to reverse the precipitous decline in deposits
in

commercial banks

that

had destabilized the commercial banking system prior

to the

passage of the Banking Act of 1933. Deposits recovered from their low point of $27
billion in

1933

to surpass

$49

billion

by 1939

(see Figure 16, chapter 4).
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As

deposits

flowed back into the commercial
banking system,

commercial banks, provided of course

income

either through

tins

enhanced the

that those deposits

profitability of

would be employed

advancing loans or purchasing government

securities.

Alongside deposit insurance, the Banking
Act of 1933 placed

on deposits

to

enhance commercial bank

intermediation. Regulation

deposits

was

11
,

Q

and the previously

From

prohibited.

set

profitability in the first

maximum

common

interest rates that

bank

The coup de maitre of this subsidy

its

could be paid on savings

on checkable deposits

a class analytic perspective, interest
rate controls decreased the

to attract a

was

interest rate controls

moment of financial

practice of paying interest

expenses required
profitability.

to earn

given amount of deposits, thereby enhancing
commercial

justification as a deterrent to speculation.

excessive competition in the

Y

first

to

commercial bank

Many New

moment of financial

profitability

Dealers were convinced that

intermediation had been

responsible for bidding up the costs of funds for commercial
banks in the
financial intermediation. In public debate at the time
of the

first

moment of

Banking Act’s passage,

widely claimed the high costs of securing loanable funds had induced
banks

to

it

was

make

highly risky loans connected with securities markets in order to earn
sufficient returns
co\ er their costs of funds (see Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 443).

of securing loanable funds, Senator Glass argued

Strictly

speaking

empowered
rate ceilings

Regulation
all

,

Regulation

Q

the Federal Reserve to

By controlling the

that interest rate controls

to

cost

on deposits

was implemented by the Federal Reserve. The Banking Act of 1933
implement Regulation Q by giving it the authority to impose interest

on time and savings deposits at member banks. In the 1935 Banking Act, authority to extend
ceilings, and the prohibition on the payment of interest on demand deposits, was extended to

Q

federally insured banks.

(Mason 1997, 26-7)
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would ‘“put

a stop to the competition

between banks

in

payment of interest, which

frequently induces] banks to pay
excessive interest on time deposits
and has

many

times

over again brought banks into serious
trouble.’” (in Vietor 1987.
20)

In the context

worked together

to

of the great depression, deposit insurance
and

support commercial bank profitability.

by depositors under the regime of New
Deal

The

interest rate controls

interest

income forgone

interest rate controls represents an
implicit

subsidy to commercial banks. Yet despite
the ability of non-bank financial
capitalists

pay unregulated

rates

of return, holding savings

fonn was

in deposit

attractive

to

because of

the security conferred by deposit
insurance. Given the public’s distrust of
corporate
equities and

bonds as vehicles

to store savings

during the great depression, the

government backing of deposit insurance made possible
a

situation in

which depositors

willingly provided this implicit subsidy to enhance
the profitability of commercial banks.

This subsidy to commercial banks was most dramatic
in the case of demand deposits.

Commercial banks were

virtually the only type of financial capitalist firm that
could offer

checking privileges, while savings held

at

other financial capitalist firms were

much

less

accessible for the purpose of executing transactions. Thus depositors
-such as productive
capitalist firms-

interest-free in

situation

who

required checking privileges were compelled to hold their savings in

checking accounts.

Ironically, a productive capitalist firm in this

would be subsidizing bank

Household depositors did have access

to

profitability in the first

moment of financial

some other institutional savings venues (savings and loans
some checking privileges. However capitalist enterprises were

associations, credit unions etc.) that offered

largely confined to using the services of commercial banks if they wanted checking privileges, which
time were indispensable for paying employees and managing accounts payable and receivable.
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at the

intermediation as a condition of
ex.stence for the

New

Deal agenda

capital to act as servant to
productive capfial in the second

to

compel

financial

moment of financial

intermediation.

The

synergistic effects of both deposit
insurance and interest rate controls

supported commercial bank profitability
both because of the greater availability
of funds

m

the

first

moment of financial

intermediation, and because of diminished
cost of

securing each dollar of deposits. Commercial
banks paid as
for every dollar in deposits

pnor

to 1929,

while by the

late

much

as 2 cents of interest

1930s banks paid under one

half of one cent interest per dollar of
deposits (see Figure 18). This dramatic

pressure in the

Y expenses

associated with attracting deposits provided
substantial

support to commercial bank profitability. Remarkably,
while deposits grew

end of the 1930s from

their

downward

low point in 1933, the

on deposits declined dramatically (see Figure
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19).

total interest

81% by the

paid by commercial banks

S

s

Per Dollar

0f Deposits

(deposits measured at year-end
call date)
Source: Banking and Monetary
Statistics 72-75, 262-265
.
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Attracted

9: T ° tal In ‘ ereSt Pa d ° n
Dep0SitS At Federal Reserve
-,
(Deposits
measured at year-end call date)
Source: Bankin g and Monetary
Statistics 72-75, 262-265.
'

Member Banks

.

With

dilemma

now
on

the advent of government sponsored deposit insurance,
the moral hazard

implicit in the state/commercial

bank relationship was

represented an enormous liability for the

all

insurable depositor losses

intensified.

state, in that the obligation to

may dwarf premiums

Bank

failures

make good

paid by commercial banks. Thus

deposit insurance intensified the degree to which the state

was concerned

to

promote the

welfare of commercial banks, since the state faced the additional consideration of its
potential liability in the event of widespread crisis in commercial banking. This link

between the health of the deposit insurance fund and the
banks as a condition of existence of commercial bank
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profitability

stability

of commercial

and was acutely

understood by

FDIC

representatives.

As

a recent

FDIC review of the

history of deposit

insurance has summarized:

For

its

part the

ss
C and

the

FDIC was

faced with a dilemma [during
1934], Although the bank

d precipi

^rd

FDIC
F
D had been
b
r'f
modestly

and the capitai rehabii

“-

successful, the banking system

was not

rong and the prospects for bank earnings
were not bright. Additionally the
fears
and uncertainties regarding bank failures
had not been dispelled by 1934 and
indeed would not recede for more than
two decades. The FDIC was thus faced
with
the problems of protecting the earnings
of insured banks until capital and
reserve
positions could be rebuilt while, conserving
what was by historical standards
s

a

modest deposit insurance fund. (FDIC 1998.
36)

To

further support

intermediation,

New

commercial bank

profitability in the first

Deal financial reformers turned

overbanking. Brain-trust

member Adolph

moment of financial

their attention to the

Berle, in his address to the

problem of

New York Bankers

association shortly after the passage of the Banking
Act of 1933, explained the dilemmas

posed by excessive commercial bank competition

in the first

moment of financial

intermediation as follows:
Is there any sense in having the First Trust
Company on one side of the street
competing with the Second State Bank on the other to draw deposits from
one

to

make

its

own

unit

unit larger?

There can be only one

result. The net pool is not enlarged. That can be done
only by credit or by the slow growth of population and the growth of
production,

in

community which you serve. Competition between the two banks can
weakening one at the expense of the other, to the advantage of neither

the particular

only end in

(1933,8)

To address

the implications of competition to attract deposits, the

FDIC became

an

important source of pressure to eliminate ‘‘unfettered" competition in commercial
banking, and instead sought to create conditions of “rightful competition”

banking (FDIC 1998, 33). This culminated

in the elimination

Banking Act of 1935. The Act gave chartering bodies
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in

of free banking

commercial
in the

a degree of discretion over entry

into

commercial banking, and one of the critena

that

had

to

be met before a new

commercial bank could be chartered included
regulatory consideration of the
“future
earnings prospects” of the bank. 13 This
legal obligation imposed on
banking regulators by
the

Act stood

as an explicit official

banks was a consideration

acknowledgement

that should guide

restraints to competition implied

“prevent the recurrence of the

by

evil

overbanked condition of the twenties.’”

As

a result

is

(in

in the 1930s, the

hailed the 1935 Act as an aid to

be greatly feared

Klebaner 1990, 162

...

the return of the

)

numbers of commercial banks

United States was dramatically reduced. At
state

to

FDIC

of both the elimination of free banking, and the general

commercial banking

its

(Members of the

crisis afflicting

in operation in the

highpoint in 1921, there had been 29,417

and nationally chartered commercial banks

figure stood at 24,258.

of commercial

banking regulators. Pleased with the

the Act, the

which

that the profitability

in the

United States, and by 1929

this

Staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal

Reserve System 1941, 419). The bank

failures

restrictiveness in permitting entry into

commercial banking following the passage of the

Banking Act

of 1935, reduced the

of the 1930s, together with the new

number of FDIC-

insured commercial banks in

operation to 13,538 in 1939. Klebaner claims that by 1940 there was an average

population per commercial bank rose to 7,400, nearly double that of 1920. (Klebaner,
1974, 158) The

beyond

number of commercial banks

this level,

in operation

have never grown substantially

(although a small increase in numbers of commercial banks occurred

13

Officials were directed in the Act to consider
the financial history and condition of the bank, the
adequacy of its capital structure, it future earnings prospects, the general character of its management,
convenience and needs of the community to be served, and whether or not its corporate powers are

consistent with the purposes of this section'”, (in

Hammond
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1941, 60- 61)

the

briefly in the late 1970s

commercial banks

and early 1980s). Klebaner

Currency claiming that

Figure 20

of growth

to regulatory restrictiveness
in granting entry into

banking. In support of this claim he
cites an

restricted approval

credits lack

1

unnamed

to ‘'the

of new bank charters (Klebaner 1974,
158)

of FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks, 1934-2001
Source: EPIC, Hi storical Statistics on Banking
Table CB02.
.
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numbers of

commercial

report of the Controller of the

936 marked a quarter century swing

Numbers

in

extreme of unduly

The Multiple and Di vergent Competitive
Of New Deal Financial Reform

The Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 had
multiple and
both commercial bank profitability and
competition.

undermined commercial bank

profitability, since

financial capitalist firms in the sense that

it

On

F.ffr.rtc

often divergent effects on

the one hand, the Glass-Steagall

enhanced competition among

prevented commercial banks from dominating

it

access to both debt and equity capital via the
creation of diversified financial capitalist
firms. This

enhanced competition

intensification

other hand,

to entry

is

understood

in class analytic

of subsumed class struggle among financial

New

Deal

interest rate controls,

FDIC

terms as an

capitalist firms.

Yet on the

protection and the erection of barriers

around commercial banking, enhanced the profitability of
commercial banks by

deterring competition in the

first

moment of financial

intennediation. These deterrents to

competition did not necessarily imply a moderating influence on the
subsumed class
struggle

among

financial capitalist firms generally. Despite the privileges granted to

commercial banks, they

still

had

to

contend with other financial

(insurance companies, pension funds, investment banks

capitalist firms

etc.) that

provided debt and/or

equity capital to productive capitalist firms. So long as subsumed class struggle was

vigorous in the second

moment of financial

intermediation, Keynesian financial

reformers were able to enhance the profitability of commercial banks in the

first

moment

of financial intennediation without necessarily subverting their agenda for low subsumed
class

14

payments

Of course,

this is

for access to

money

14

capital.

not to say that restrictions on competition in the

Subsumed

class struggle in credit and equity markets are shaped

conditions in the

first

moment of financial

by

moment of financial
moment of financial intermediation.

first

intermediation had no effect on subsumed class struggle in the second

a host

of factors including competitive

intermediation, as well as the banking regulations of the various
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This approach to managing
competition

among

financial capitalist firms

hallmark of the organization of finance
in the Keynesian welfare
cartelization of finance”, financial
capitalist firms

particular

were

method through which they gathered funds

became

the

state. In this so-called

classified according to the

in the first

moment of financial

intermediation. Financial capitalist
firms of one category were largely
prohibited from

entering activities classified in another
regulatory category. Commercial banks,

investment banks, insurance companies,
pension funds and so on were
regulated and confined to gathering of
savings in the

manner

particular regulatory classification.
This financial regulatory

Keynesian welfare
classifications

separately

characteristic of their

framework

state capitalism inhibited financial
enterprises

from competing with each other over access

all

characteristic of

of different functional

to savings. This restricted

competition across regulatory categories, but did not
preclude competition within
regulatoiy categories. Moreover,
to

compete with each other

all

in the

of these types of financial

second moment of financial intermediation, thus

preserving the benefits of subsumed class struggle

terms of its

downward

capitalist firms continued

among

financial capitalist firms in

pressure on the subsumed class payment required to secure

money

capital.

state jurisdictions, the existence, diversity

jurisdiction, as well as the

and regulation of non-bank financial capitalist firms in each
factors. Thus it is possible that in some areas and at some times
related to accessing savings may have translated into upward pressure on

numerous other

restrictions competitive activities

the subsumed class payment required to secure money capital. The point here is that, with
sufficient
subsumed class struggle in the second moment of financial intermediation, the regulatory moderation of

competition in the
for

low subsumed

first

class

moment of financial
payment required

intermediation need not have subverted the Keynesian agenda

to access

money

145

capital.

This interpretation of the
anti -competitive

impulses

is at

New Deal

financial reform as

embodying both pro- and

odds with much mainstream financial

literature

1970s and beyond. Following the publication
of Friedman and Schwartz’s

M onetary History of the United States in 1963, mainstream economics
the

argument

banking

that

failures during the depression

were

role

Since

this literature largely

influential

began

to

A

embrace

attributable to faulty

government intervention rather than reproachable
conduct on the
capitalists.

from the

part of financial

absolved financial capitalists from a significant

m provoking the financial crises in the

1930s,

it

regarded

New

Deal financial

regulation as an unnecessary and distortive impediment
to the efficiency of financial

markets.

From

restraint

of competition

this perspective,

among

New

Deal financial reforms were equated with the

financial intermediaries

(1987) and Bentson (1990). As

this

1970s and 1980s,

intellectual

it

formed the

by authors such

anti-Keynesian critique gained

as

Angermueller

momentum

during the

backdrop for the advocacy of financial de-

regulation in the 1970 and 1980s.

Nor would

this class analytic perspective

endorse a depiction of the Glass-

Steagall Act as a uniformly pro-competitive intervention. This interpretation has

currency

among

critics

of large financial conglomerates,

of commercial and investment banking as a prerequisite
competitive conditions

among

who

often extol the separation

to the establishment

financial capitalists. This perspective

popularity in light of the frenzy of mergers and acquisitions

some

among

may

of genuinely

again grow in

financial capitalist

since the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. This ushered in a phase of even greater

concentration

among

financial capitalist firms coinciding with the final phases of a stock
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market

boom and

subsequent bust. Critics of
the speculative
excesses and dubious

business practices of these
diversified financial
capitalist firms again
look to the

competition

Thus

among

financial capitalist firms
that

a class analytic
perspective views

ts

conducive

New Deal

to

economtc growth.

financial refonns as
having

multiple, divergent and
ultimately unanticipated
effects on competition
capitalist firms. This
dtssertation seeks to avoid
totalizing

ether pro or anti-competitive,
bu, rather sees

New

among

financial

Deal financial reform as

this regulatory structure
as necessarily

both

pro and anti-competitive. The
illustration of the contradictory
unity of these tensions
relies

on the distinction between the
two moments of financial
intermediation. The pro-

competitive dimension of these
refonns, namely the intensification
of subsumed class
struggle

among

providers of debt and equity capital,
was necessarily combined with

competitive measures as

New

Deal financial reformers attempted

to

anti-

grapple with urgent

necessity of restoring and maintaining
financial capitalist profitability.
Neither pole of
this dialectic

can be forsaken. Both the affirmation
and negation of competition form the

unity in contradiction which
constitutes

New

New

New

Deal Financial Reforms

Deal financial reforms.

A nd The Advent Of Pax Fmnnr

Deal financial reforms did not prove

to

be a panacea either for commercial

banking profitability or for recovery from the
great depression. Commercial bank

were abated, deposits recovered and commercial
banking

however these developments were not

interest

failures

expenses declined,

sufficient to create propitious conditions for
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commercial bank

profitability.

While commercial bank

dramatically in the early years of the

New

profitability recovered

Deal financial reforms, the

later

1930s were

characterized disappointing commercial
bank profits (see Figure 14, chapter

Commercial bank
economic climate

profitability during the

the

1930s was overdetermined by the

(as well as such factors as the
effects

commercial bank responses

4).

difficult

of monetary policy), and

in turn

to their difficult profitability
situation in turn

overdetermined economic growth. Despite the
increased

stability in the

commercial

banking system following the passage of New
Deal financial reforms, commercial banks

were slow

to

resume

their

subsumed

fundamental class process.

capitalist

class role as providers

By December 30 of

were members of the Federal Reserve System stood

at

of money capital

to the

1939, total loans of banks that

$13,962 million, well off their

height of $26,165 million on October 4 of
1929.(Board of Governors of the Federal

Reserve System 1943, 72-74)
reserves,

banks

which many

critics

in acting in their

indication that they

In part

1

"

Moreover, commercial banks continued

viewed

subsumed

as an indication

class role to

were an unreliable channel

in lending to the capitalist

1932 during the Hoover administration

The

15

If

RFC

had authority

we remove

$16,171

On

for the transmission of

loans

October

to

resume

monetary policy.

subsumed

their

in

to step into the breach.

response to the

RFC

class role

crisis in

had been created

commercial banking.

borrow from the Treasury, and pursued a mandate

made on

4,

to

as well as an

fundamental class process, the government directed the

Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC)
in

hold excess

of the inefficacy of commercial

promote accumulation,

because commercial banks were hesitant

to

“to extend

securities from this total, the total non-securities related lending was
1929 while by December 30, 1939 it was $1 1,980.
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aid to agriculture, industry and

companies and other

trust

RFC

22118)

lifespan,

commerce through

financial institutions.” (U.S.

The

role

RFC

of the

House of Representatives 1969.

RFC was

many banks

constitutes another aid to commercial

teetering

bank

profitability, but

it

it

was intended

component of the long-term regulatory

available to commercial banks via

RFC,

this

to

its role.

After 1935,

advance loans directly

RFC

RFC

the

has not been incorporated
as

emergence

infrastructure. Despite the

was did not produce

infusions of money capital to promote accumulation,
and by 1935 the

change

its

of commercial banks, thus

on the precipice of failure. Thus

above discussion of New Deal reforms because

assistance rather than a

in the first 2.5 years of

its

expanded when the Emergency Banking Act
of 1933

to invest directly in the preferred
stock

staving off insolvency for

made

loans to banks,

authorized about $3.9 billion in loans
to banks and trust companies
over

authorized the

funds

medium of direct

and three fourths of this assistance
was disbursed

existence.

into the

the

RFC

large

began

to

loans to financial institution diminished and they began

to “business enterprise

and public agencies”(ibid.,22120) 16 and
,

after

1938 the

RFC was empowered to purchase

business enterprise. In this maimer, the

RFC

securities

and obligations from any

provided $5.1 billion

enterprises, with an additional billion in loans to railroads, (ibid.,

the post-war

economic recovery began the
,

competitor

RFC

RFC was

to private financial capitalist firms.

in loans to

business

22120) However, once

increasingly viewed as a

Under aggressive lobbying by

the

was empowered to make longer term loans then were typical of commercial banks at the time, and
was later adopted by commercial banks. Term loans (with a maturity of more than one year)

this practices

were negligible in 1933, but reached 2.2 billion by the end of 1940. (Klebaner 1974, 147) Thus RFC is
credited with lengthening the term of business loans in commercial banking, which increased the ability of
productive capitalist firms to use bank loans

to

fund accumulation.
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commercial banking

sector, legislators

embraced the

compete with private sources of credit”(ibid„
221
1953.

9),

and the

RFC was

RFC

must not

liquidated in

17

From an overdetermmist

point of view,

financial reforms did not in themselves

was

1

principal that “the

it is

remedy

not perplexing that the
the great depression.

New Deal

The

great depression

the product of a variety of interacting
factors in addition to the crisis in
commercial

banking, such as the generally depressed
demand conditions, international instability

in

both trade and financial conditions, dilemmas
in the conduct of monetary policy and
so
on.

Thus interventions

to

address the situation confronting commercial
banking did not

automatically overcome these multiple overdeterminants
of persistent economic
depression.

might be,

However

if the

successful the

economic

situation

New

is

Deal restructuring of financial

such that the

demand

for loans

then accumulation will not proceed. The purpose of this
dissertation

whether the

New Deal

is

is

financial reforms “solved” the great depression;

capitalist activity

not forthcoming,

not to adjudicate

on the contrary

such an inquiry would run counter the overdetermmist theory of
causality.
to the

ways

in

which the

New

We look only

Deal financial reforms were consistent with the Keynesian

vision for economic growth. Thus our attention primarily turns to the post-war
period to
investigate the

New

Deal financial refonns during the heyday of Keynesian welfare

state

capitalism.

Although the Small Business Administration, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
and the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) were created to continue some of its
activities.
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Followmg

the

war and

the adjustment to a peace-time

transformed international conditions,
the

economic growth and

stability

economy under

US economy enjoyed

“golden age" of Keynesian welfare

failures

system

is

state capitalism.

low

at relatively

This

often referred to as the

The New Deal

credit

was forthcoming from

real interest rates.

18

financial regulatory

the commercial banking

measured by Return on Assets, exhibited an upward
trend through

New

19
).

Thus despite

Deal financial refonn, financial capital acquiesced

framework created during the

New

Bank

At the same time, commercial bank

years of Keynesian welfare state capitalism
(see Figure 21

imposed by

is

state.

often regarded as an important support
of this Keynesian golden age.

became uncommon, and

profitability,

a prolonged period of

under the auspices of the Keynesian
welfare

period from the early 1950s to
approximately the mid-1970s

framework

radically

the early

the constraints

to the regulatory

Deal.

Although the reform legislation of the 1930s had divided
up the financing terrain
what some thought was an arbitrary manner, the major financial
intermediaries
largely acceded to the legislation; it appeared to offer
both an umbrella

in

of

protection against the well-remembered wrath of the public
after the profligate

1920s and an effective barrier to unwelcome competition. With each
group’s
designated business territory in the financing landscape growing
comfortably, there

The association of the golden age of Keynesian welfare state capitalism and a regime
of low real interest
should not be taken as a claim that the New Deal financial reforms cause low
real interest rates. As Crotty
(2000) points out, a variety of international and domestic conditions converged to produce low real
interest
rates prior to the

mid 1970s.

19

While the argument below proceeds in reference to the return on assets of FDIC-member commercial
banks portrayed in Figure 21, it should be noted that a the return on equity behaves somewhat differently
during the 1965-1980 than does return on assets. While the return on assets largely stagnated during
this
on equity climbed from 10.1% in 1965 to 13% by 1980, and then declined roughly in step
with return on assets thereafter. Thus those who regard the return on equity as a more important indication
period, the return

of profitability that return on assets may argue that the pressure on commercial banks was less acute in this
time period. Since both ratios have the same numerator, the difference in the performance of these ratios is
the result of difference in the valuation of assets and equity in this time period. Rather than entering into a
discussion of the vagaries of the valuation of these various denominators, the argument
the perspective of return

on

indicators of profitability,

is presented from
on equity, as well as other
times provide conflicting indications of commercial bank profitability.

assets.

may

at

However,

the caveat
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is

made

that the return

*as Hlfk mcemiTC to encroach on the
territory of the other financial
intermediaries
and thereby disturb the unspoken "
paxfmancus ” that appeared to be servin<>
*
everybody reasonably well. (Hayes
‘

'

1987. 3)

Figure 2 P Return °n Assets 1933-1999,
Sources. HSOB CB04 and CB09.

FDIC-Member Commercial Banks
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For close

to three

the financial regulatory

decades following the war,

framework created during the

modification. However, as

we

New

in

Deal financial reform

L

this 'pax financus

New Deal

”

persisted,

survived with

shall discuss in the following chapter, the ability

and

little

of the

terms of managing the potentially divergent imperatives of

supporting both the conditions of existence for accumulation and commercial bank
profitability did not persist indefinitely.

The tensions inherent

in

managing

the

contradictory imperatives of New Deal financial reform ultimately contributed to
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remainder of the dissertation
argues

».noin« tap.*,,,

that the inherent
contradictions

balancing act ultimately
subverted the

New
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Deal financial reforms.

animating

this

CHAPTER 6

AND THE

RISE OF BELLUM FINANCUS
CRISIS OF NEW DEAL FINANCIAL

REFORM

From Pax Financus To Bellum Fina ncus The
Contradictions Of New rvsl
Financial Reform And The Transformation
Of US Financial Capital
:

After a long “golden age” of economic growth
and stability, Keynesian welfare
state capitalism faced intensifying crises
during the 1970s

ramified, the Keynesian welfare state

was

largely

and 1980s. As these

crises

abandoned as the preferred avenue

through which to promote the continued wellbeing of the
capitalist fundamental class
process.

While Keynesian welfare

financial reforms that

had helped

state capitalism

was unraveling,

to secure the conditions

the

New

Deal

of existence of Keynesian

welfare state capitalism were also under attack. Despite the lauded
success of the

Deal financial regulatory framework

in sustaining the

pax financus

New

that characterized the

early golden age of the Keynesian welfare state, during the 1970s and 1980s this

framework was manifesting ominous signs of strain. Ultimately

pax financus gave way

to a

bellum financus

,

in

which

the relative stability of

financial capitalist firms of various

types engaged in vigorous competitive struggles that ultimately undermined the viability

of the

New

Deal financial reforms.

This disintegration of the Keynesian financial regulatory framework during the

denouement of Keynesian welfare

state capitalism is

overdetermined consequence of the contradictions
reform. Thus far the dissertation has

made

analyzed

that

the case that
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in this chapter as

animated

New

New

an

Deal financial

Deal financial regulations

were obliged

to

balance two potentially divergent
imperatives, namely the promotion
of

both low subsumed class payments
for access to
profitability.

these

Chapter five argued

that

New

two contradictory imperatives by

money

and commercial bank

capital

Deal financial reform attempted

to deal

with

instituting the so-called
“compartmentalization”

of finance. This compartmentalization
of finance in some respects promoted and
in some
respects

impeded competitive struggles among

financial capitalist finns. Chapter six

presents the case that the contradictions
inherent in financial compartmentalization
ultimately undermined this delicate balance
between the pro and anti-competitive

impulses of New Deal financial reform.

As

is

the case

when

the positive

the compartmentalization of finance

relative tranquility

moment of the

was undermined by

oi pax financus, incentives began

to

provokes

dialectic

its

own

emerge

on the

among

New

Amidst

new

financial capitalist firms that produced severe and unsustainable strain

many prominent

aspects of the

framework became a casualty of this

New

financial capitalist firms

will be

intensified struggle

and the ensuing demise of the

among

financial capitalist firms.

New

among

Deal financial regulatory

viewed from the vantage point of commercial banks.
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into

Deal financial regulatory

has been the case throughout the dissertation, the intensifying struggles

framework

the

competitive

Deal financial regulatory framework. As pax financus degenerated

bellum financus,

As

negation,

to subvert the

compartmentalization of finance. These opportunities unleashed
struggles

success.

its

In particular,

we

will focus

on the changing compel, live struggles
between commercial banks and

non-bank financial
commercial bank

capitalist competitors,

Inherent Contradictio n s

A nd

provoked

analysis of the

its

own

and the implications of these struggles
on

profitability.

Ih e

The

their

negation

Of New

Deal Financial Reform.

The Provocation Of Bellum Finmiru ?

ways

in

New

which the

relies, in part,

Deal compartmentalization of finance

on the recognition

that the

compartmentalization of financial capital necessarily bestows
an uneven assortment of

advantages and disadvantages on the various types
of financial
financial capitalist firms in

capitalist firms. If

one compartment discern competitive advantages enjoyed
by

financial capitalist firms of a different regulatory
category, the incentive exists for the

relatively underprivileged financial capitalist firms
to

advantages.

By the same

undermine those regulatory

token, any regulatory requirements that burdened a given

category of financial capitalist firms vis

ci

vis other financial capitalist firms

produce

incentive for the disadvantaged financial capitalist firms to attempt to
evade or eliminate

these restrictions. This uneven landscape of both regulatory strictures and
perquisites
creates the possibility for internecine struggle

among

financial capitalist firms as they

attempt to manipulate, evade or expand upon the pastiche of competitive advantages or

disadvantages created by the regulatory framework that supports financial
compartmentalization.
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Commercial banks were

in

many ways

a privileged beneficiary of
financial

compartmentalization. Barriers to entry shielded
commercial banking from competition

from other financial

capitalist firms,

while interest rate controls reduced
the costs

associated with attracting deposits.
Deposit insurance and lender of last
resort support
insulated commercial banks from crisis.

Thanks

to these advantages, as well as
the

exclusive and virtually free access to the
payments system that enabled commercial
1

banks

execute transactions, bank deposits were the
instrument of choice with which the

to

public stored their savings. This reliable access
to large and inexpensive volumes of

funds

in the first

moment of financial

the expansion of value in the second

intermediation provided propitious conditions for

moment of financial

intermediation.

Deal regulatory framework was largely credited as having
contributed

Thus

the

New

to a historically

unprecedented era of stable and profitable American banking.

Ultimately, the profitability of commercial banking that

was

a cornerstone of New

Deal financial reform also provoked the subversion of these financial reforms.
Financial
capitalists largely

acquiesced to

New

Deal financial reforms during the tumultuous times

of the great depression and the Second World War, but tensions
of relatively stable post-war prosperity continued. The

bank

profitability contributed to a

growing perception

excessively coddled by regulatory privileges

Until 1980

all

New
that

built as the long period

Deal supports

to

commercial

commercial banking was

2
.

costs associated with the operation of the

payments system were borne by

the Federal

Reserve.
"

Within financial circles commercial banking came

the reputation of bank executives for borrowing

and arriving

at the

to

be referred to as a “3-6-3” occupation, referring

money from

golf course by 3 in the afternoon.
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depositors at 3 percent, lending

at

to

6 percent,

Most banks were
etween

was

their cost

[stodgy].

They

of funds and the

didn't make risky loans, and
the
interest rates they could charge
their borrowers

‘Wad”

relatively stable at three to four
percentage points, leaving a satisfactory

profit
margin of the bank after the deduction of
“G&A” (general and administrative)
expenses and loan losses. That was, after
all, the purpose of
restricting entry by
making charters hard to get, and limiting the
interest rates bank could pay
their
depositors: the government wanted the
bank to be stable and profitable. ...on
balance banking was a steady, routine
business from the Roosevelt rescue in
the
depression to ... 1968. (Mayer 1997.
16)

Ironically, to the extent that regulatory
advantages

enhanced the

commercial banks, these same advantages created
incentives
capitalist firms to find

Thus

ways

to

for

profitability of

non-bank

financial

compete away these enhanced commercial bank

profits.

the success of New Deal financial reforms in
enhancing the profitability of

commercial banks

set in

capitalist firms that

As

motion competitive responses on the part of non-bank

would serve

to

financial

undermine these reforms.

the golden age of Keynesian welfare state capitalism
matured, a

number of

uniquely overdetermining circumstances inflamed the competitive struggles
among
financial capitalists,

which

compartmentalization.

in turn ultimately

One overdeterminant

undermined
will

New

Deal financial

be given particular attention, namely the

acceleration of inflation during the latter part of the Keynesian welfare state era.

However, a variety of other

factors also played important roles in transforming financial

capitalist activity, despite the fact that they are

only given tangential analysis below. For

example, changing regulatory and judicial interventions both reacted

provoked the transformation

in financial capitalist activity.

and communications technology

facilitated the creation

instruments that transformed competitive struggles
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to

and further

The evolution of computing

of sophisticated financial

among

financial capitalist firms. In

general,

many of the

factors that contributed to the
crisis of

capitalism (changing dynamics of
international competition

Keynesian welfare

among

state

productive capitalist

firms and financial capitalist firms,
the capacity of unionized workers
to affect wages
rates etc.) also

overdetermined financial

influences on the

subsumed

capitalist activity

class struggle

by exerting

between productive and

a variety of

financial capital.

Of Non-Bank Financial Capitalist Firms
To Disrupt Financial Compartmentalization

Strate g i es

As they sought
non-bank financial

to

compete away the enhanced

capitalist firms

were obliged

profitability

to fashion their

of commercial banks,

competitive strategies

according to the regulatory provisions that governed the
various compartments of
financial capitalist activity. In general, the
competitive strategies formulated

financial capitalist firms attempted to

mimic

by non-bank

the convenience (especially the capacity to

write checks) and security (deposit insurance) that regulators
had enabled commercial

banks

to offer.

Non-banks were not subjected

to

any

restrictions

on the

rate

of return

that

they could offer savers, thus they could attract savings out of the
commercial bank

system by paying more for them. The expense of offering higher

rates

of return

to savers

could be defrayed to some extent because non-banks were exempted for some of the
regulatory responsibilities that constrained commercial banks. Non-banks were not
obligated by law to hold required reserves, thus a greater proportion of every dollar of

savings that non-banks attracted could be used to earn

non-bank financial

capitalist firms required to

some form of income. Nor were

pay deposit insurance premiums, since

they did not enjoy the protection of deposit insurance. In addition, often non-bank
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financial capitalist firms had lower

Y expenses

in

terms of non-interest costs
because

they did not maintain an extensive
network of branch offices. Commercial
banks were
also subject to various regulations
that impaired their competitive
options. For example,

regulators

imposed

limits

on the lending

that a

bank could provide

to

borrower, whereas non-bank financial
capitalist firms faced no such

bank financial

capitalist Finns

were not bound by the

an individual

restrictions.

legal prohibition

on

Non-

interstate

banking, thus they more able to expand their
operations geographically while commercial

banks were confined within

In the early years

bank
rates

state lines.

of Keynesian welfare

state capitalism,

financial capitalist firms to attract savings

of return

burden

it

in

would impose on non-bank

viable for non-

away from commercial banks by

Q

financial capitalist firms

offering

in the early

the later period of Keynesian welfare state

capitalism changed this situation. In an inflationary context,

became increasingly

and because

cap was above the going rate paid on savings deposits.

However, the acceleration of inflation during

bound by

was not

excess of New Deal interest rate controls, both because of the
cost

post-war days the Regulation

contiols

it

New

Deal

interest rate

unattractive for depositors. Since non-banks were not

interest rate controls in the first

moment of financial

intermediation, they could

outbid commercial banks for access to savings. Provided that other costs of non-bank
financial capitalist firms

for

non-banks

to

were lower than those of commercial banks,

pay more

to intensified competition

context,

New

to attract savings

and

still

enhance

became

possible

their profitability.

Thanks

between commercial banks and non-banks

Deal interest

rate controls

it

in this inflationary

were transformed from the implicit subsidy
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to

commercial banks
abhor Regulation

to

Q

a competitive encumbrance. Over
time commercial banks grew

in particular,

and

at their

insistence

it

was phased

to

out with the

passage of the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act

(DIDMCA)

in 1980.

Even

if

non-bank financial

were higher than the

interest paid

capitalist firms

to

pay

rates

of return

on deposits, the problem remained of how

savers a vehicle for their savings that

was

were able

was

that

to offer

a close substitute for deposits. This challenge

particularly important in finding a substitute for
checking accounts, since depositors

who needed

the ability to execute transactions were severely
penalized by holding their

savings in interest -free checking accounts during a
period of growing inflation. Thus

non-bank financial

capitalist firms

pursued a variety of financial innovations 3

that

enabled them to offer savings vehicles that mimicked the convenience
and security

provided by commercial bank depository accounts.
available to savers to

winning

make them

for their regulatory

By

adapting the financial instruments

a closer substitute for deposits, and in

some

cases

by

compartment other advantages enjoyed by commercial

banks, non-bank financial capitalists were able to parlay their ability to offer higher rates

of return into a competitive assault on commercial banks

in the first

moment of financial

intermediation.

1

The term

“financial innovation” refers to an adaptation of financial instruments or practices that enable

financial capitalists to seize profit-making opportunities
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by evading regulatory

restrictions.

As non-banks succeeded
the savings of the

economy

in eroding

New

Deal compartmentalization and
attracting

out of commercial banks, the
profitability of commercial

banking was ultimately undermined. As Figure
20

in chapter 5 illustrates, the
Return

on

Assets of FDIC-member commercial banks
hovered between .75% and .88% between

1960 and 1973, however by the early 1980s

New

it

hovered a

Deal regulatory framework that was designed

profitability

was increasingly regarded

commercial banks

to

compete with

to

over .6%. Ironically, the

support commercial bank

as a debilitating

their

little

impediment

non-bank financial

to the ability

capitalist rivals. In

of

many

important instances, regulators attempted to respond
to these unintentional ramifications

of the

New

Deal regulatory structure, but their interventions often
inadvertently hastened

adaptations in both commercial bank and non-bank competitive
strategies that further
distorted and

undermined

New

Deal regulatory principals. Confronted with these

difficulties, financial regulators in the

1980s and 1990s were persuaded

that the welfare

of commercial banking, as well as the general prospects for economic growth and
stability,

demanded

the dismantling of several of the preeminent

Deal financial compartmentalization, culminating
in 1999.
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in the repeal

components of New

of the Glass-Steagall Act

Ihe

Competitive Strategies Of Nnn - Bank Financ-ial raP italisi Firm.
T o Lure Depo sits Away From Commercial

Banks

The following

section has selected several examples
to illustrate the strategies

followed by domestic 4 non-bank financial
capitalist Finns
first

moment of financial

to

out-compete the banks

intermediation by undermining the various
aspects of New Deal

regulatory privileges enjoyed

by commercial banks.

In

some

cases these strategies

involved finding an assurance of security that
approximated deposit insurance, and

some

in the

in

cases these strategies focused on providing the
capacity to execute transactions in a

manner

similar to checkable deposits.

However,

in all cases these strategies relied

paying a higher rate of return than could be earned on
bank deposits. To

upon

illustrate the

progress of these non-bank financial capitalist firms in attracting
savings out of the

commercial banking system, the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds data
a

is

used

to

provide

comparison of commercial bank deposits (checkable deposits plus small
time and

savings deposits) versus the savings attracted by the non-bank
competitors discussed

below.

4

Although international competition among financial capitalists is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it
US commercial banks faced an international competitive threat in both the first and
second moments of financial intermediation by the development of Euromarkets. Initially, the Eurodollar
should be noted that

market was fueled because US dollars held abroad became more abundant as large and persistent US
balance of payments deficits characterized the decline of the Bretton Woods system in the 1960s. These
dollars held abroad gave European banks the opportunity to take deposits and make loans in US dollars.

US

Non-US banks were exempt from Regulation Q, and from other US regulatory restrictions such as
American standards on required reserves and the payment of deposit insurance premiums. Thus non-US
banks had the possibility of paying more to attract deposits, while making up for this additional cost by
saving on other expenses incurred by US banks. As the Eurodollar market matured, it both attracted savings
away from US commercial banks and made loans to US borrowers. This practice became so widespread
that the phrase “round-tripping”

evolved to connote funds originating

Eurodollar market and subsequently re-lent to

US

borrowers.
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in the

US

that

were deposited

in

the

In 1971

money market mutual

commercial bank deposits

funds

to attract savings.

(MMMF) were introduced to
MMMFs,

financial capitalist firms that sell
shares publicly
assets.

However

evolved they

may

assets, particularly

US

mutual funds, are

and use the proceeds

MMMFs are a unique type of mutual

buying money market

like other

compete with

to

buy

financial

fund in that they specialize in

Treasuries (although as

MMMFs have

also hold commercial paper, bank
certificates of deposits, banker’s

acceptances and repurchase agreements 5
).

By

operating as a mutual fund,

MMMFs can

aggregate smaller amounts of money to buy
financial assets that are denominated in

amounts too large

to

be practical for small savers. 6

government insurance
with

US

for the savings they attract,

MMMFs cannot offer explicit
however

the default risk associated

MMMFs depends on the default risk of the financial assets that the

Treasuries are regarded as having an extremely low default
risk, a

large percentage of US Treasuries

insured deposit. Moreover,
that they

Since

regarded as a good substitute for placing funds

to write

MMMF. MMMFs also

MMMFs are not

MMMF holding a
in

an

MMMFs competed with traditional bank checking accounts in

allowed shareholders

shares of the

is

fund holds. Since

checks (with some restrictions) against

their

enjoyed cost advantages over commercial banks.

legally deposits, they are not subject to reserve requirements or

deposit insurance premiums.

As

MMMFs increased, this often served to allow commercial banks access to
MMMFs as when a MMMF purchases a bank certificate of deposit (see

the variety of assets held in

the funds intermediated

by

,

chapter seven).

Prior to 1970, the

minimum denomination of Treasury

smaller savers. However, as Regulation

Q

ceilings

Bills was $1,000 which was within reach of
became binding, it was noticed by government officials

(and the commercial bank officials that lobbied them) that savers were fleeing commercial banks
Treasuries. In 1970, the

minimum

size

of Treasury

bills

was increased

to $10,000. This

change

to

buy

in the

denomination of Treasuries was intended to support commercial banks in their quest to attract deposits, but
had the unintended effect of helping to stimulate the development of MMMFs to compete with commercial
banks over access to savings. (Gart 1994, 82)
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By mimicking
in

the functions of checking accounts,
undercutting commercial banks

terms of the cost of attracting funds,
and paying unregulated rates of interest

MMMFs posed a significant competitive threat to commercial banks.
when nominal
Q,

interest rates

climbed considerably above the cap then

MMMFs grew dramatically.

In the 10 years

to savers,

In the late 1970s,

set

by Regulation

between 1974 and 1984 the

total

value of

MMMF shares outstanding grew from $2.4 billion to $232.2 billion. As Figure 22
MMMFs grew to control savings in the neighborhood of 20% the size of

illustrates,

commercial bank deposits by the early 1980s.

In addition, the

MMMF created

opportunities for other non-bank financial capitalist
firms to compete with commercial

banks. For example, in 1977 Merrill Lynch led the
the

way

for investment

MMMF to develop Cash Management Accounts (CMA). Prior to

capital gains realized

banks

to utilize

1977, dividend and

by investment bank customers were frequently deposited

into a

saving or checking account in a commercial bank. Cash
management accounts were

developed

to

allow investment banks

on behalf of their customers. These
credit cards

and loans

to investment

to

automatically invest these funds into a

CMAs
bank

later

evolved to offer check-writing privileges,

clients.
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MMMF

8U e
^9 4 5- i999

MMMF ShareS ° U,Standin8 As A Pontage Of Commercial

Bank

Deposits,

Source: Flow of Funds L.l 10 and L.121.
.

Pension funds were another type of non-bank financial

encioached upon commercial banks capacity
for

some time

to attract deposits.

prior to the 1970s, pension funds

commercial banks when they surmounted
of the security of funds placed
deposit insurance.

7

in

capitalist firm that

became

Although they existed

a serious competitor to

their inability to offer a

government-guarantee

pension funds analogous to the guarantee offered by

Prior to this time, pension funds were a problematic vehicle for

workers' savings, since pension funds are often affiliated with and controlled by the

employer. In the 1950s and 1960s, relatively

strict

7

vesting requirements meant that

The growth of pension funds was also assisted by the capacity of unions to demand pension benefits
during the hey day of Keynesian welfare state capitalism, among other reasons.
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workers frequently were obliged

to forfeit pension contributions

made on

and pension funds were often so
under-funded or so heavily invested
the

employer

that a profitability crises in the
ftrm

disaster tor workers' pensions.

plan

their behalf,

in the securities

sponsoring the pension fund spelled

The scandalous termination of the Studebaker
pension

s

1964 and other pension plan abuses prompted
the United Auto Workers,

in

as other union

and non-union advocates of pension reform,

Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)

ERISA

to

push

as well

for the passage

established the Pension Benefit Guarantee
Corporation (PBGC), which

afforded pension funds a security similar to that of
deposit insurance, since the

guaranteed the security of pensions even

pension fund assets were inadequate

to

if the

PBGC

PBGC

employer went out of business and

meet obligations.

government would not be overwhelmed by enormous

ERISA

of the

in 1974.

dramatically increased the attractiveness of holding
savings in pension funds. The

plans,

of

In order to ensure that the

liabilities

from

failed pension

held employers to higher standards in terms of funding and diversification

of pensions plans. 9 Both the increased perceived safety of pension plans, and the
ERISA
funding requirements that obliged employers to
to their

make

substantial

ongoing contributions

pension funds, encouraged a great inflow of funds into pension funds. As Figure

x

Studebaker retirees and retirement eligible workers over sixty years of age received their full pensions
Studebaker closed its doors. However, Studebaker workers under sixty years of age received a lumpsum payment equivalent to about 15% of the value of their pension. All workers whose pensions had not
after

vested

—

including

all workers under age forty
got nothing. (Wooten 2001, 731) The outcry over the
by Studebaker workers compelled the United Autoworkers to push for legislative reform
protect worker’s pension rights, which increased the pressure to pass ERISA in 1974.

situation faced

}

ERISSA

also

made

to

the financing of pension plans

employer contributions

to

more manageable by conferring tax benefits on
pension plans. In addition, the earnings generated within the plans are not taxed,

nor are employees taxed on any earnings until these earnings are removed from the plans (provided
earning are not placed in

some

other tax-favored vehicle such as an IRA).
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that the

23

illustrates, prior to

slightly

1974, the total reserves held by pensions
10
funds amounted to

more than 50% of the

the passage of

ERISA,

deposits of commercial banks. In
the ten years following

the total reserves of pension funds

grew by 145%,

savings held in pension funds have exceeded
those held in deposits.

two

dollars

were held

in

By

until

the

by 1984

mid 1990s

pension funds for every dollar held in checking
or savings

accounts.

10

Figure 23 refers to total reserves

in

both private pension funds and state and local government employees

pension funds.
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1

Figure 23: Pension Fund Total
Reserves
Bank Deposits
Source:

Flow of Funds

Pension plans

.

L.

1 1

0 L.

1 1

9 and L. 1 20.

in this era often

that eligible pensioners

As Percentage of US Chartered
Commercial

took the form of the defined benefit plans, meaning

were guaranteed a stipulated pension benefit regardless of the

performance of the assets held

in the

pension fund. This resulted

in the firm

sponsoring

the pension fund bearing the risk that inadequately performing financial
assets might not

generate sufficient funds to cover pension

liabilities.

Productive capitalist firms and other

employers offering pension plans sought ways of shifting
recipients.

this risk

Defined contribution plans, particularly 401(k) plans

1

1

',

onto pension

became

the

method of

40 1 (k) plans take their name from the section of the Internal Revenue Code that authorized their tax
deferred status. Employees of “for profit employers” are eligible for 40 (k) plans, while public school, nonprofit organizations and state and local government employees all have similar defined contribution plans
1

authorized by other sections of the IRS code. (Kimpel 1997, 271)
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choice to accomplish this shifting of
risk back to pensioners.
Unlike defined benefit plans
in

which

retirees are paid a specified

amount when they become

eligible for pensions,

defined contribution plans stipulate what
the employer must contribute
toward the
pensions.

The amount of the pension paid

performance of the assets
not eligible for

PBGC

in the

at

the time of retirement will depend
on the

pension plan. However, defined contribution
plans are

guarantee.

Thus while these pension plans saved employers

expense of both making good on under-performing
pension assets and having

premiums

to the

PBGC,

for this

pay

these pension plans were less attractive in that
they lacked a

governmental guarantee

compensate

to

the

to protect the value

drawback

in

of the savings held

in the pension.

To

defined contribution plans, the federal government
was

prevailed upon in 1982 to provide these plans with tax
deferred status, (see Kimpel 1997,

256) While retirees were denied the security of government sponsored
insurance on

their

savings, this preferential tax treatment (which accelerated the
growth of savings held

defined contribution plans)

Given

that

made

this

burden more palatable.

employees bear increased

risk with defined contribution plans,

employees also were accorded increased capacity
assets in their plans. This created a

in

to direct the

tremendous opportunity

investment decisions of the

for

mutual funds. Mutual

funds offer savers the opportunity to diversify even relatively modest savings portfolio,

and they are convenient

to

redeem. Savers could invest funds held in these defined

contribution plans into mutual funds in order to both enjoy both the tax deferred status of
the defined contribution plans and place their savings in a wide variety of financial
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instruments. While prior to 1970,
mutual funds invested primarily in

common stock,

but

they have subsequently expanded into
holding virtually every type of debt
and equity
instrument.

Figure 24: Mutual Fund Shares Outstanding
Source: Flow of Funds L.1 22 and T
.

As non-bank

m

As Percentage Commercial Bank

Deposits
F

financial capitalist firms succeeded in both paying higher rates of return

than commercial banks, and offering savings vehicles that approximated the security and
accessibility

of deposits, these competitive

strategies

began

to

have

startling

the ability of commercial banks to attract funds via deposits. This impact

Figure 25, which displays the percentage of the
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total financial assets

is

impact on

illustrated in

of households, non-

profit organizations

and non-financial corporate business 12

The category “deposits” displayed
have defined them

in

graph

in this

is

that are held in various forms.

an overstatement of deposits as

our class analysis of commercial banking.
Ideally

display checking and savings deposits,
however the
that the line labeled “deposits"

we would

Flow of Funds categoric

we
wish

to

are such

on Figure 22 unfortunately includes both currency
and

time deposits (such as the certificates of deposit
that will be discussed

in

chapter

8), as

well as our desired categories of checking and
savings deposits. Despite the exaggeration

of the size of deposits
banks’ hegemonic

12

in the

command

Non-financial corporate business

Figure 25,

over the

is

it

provides an indication of loss of commercial

first

moment of financial

intermediation.

used here as the best approximation of productive

offered within the flow of funds categories.
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capitalist firms

Percentage

Yr

The Tot

^

A " d MuU,al
° f H0USeh °' dS

ShareS

'

nSLw SSS bS

‘S

Fllnd Shares

As

A

-s And

'

’

Source: Flow of Funds B.100 and
B.102.
.

“““ Deposits/TFA
MMMF/TFA
“

“ Pension Funds/TFA
MF/TFA
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And Its Impact On The
Of Class Processes Within The Finn

Be/luni Financus
Diversification

The success of non-bank
attract

savings

financial capitalist firms in their competitive struggles to

away from commercial banks

in the first

moment of financial

intermediation created conditions that transformed financial capitalist activity in the

United States. With more funds

and purchase equities
financial capitalists

in the

were

at their disposal,

and the capacity

to provide both loans

second moment of financial intermediation, non-bank

in a position to

transform subsumed class struggle
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among

financial capitalists. In terms of the
provision of loans,

commercial banks were being

increasingly supplanted as the major
provider of credit. This trend
26,

which displays the percentage of total

banks,

MMMFs,

banks provided

credit

is

illustrated in Figure

market debt 13 provided by commercial

pension funds and mutual funds over time.
Until 1980, commercial

in

excess of 25% of all credit market debt, while
by the time of the

elimination of Glass-Steagall in 1999, commercial
banks provided only

market debt. Unlike commercial banks, non-bank
financial
restricted to the provision

of loans

in the

16% of credit

capitalist firms

were not

second moment of financial intermediation. In

the later part of the 1990s, pension funds held
over half of their total financial assets as

corporate equities, while for mutual funds this ratio was
close to three quarters ( Flow of

Funds LI
,

13

19,

L120 and L122).

Total credit market debt held by these various entities described in figure 26 excludes mutual fund

shares,

which may

affect the total of credit

market debt indirectly provided..
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The Total Credit Market Assets Of
Commercial Banks Pension Funds
Funds Relative To Total Credit Market
14
Assets
Source: Flow of Funds L.l.
are

ff J
MMMFs
And Mutual
6:

.

“”
”

"

Commercial Banks
Pension Funds

—— MMMFs

Mutual Funds

This displacement of commercial banks

was

in

both moments of Financial intermediation

a dramatic departure

from the assumptions about financial

capitalist activity

New

Deal financial regulatory framework.

New

the architects of the

reform was predicated on non-banks having limited access

made by

Deal financial

to savings (since they

were

prohibited from accepting deposits) but unimpeded ability to provide both debt and

equity capital, while commercial banks had access to deposits but were unable to be

involved

the

14

in the

provision of equity capital.

economy's savings

in the first

Now non-banks had both

moment of financial

Total credit market assets of commercial banks include

corporate and foreign bonds as well as total loans.

US

increasing access to

intermediation, while maintaining

government

securities,

municipal securities

They exclude any holdings of corporate

mutual funds.
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equities and

their ability to

engage

in

both debt and equity capital provision

financial intermediation. This

new

situation

in the

second moment of

produced a variety of strains on the

Deal financial regulatory framework. Since
non-bank financial

New

capitalist firms are less

stringently regulated that commercial banks,
the pool of savings that

was intermediated

outside of the commercial banking system could
be used in creative ways not foreseen by
the architects of New Deal financial refonns.

Thus the new channels through which

savings were intermediated produced (and were
further accelerated by) the introduction

of new financial innovations, which

in turn further

eroded the coherence of New Deal

financial reforms.

With

a

growing pool of savings

had the opportunity

at their disposal,

non-bank financial

some of the competitive advantages

to challenge

with commercial banks. The ability of non-banks to advance

purchases

is in

some ways

less flexible than

money

that

capitalist firms

still

remained

capital via securities

commercial bank lending, since banks could

lend to consumers and other entities that could not issue securities. Commercial banks
also

had informational advantages over non-banks

in assessing the future prospects

of

firms in need of money capital. Over time, progress in computing and communications

technology substantially eroded

this informational advantage.

developed financial innovations

that

progress, and that

would enhance

Non-banks increasingly

would both take advantage of this technological

the flexibility of their activities in the second

of financial intermediation. As non-bank financial

capitalist firms

moment

overcame these

disadvantages, a host of new financial developments was unleashed which further

undermined

New

Deal compartmentalization.
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Instead of relying on the purchase
of debt or equity securities in the
second

of financial intermediation, non-bank
financial

capitalist firms

moment

have the option of

advancing money capital via the commercial
paper market. Commercial paper

is

an

uncollateriahzed short-term debt that can be
a good substitute for the short-term

borrowing from commercial banks by productive

capitalist firms (and other issuers).

Provided that commercial paper has a maturity
of less than ninety days,
considered to be a security and

is

not subject to the

of 1933. Because commercial paper does not have

Exchange Commission

as a public offering,

it is

charged with the surveillance of

is

(d' Arista

historically

Given

by any

paper markets lack

not secured

many of the

issuer can cause a panic analogous to a

to other sources

of funds

been fraught with

specific asset, and that

bank run

that shuts

is

down

a short term instrument that

commercial paper issuers are obliged

if lenders flee the

commercial paper a problematic

15

capital

and for firms

The commercial paper market

in

is

commercial

the supply of funds into

to collectively run

commercial paper market. This dynamic

frequently debilitated the commercial paper market prior to the 1970s, and

money

difficulty.

A default by a commercial paper

crisis.

the commercial paper market. Since commercial paper

rolled over,

and Schlesinger 1993, 168)

safeguards required in securities markets, the commercial

paper market has periodically been thrown into

must be constantly

Securities Act

be registered with the Securities

to

However, the commercial paper market has
is

not legally

not required to meet the disclosure

trading practices in the commercial paper market,

commercial paper

is

many provisions of the

standards of other securities, and no regulatory body

that

it

made

substitute for traditional securities both for suppliers of

need of money

most

1

^

capital.

attractive to issuing firms with

perceptions of a borrower’s capacity to repay

its

good

credit ratings, since

loans assumes heightened importance given that
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Following a convulsion

in the

the stability of the commercial
paper

commercial banks (see chapter

8).

commercial paper market

was surmounted,

in

1970

16
,

this obstacle to

ironically with the assistance
of

Commercial banks were enticed

to earn fee

income by

providing lines of credit to support the
issuers of commercial paper. In the
event

doubts arise concerning the capacity of the
issuer to repay

of credit can be activated so
for lender

that the issuer

can honor

of last resort support provided a backstop

paper market. With

this support in place, the

as mutual funds, pension funds and

commercial paper. (Chapter

many

its

its

commercial paper, the

in

to deter panics in the

commercial

commercial paper market grew enormously

others

came

forth as eager purchasers of

8 points out the irony that, as the

commercial paper market
issued commercial

order to gain access to the funds that were no longer flowing
to the commercial

banking sector

in the

form of deposits.) While

outstanding constituted only about
late

line

debts. This contrived substitute

became an important source of funds, commercial banks themselves
paper

that

in

1970, only commercial paper

10% of the commercial bank

1990s commercial paper outstanding constituted

40%

loans outstanding, by the

of the commercial bank loans

outstanding.

commercial paper
are

more

is

not backed by collateral. Thus firms that access funds in the commercial paper market

sensitive to changes in

rating can dry
the capacity

up

of productive

instability, since

how

they are evaluated by credit ratings agencies, since a negative credit

their access to funds

on

this

market. Thus while the commercial paper market enhances

it also adds new sources of
they are increasingly vulnerable to negative market perceptions that may plunge them into

capitalist firms (and other firms) to access funds,

a liquidity crisis.
16

In 1970,

Penn Central Railroad defaulted on $83 million

in

commercial paper, which provoked

seizing up of the commercial paper market, even for solvent borrowers. (Hayes 1987, 87)
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a virtual

Figure 27: Commercial Paper Outstanding
Loans Outstanding, 1 970 -1999.

Source Flow of Funds L.208 and L. 1

As

1

As

A Percentage Of Total

Commercial
ommerciai bank
Bank

0.

the commercial paper market provided a conduit for the savings intermediated

outside of commercial banks,

financial capitalist activity.

capitalist firm that seized

companies (such

as

new

opportunities were created that further transformed

The finance company was one type of non-bank

on commercial paper

to

promote

this transformation.

Household Finance Company) have long existed

financial capitalist Finn that acquires funds and

makes

financial

as a type of

loans, often to consumers.

the commercial paper market flourished in the 1970s, finance companies could

commercial paper (although they may also issue
use the proceeds to

make both subsumed

Finance

securities

Once

sell

and other instruments), and

class loans to productive capitalist firms and
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non-class loans to other types of firms,
consumers and other

companies of dependence on commercial bank
loans

as a

entities.

This freed finance

means of accessing funds

for

subsequent re-lending. Finance companies are
not highly regulated, and they do
not have
to

comply with

the various soundness regulations, such
as capital or liquidity

requirements, limits on loans to individual or related
borrowers, or limits to loans to
parents or affiliates that affect commercial banks,
(d’ Arista and Schlesinger 1997 489
)
.

Thus finance companies
that they choose,

are virtually free to raise funds and hold assets
in any

and unlike commercial banks they are able

180

manner

to cross state lines.

Figure 28: Total Financial Assets Of
Finance Companies As A Percentage
inancial Assets Of US-Chartered
Commercial Banks, 1970-1999
Source: Flow of Funds L.l 10 and L.128.

Of Total

.

Year

The

availability

of funds on the commercial paper market (and

later other

financial innovations such as securitization 17 provided opportunities that
)

would

transform the class character of the firm. Productive capitalist firms and merchant

The process ot securitization converts a portfolio of illiquid loans into securities that are backed by those
Thanks to the development of sophisticated computing technology, loans of a given risk profile are

loans.

gathered into a pool, and shares of the cash flow emanating from

this

pool of receivables are sold as

The security sold as a result of this process is referred to as an asset-backed security (ABS). The
risks posed by the loans in the pool are typically defrayed by some form of third party insurance. ABS
provides some advantages over the commercial paper, in that short-term commercial paper must be
securities.

frequently rolled over, which
are

removed from

the

may prove

books of the

difficult if the parent

issuer, thus freeing

company

up funds

to

is

experiencing

difficulties.

ABSs

advance new loans. In addition, the

process of securitization has “p ro P ertized” the right to services loans. Since the loans the underlie these
securities can be divorced

from the company which originated them, the “servicing” of loans, meaning

ABS now exists
the ABS pool to a

collection of payments and the distribution of revenues to the holders of the

of ABS

may earn income by selling the rights to service
commercial bank may earn fee income by gaining the right
loans of a automotive finance company.
activity. Creators

Thus potentially

a
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the

as an distinct
third party.

to service the securitized car

}

capitalist firms

subsidiaries,

could access

this

pool of funds by developing finance
company

dubbed “captive" finance companies. 18 Thus
prominent productive

firms, like General Electric and the
North

now

capitalist

American automobile manufacturers, could

both appropnate surplus value and earn
subsumed class and/or non-class revenue by

engaging

in

money-lending financial

capitalist activity.

of captive finance companies were

activities

While the

initially closely

financial capitalist

connected

to the surplus

value appropriating divisions of the parent diversified
capitalist firm, captive finance

companies, such as those associated with General Electric,
have flourished
that they are

engaged

in

to the extent

lending to entities that are not immediately connected
with the

other activities of the other subsidiaries of the parent
company.

While we have heretofore conceived of the relationship between productive and
financial capital as an

amis length subsumed

class relationship in

which

financial capital

supports productive capital by providing funds for accumulation, this transformation
the class processes occurring within a diversified capitalist firm provides

which

financial and productive capital

may

interact.

new ways

Surplus value appropriation

supported to the extent that the financial capitalist subsidiary makes loans

purchase of the commodities produced by the productive

company.

1

The capacity

offers the opportunity to

to

combine

financial

package productive

capitalist

in

may be

to facilitate the

capitalist division

and productive

in

of the parent

capitalist activity also

and financial

capitalist activities in

18

Many firms, such as General Electric, had finance companies that predate the development of the
commercial paper market, but they were much less important prior to the accessibility of funds that the
commercial paper market provided.
19

A

captive “sales” finance

company

will

engage

in

company

will

money-lending

advance these loans

(via loans or

more

to

consumers, while a “business” finance

circuitously via such practices as factoring or

leasing equipment) to other productive and unproductive capitalist firms.
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ways

that disgu.se the extent to

for the financing to

capitalist division

way

may be

assisted in their competition in product
markets if the finance

financing to consumers

in

may compel

customers

which productive and

concerns the provision of funds
production.

goods

commodity purchased or

at rates that

compensate

for substandard

price or quality. Alternatively, the advantages
of diversified capitalist firms in

product markets

second

are paying for the

purchase the commodity. Thus the parent
company’s productive

company can provide
commodity

whieh buyers

A

on disadvantageous tenns.

financial capitalist activities

to suppliers

diversified capitalist firm

in return for pricing

to accept financing

may be combined

of raw materials or equipment required

may

provide

money

A

in

capital to suppliers of “c”

or other concessions on these commodities, or alternatively
the

diversified financial capitalist firm

may provide

market subsumed class payments in exchange

financing to suppliers in return for below

for, say,

exclusive access to raw materials.

While Hilferding’s Finance Capital had foreseen the blending of productive and
financial capitalist activities under the

dominance of financial

capital, the

development of

the diversified capitalist firm represents the blending of productive and financial
capitalist activities

may

be such that the financial

carried

may

with no necessary relationship of dominance. While considerations

on

to

promote

capitalist activity

profitability

of the diversified

of the firm’s productive

also develop to produce the opposite,

namely

capitalist firm

might be

capitalist activities, conditions

a diversified capitalist firm that

operates such that revenues from financial capitalist activity dictates the behavior of

productive capitalist subsidiaries. The detailed class analysis of any diversified capitalist
firm will be required to judge whether, in any uniquely overdetermined context,
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productive capitalist or financial capitalist
imperatives are
as the overdetermined context
unfolds,

firm will change

relative

its

The organizational

that, for

is

entirely possible that a diversified
capitalist

subsumed

class struggle internal to the firm. In
the

of the same parent diversified

concerning the financial capitalist and productive
diversified capitalist firm.

internal to the finn,

it

capitalist activities

structure of the diversified capitalist finn
also presents the

example, a finance subsidiary provides

capitalist subsidiary

ascendancy. Moreover,

emphasis of its financial and productive

possibility that this firm will exhibit

event

it

in the

Even

may be

financial capitalist subsidiary

it

this direct

money

capitalist finn, there

capitalist

subsumed

that the condition

of the diversified

capital to a productive

may be

conflicts

agendas animating the

class relationship doesn’t exist

of existence for profitability
capitalist finn are at

in the

odds with the

condition of existence for profitability in the productive capitalist
subsidiary. To the
extent that diversified capitalist firms

adds

new complexity

capital

.

become

to generalizations

the predominant organizational form, this

about “financial

capital’’

and “productive

Productive capital and financial capital must be understood as processes to

expand value rather categories under which

name of a

finn (with

its

capitalist finns

can be neatly

classified.

The

productive of financial capitalist connotations) or even a cursory

assessment of where to gamers the majority of its revenues,

may not

categorization of such firms as productive or financial capitalist.
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suffice to justify the

The development of the

diversified capitalist firm further
destabilized the Glass-

Steagall regulatory framework.

capitalist firm

As

financial capitalist activity migrated
into diversified

and other organizational forms

traditional financial capitalist firms,

compartmentalization

in

ways

that

it

that

became possible

were forbidden

regulated explicitly according to the

were much

New

less heavily regulated than

to subvert

New

Deal financial

to financial capitalist firms that

Deal categories of financial

were

capitalist activity.

For example the various financial subsidiaries
of General Electric increasingly engaged
in

money

lending, the provision of insurance, and
securities dealings that financial

capitalist firms regulated

to blend.

under

New

Deal financial compartmentalization were forbidden

This created further pressure for regulators to relax
the regulatory barriers that

compartmentalized financial

capitalist activity.

However, the challenge remained

to

incorporate commercial banking into diversified capitalist
firms, or for that matter, into
diversified financial capitalist firms.

Commerci al Banks And The

New

Diversification of Capitalist Firms

Deal financial reforms and the Bank Holding Company Act were intended

to

prevent the blending of commercial banking with other financial capitalist or productive
capitalist activity.

By preventing

the interconnections between commercial banking and

other capitalist activities in diversified firms, the commercial banking system was

shielded from the possibility that these interconnections might induce commercial

banking

crises.

activities

For example, the separation of commercial banking from other

capitalist

prevented the possibility that a commercial bank subsidiary of a diversified

capitalist firm

might

fail

due

to

unwise loans made
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to productive capitalist or financial

capitalist subsidiaries.

activity

This segregation of commercial
banking away from other capitalist

was intended not only

as a whole, but to contain the

Both via lender of last
possibility

to

enhance the

stability

moral hazard dilemma inherent

resort support

of capitalist

threaten the solvency of commercial banks.

Thus the

in crisis.

the intensification of the moral hazard
dilemma, lest

to all sorts

in

commercial banking.

and via deposit insurance, the

of bailing out commercial banks

of lender of last resort

of the commercial banking system

it

state is

exposed

concerned

to the

to limit

find itself playing an indirect role

activities that

By

state is

have been positioned

to

shielding commercial banking from

participation in diversified financial capitalist
firms or diversified capitalist firms, the
state

sought

to

avoid the possibility that

responsibilities to maintain the stability of the

its

commercial banking sector might be imposed upon

to

handle difficulties that emanated

from beyond the commercial banking system.

However, the

intensification of this moral hazard

banking

capitalist activities with

enhance

capitalist profitability.

commercial banking

A capitalist

dilemma by blending non-

may be

a powerful strategy to

firm that enjoys even the possibility of state

support in the event of crisis has a higher tolerance of risk, and thus can pursue strategies

with a higher risk/expected return tradeoff. Moreover, positioning

capitalist activities

within a commercial bank, or sufficiently nearby that the moral hazard

have important cost savings. As Alan Greenspan reasoned
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state.

In recognition

20

intensified, can

in the late 1990s, the cost

funds used to engage in any activity housed within a commercial banks

because of this implicit support of the

is

is

of

moderated

of the importance of this

[I]f you have a new power and you can stick it in the bank, you will do so, because the cost of capital is
lower of the bank’. But the reason for the reduced costs, Greenspan insisted, was the implicit subsidy given
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safety net,

many of the

mimic lender of last
always imperfect.
is finite in

the

financial innovations discussed
in this chapter

resort support or deposit insurance.

Any

that

backs

commercial banks extends
the entity that creates

non-bank financial
for a fee), while

virtue

it.

it

provides and

By

contrast, the

is

mimicry was

money

itself.

capitalist firms

ultimately only as reliable as the

emergency assistance provided

to the full capacities

to

of the Federal Reserve system, which

is

Moreover, any source of crisis support devised by

comes

commercial banks are

at a

price (as

when

eligible for lender

a line of credit

is

purchased

of last resort support just by

of being commercial banks.

Commercial banks thus have
capitalist activity in

advantage

in

hopes of that

a powerful incentive to engage in other types of

their lender

of last resort will translate

these non-banking pursuits. However, the

(BHCA) of 1956

(see chapter 5)

commercial bank

to

was intended

into competitive

Bank Holding Company Act

to prohibit just

engage in diversified financial

of productive and financial
to

this

to

substitute for lender of last resort
support, such as a line of credit,

emergency funds

commercial bank

However,

were motivated

such an attempt by a

capitalist activities, or in the

capitalist activity. In the 1960s,

commercial banks attempted

evade these restrictions on the blending of commercial banking with other

activities

by attacking

the definitions

bank holding company as a firm
contended that

exempt from

if their

employed

that controlled

in the Act.

mixing

While the

capitalist

BHCA defined a

two or more banks, commercial banks

holding companies controlled only one bank, that they should be

BHCA. The

the constraints of the

banks by the world’s knowledge

that the

resulting “one-bank holding

company”

Fed and the FD1C stood behind the banks’ borrowing from

depositors and even from the market.” (in

Mayer 2002, 50)
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their

flourished until Congress acted to address
this loophole that
for

commercial bank involvement

Company Act Amendments were
however

their

While
capitalist

non-banking

it

firm that

1 )

were

commercial bank's

demand

The 1970

ability to initiate diversified

that assisted the formation

legislation defined a

deposits and 2)

to exist,

be “closely related to banking”.

to

had unintended consequences

accepts

1970 the Holding

passed which allowed bank holding
companies

activities

capitalist firms in other respects.

creating opportunities

in diversified capitalist firms.
In

this legislation limited

Anns,

was

makes commercial

of diversified

commercial bank

as a

loans. In an attempt to

subvert this prohibition on the blending of commercial banking
with other capitalist
activities within a

holding

this legislated definition

company

structure, legal

arguments were advanced

of a bank. Lawyers successfully reasoned that a firm

to attack

that

makes

commercial loans without taking deposits, or takes deposits without making commercial
loans,

is

not legally a bank. Thus the “non-bank bank” was born. In 1980 Gulf and

Western's finance company subsidiary, Associates
Fidelity National Bank.

First Capital Corporation, acquired

The Comptroller of the Currency was persuaded

firm need not be classified as a bank in the meaning of the

divested of its commercial loan portfolio. The

same reserve requirements and examinations
access to the payment system and for

FDIC

BHCA so

long as

new non-bank bank was

as regular banks,

that the resulting

it

was

subject to the

and remained

eligible for

insurance, (see Vietor 1987, 49-50) Direct

access to the payments system proved to be an enormous competitive benefit for non-

bank banks, since
activities

it

enabled them to support the credit card and consumer lending

of the parent corporation, or

in the

case of Merrill Lynch,
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it

could execute

its

cash management account transactions.
This offered substantial savings for
the parent

company, because without access

to the

payments system transactions would have

cleared via a commercial bank for a fee.
However, the parent firm

was

to

be

able to engage in

productive and merchant capitalist activities,
as well other financial capitalist
activities

such as corporate securities underwriting and
insurance brokerage.

A

battle

ensued as the Federal Reserve moved

to

broaden the definition of a bank

(including a decision in 1984 to define the purchase
of commercial paper as constituting a

commercial

loan). In

1

986 the United States Supreme Court struck down the changes

in

the definition of commercial banks that the Federal
Reserve had imposed to address the

growth of non-bank banks, and within weeks almost a hundred applications

bank banks were
merchant

filed.

such as Sears,

bank banks

in

of financial

capitalist activity,

1

capitalist activity, the

banks. The

K Mart and Montgomery Ward began to run non-

competition with commercial banks.' To contain

CEBA

Savings and Loan

form non-

Insurance companies, mutual funds, brokerages and even

capitalist firms

Although the

to

this rapid transformation

and the blending of productive, merchant and financial

Competitive Equality in Banking Act (CEBA) was passed

is

primarily remembered for

crisis, the

CEBA placed more

its

in 1987.

intervention in the unfolding

stringent requirements

on non-bank

CEBA obliged the companies affiliated with non-bank banks to

face the

same

regulations as bank holding companies. Although existing non-bank banks were

grandfathered, their asset growth

new non-bank banks was

J

Aswe

was

limited to 7 percent annually and the creation of

prohibited for one year. (Gart 1994, 88-9)

shall see in chapter seven,

even commercial banks sought
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to establish

non-bank banks.

Faced with both the subversion of both

New

Deal financial reforms and the

erosion of the principle of the separation
of commerce and finance generally,

compelled
in the

to confront the increasingly

thorny issue of how to define a
commercial bank

context of the dramatic transformation of financial
capitalist activity. In an implicit

acknowledgement of the impossibility of achieving any
commercial banking

definition

to its role in financial intermediation, the

which would

CEBA

CEBA proclaimed that

a bank

change represents an admission

is

defined as a

that the

member of the FDIC.

metamorphosis

relate

abandoned the

attempt to define a commercial bank in terms of its
financial capitalist
the

CEB A was

activities. Instead,

This definitional

in financial intermediation

had

rendered conceptualizations of financial capitalist activity based
on norms associated
with

New

Deal compartmentalization increasingly obsolete.

The Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act

Throughout the

late

1980s and early 1990s

New

Deal compartmentalization was

becoming increasingly unsustainable. Commercial banks lobbied and fought
with a variety of regulators to expand their capacity to engage
capitalist activities.

While a large number of state and

facilitated this erosion

legal battles

in multiple financial

federal legal and regulatory battles

of New Deal compartmentalization, only a few of the highlights

can be mentioned here. In 1986, the Federal Reserve Board, was prevailed upon
reinterpret Section

to

20 of the Glass-Steagall Act which prohibited commercial banks from

being "engaged principally" in securities business. The Federal Reserve decided

banks could have up

to 5 percent

of gross revenues from investment banking
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that

activities.

Thereafter ensued

principally”,

banking

numerous

battles

concerning the interpretation of the
phrase “engaged

and over time the 5 percent

activities that

was increased and

limit

were permissible were broadened

companies are permitted

to

own

investment bank

until

affiliates

the types of investment

by 1996, bank holding

with up to 25 percent of their

business in securities underwriting. In 1997
Banker's Trust became the

purchase an investment bank, and

first

US

bank

to

199S the Travelers Citicorp merger was announced.

in

Since the Travelers Citicorp merger blended
insurance, commercial banking and

investment banking,

it

was

still in

violation

have required the divestiture of some

however Congress succumbed
repealed

in

lines

of the Glass-Steagall Act. The merger would

of business

to intense lobbying

in the

new

firms within 2 years,

and the Glass-Steagall Act was

1999.

With the passage of the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
“financial modernization act”), the Glass-Steagall Act

created a

new

entity, referred to as a financial

holding

was

(the

repealed. This legislation

company (FHC), which

could

combine commercial banking, investment banking, insurance provision and other
financial capitalist activities within

one holding company

round of mergers and acquisitions amongst large financial

structure. This facilitated a

capitalist firms in

which

large

commercial banking could again be blended with investment banking, insurance
provision and a variety of other financial capitalist activities. Thus the landscape of
financial capitalist firms

Deal

era,

when

was again transformed

in the context

in a

manner reminiscent of the pre-New

of a stock market bubble financial

blend a variety of financial capitalist

activities.
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capitalist firms rushed to

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act

did maintain

some

obstacles to the financial

holding companies’ engaging in productive
capitalist activity. While financial
holding

companies are permitted

to take a controlling interest in
non-financial enterprises 22 these
,

investments are not to be held indefinitely. 23 Moreover,
the financial holding company
not intended to “routinely

manage

or operate" any non-financial firm in which

it

is

invests,

(see Kroszner, 2000) In due course, these
restrictions on creating diversified capitalist

firms are being challenged by financial holding
companies. At the same time, other firms

such as Wal-Mart are making inroads into banking in certain
states while escaping
Federal Reserve oversight since they are not structured as
financial holding companies.

Evaluating
In Light

The

New

Deal Financial Reforms
Of Their Keynesian Motivations

dissertation has presented the case that the

New

Deal financial reforms were

motivated by a Keynesian agenda focussed on the joint objectives of reducing the

subsumed

class

payment required

to secure

money

banking system by enhancing commercial bank

capital

and stabilizing the commercial

profitability. In particular, the

argument

has been presented that financial compartmentalization one of the means by which these
joint objectives

to exert

1

as a

pressure on the subsumed class payment required to secure

class struggle in the second

Subject to some restrictions, such as the requirement that

of Tier
23

downward

by enhancing subsumed

capital

“

were pursued. Financial compartmentalization was analyzed

total

means

money

moment of financial

holdings cannot exceed $6 billion or

capital without Federal Reserve approval.

The Act

stipulates only that such investments can be “held for a period of time to enable the sale or

disposition thereof on a reasonable basis consistent with the financial viability of the [investment]”.

(Kroszner 2000,

1)
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30%

intermediation. This

competition in the

was matched by

first

the moderating effects of
compartmentalization on

moment of financial

banks might gain access

to funds

more vigorous subsumed

intermediation, in order that commercial

cheaply and thereby enhance their
profitability despite

class struggle in the

second moment of financial intermediation.

This chapter traces the ways in which the success
of financial compartmentalization

unleashed pressures to subvert financial
compartmentalization, culminating

complete repudiation of this regulatory principle
1999. However,

little

in the repeal

in the

of the Glass-Steagall Act

has been said throughout the dissertation concerning

how

in

the rise

and decline of financial compartmentalization impacted
these joint objectives of low

subsumed

class

payments

for access to

banking system. Chapter 8 will speak

banking system over

money

this

money

capital

to the issue

and

of the

stability in the

stability

commercial

of the commercial

time period, however some comments on the costs of obtaining

capital are in order here.

Thus

far the

question has not been posed as to whether

New

Deal financial

reforms succeeded in producing a low subsumed class payments for access
capital.

Nor have we considered whether

the undermining of the

New

to

money

Deal reforms

translated into an increase in this

subsumed

class

payment. These questions have not been

posed since the assertion

subsumed

class

payment required

capital

is

that the

to obtain

money

overdetermined precludes establishing a cause and effect relationship between

the measures

imposed by

that prevailed.

New

Deal financial reforms and the subsumed class payment

We argue that the intensification of subsumed class struggle among

financial capitalist firms

was promoted by

the abolition of diversified financial capitalist
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firms.

However,

at

the

same time

the contradictory possibility exists
that

compartmentahzation might exert an upward pressure on
the cost of securing savings
the

size

first

moment of financial

intermediation might translate into upward
pressure on the

of this subsumed class payment. Since the design
of compartmentahzation contained

contradictory implications,

would produce
secure

this

in

money

subsumed

capitalists

in

it is

impossible to conclude what the “success” of this
reform

terms of its net effect on the subsumed class
payment required

capital.

to

Moreover, these particular reforms are not the only
determinant of

class payment. For example,

subsumed

were overdetermined by numerous

factors,

class struggle

among

financial

such as the imposition of

constraints concerning international capital flows, the dynamics
of stock markets and

business cycles, the evolving tax treatment of debt verses equity capital and
so on. In
addition, this

subsumed

between productive and

class

payment was overdetermined by subsumed

financial capital,

which

in turn is

class struggle

shaped by factors such as the

extent of retained earnings in productive capitalist firms, varying tax provisions, and
so
on.

Nor can an overdeterminist
compartmentahzation
increase in the

set in

subsumed

class

reemergence of diversified
firms could

motion

analysis conclude that, as financial

its

own

negation, this translated as an unambiguous

payment required

to secure

money

capital.

Arguably the

financial capitalist firms again posed the possibility that such

manage subsumed

class struggle in the second

moment of financial

intermediation in order to promote upward pressure on the subsumed class payment

required to secure

money

capital.

However, the overdetermined context
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in

which these

diversified financial capitalist firms
re-emerged differed vastly from the
context that

prevailed in earlier encounters with “finance
capital” a la Hilferding. For
example, while

some

financial innovations facilitated the
re-emergence of diversified financial
capitalist

firms, they also

capitalist firms

produced opportunities

for productive capitalist firms to
bypass financial

and access funds directly from savers. Add

to these ambiguities all

of the

other overdeterminants that were exerting diverse
impacts on the subsumed class

payment required

to secure

relationship between the

money

capital,

and no ready assertion can be made as

denouement of New Deal

financial reforms and this

to the

subsumed

class payment.

Given

that

any policy

of overdeterminants

initiative implies its

that are set in

own

negation, and given the multitude

motion by the contradictory impacts of the policy

intervention, the possibility of establishing a causal determination between
policy

intervention and

outcome

is

abandoned. Thus

we

forsake at the outset any attempt to

conclude that a policy “works” (or doesn’t “work”)
represents a dramatic departure from the

policy.

The economic

to achieve its desired objective. This

more conventional motivations

for studying

history presented in this dissertation remains agnostic about the

matters typically advanced in economic history (namely offering conclusions about the

success of an intervention and offering suggestions as to

how

an intervention might be

improved). Instead, this dissertation follows the unfolding of the contradictions of a
particular set of reforms to illustrate the uncontrollability of policy from an

overdeterminist perspective.
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CHAPTER

7

THE TRANSFORMATION OF COMMERCIAL BANKS
DURING THE
DECLINE OF NEW DEAL FINANCIAL
COMPARTMENTALIZATION

Commercial Bank Response To The C ompetitive Threats
During The Erosion Of
Financial Compartmentalization

Chapter six argued

enhance commercial bank

that, despite the intention

of New Deal financial reforms

profitability as a condition

of existence

for the stability

to

of the

commercial banking system, these reforms ultimately had the
unintended consequence of
provoking competitive struggles

that

undermined commercial bank

supports to commercial bank profitability contained in

New

profitability.

commercial banks

lost

ground both in

provision of funds in the second

culminated in a profitability

moment

crisis for

FDIC member commercial banks
stood

at

.66% and

hit its

low point

Commercial banks responded
regulatory framework

discussed

company

ol financial intermediation.

at

1987

.85%,

at

in several

it

in

and

capitalist

in the

These developments

1970 the

ROA of

decline thereafter until by 1985

it

.09%. (see Figure 21, chapter 5)

ways

was increasingly impairing

some of these responses

the holding

in

their ability to attract savings

commercial banks. While

stood

the

Deal financial

compartmentalization were subverted by competition from non-bank financial
firms,

As

to the recognition that the

their profitability.

as they related to the creation

structure, this chapter focuses
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New

Deal

While chapter 6

of diversified firms via

on the practices adopted within

commercial banking firms

1

to

enhance

their profitability. This chapter
outlines

categories of competitive strategies employed

by commercial banks

to

manipulate the

confines of New Deal financial
compartmentalization to their advantage.

commercial banks attempted

to

enhance

their profitability

two broad

First,

by innovations within

the

practice of commercial banking. These sorts
of competitive responses will be referred
to
as “commercial banking strategies”, since
they

commercial banking employed

fall

in this dissertation,

within the confines of the definition of

namely

that

constitutes the taking of deposits and financing loans
based

commercial banking
first

strategies focussed both

commercial banking

on these deposits. These

on commercial bank

activities in both the

and second moments of financial intermediation. Secondly,
commercial banks

sought to enhance their profitability by engaging in activities that
expanded beyond the
class analytic definition

in the first

of commercial banking. Commercial banks began seeking money

moment of financial

intermediation through sources other than deposits, and

they began to engage in fonns of value expansion other than the earning of subsumed
class

and non-class revenue from the provision of loans. These

sorts

of competitive

responses will be referred to as “strategies beyond traditional commercial banking”,
despite the fact that these strategies were

employed

in firms that, for regulatory purposes,

were categorized as commercial banks.

1

By

referring to the practices adopted “within commercial banking firm”,

entity classified as a

subsidiaries that

commercial bank.

engaged

activities occurring in the

we mean activities within the
company structure that had

If that entity existed within a holding

non-commercial banking activities, we are not referring to
non-commercial bank subdivisions of the holding company.

in

197

the plethora of

Whether within or outside of traditional commercial
banking,
employed

to

enhance commercial bank

profitability exhibited

these strategies

some commonalties. As

many of the

benefits of New Deal compartmentalization
were transformed into

competitive

liabilities for

commercial banks, commercial bank

profitability

was

constrained by both interest rate controls and the
regulatory constraints that prohibited

commercial banks from engaging

commercial banks

lost their

in

non-banking forms of value expansion. Moreover, as

hegemonic

necessity of maintaining required reserves

competitive

liability.

among

status

financial intermediaries, the

was regarded

as an increasingly

The evasion of these major regulatory

constraints

burdensome

became

a central

focus of commercial bank strategies to respond to the threats to their
profitability posed

by non-bank financial

capitalist firms.

However, commercial banks

also formulated their competitive strategies with an

eye to maximizing their regulatory advantages. Their privileged access

to the

payments

system was increasingly eroded but not eliminated as a competitive advantage

non-bank financial

capitalist firms.

advantage was their ability
explicit access to lender

to offer

However commercial banks’ most

vis

a

vis

distinctive

government sponsored deposit insurance and

their

of last resort support. The existence of this safety net helped

to

induce commercial banks to respond to their profitability problems by moving into
activities that implied greater risk

while

New

exposure for the commercial banking system. Thus

Deal financial reforms had sought

to support the stability
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of the commercial

banking system, over time one of their unintended
consequences was

commercial banks

engage

to

in activities that

compromised

to induce

the stability of the

commercial banking system.

C ommercial Banking

In order to

traditional terrain,

the

first

Stra teg ies In

respond

The

to the incursions

First

Moment Of Financial

of non-bank financial

commercial banks sought ways of buttressing

moment of financial

intermediation. Since

hindered the ability of commercial banks

to attract

New

Deal

Intermediation

capitalists

on

their

their access to savings in

interest rate controls

savings in an environment of

accelerating inflation, commercial banks were obliged to subvert
the interest rate controls

had originally been enacted

that

support their profitability. Depending on the type of

to

deposit account in question, raising the interest paid to attract deposits involved

overcoming the Regulation

Q cap

on the

rate

of interest that could be paid on savings

accounts, or overcoming the complete prohibition on paying interest on transactions
deposits.

However,

if

a commercial

bank successfully managed

to

restrictions to increase their access to savings, this implied putting

the

Y

expenses associated with attracting deposits. Figure 29

on domestic deposits

as a percentage

upward pressure on

illustrates

how

interest paid

of total domestic deposits grew dramatically during

the 1970s and 1980 as commercial banks

Thus

evade these

were compelled

to

pay more

to attract deposits.

the success of commercial banks’ evasion of interest rate controls had contradictory

effects in that

it

both enhanced and detracted from commercial bank
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profitability.

Figure 29: Interest

On Deposits In Domestic Offices As A
Of FDIC Member Banks
Historical Statistics on Banking CB06
and CB15.

Percentage

Deposits

S° urce

:

To

Of Total Domestic

deal with this dilemma, commercial banks sought to devise competitive

strategies that simultaneously

upward pressure on

dilemma was

their

promoted

their access to savings while defraying the

expenses of attracting these savings. One response

the attempts

by commercial banks

deposits. This so-called “liability

to

enhance the earning potential of

management” sought

to enable a given

deposits (the liabilities of the commercial bank) to support

compensating

for the increased costs

more

lending, thus

is

to

manage required

reserve positions

aggressively. Required reserves represent a forgone opportunity to

at the

amount of

of attracting funds from savers. One of the ways

support the earning potential of deposits

they do not earn interest

to this

Federal Reserve.
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To

make new

to

more

loans and

the extent that commercial banks

could reduce their holdings of reserves
for a given amount of deposits,
generate

new

lending.

However, as reserves decline

this freed

relative to deposits,

banks become more highly leveraged and thus
more vulnerable

commercial

to instability.

extent that commercial banks attempted to
enhance their profitability

funds to

Thus

to the

by diminishing

their

holdings of required reserves per dollar of deposits,
this development promotes

commercial bank

profitability

by creating greater

fragility in the

commercial banking

system.

Perhaps the most famous example of liability management
was the development of
the federal funds market.

that a

commercial bank

As was

may

discussed in chapter

3,

lending conditions

elect to hold excess reserves.

may be

such

Commercial banks developed

the federal funds market to take advantage of any slack in the
required reserves of the

commercial banking system as a whole. The federal funds market
exclusively to commercial banks, and
to

“lend" them overnight

its

lending opportunities.

fully

employ any excess

to a

it

reserves, the

open almost

allows a commercial bank with excess reserves

commercial bank

By improving

is

that has insufficient reserves to support

the capacity of the commercial banking system to

development of the federal funds market enhanced

the profitability of the “borrowing'’ commercial banks (which could

now advance new

loans) and “lending" commercial banks (that earns income for their provision of excess

reserves).

2

When

federal funds transactions

Prior to 1963 the federal funds market

to

by commercial banks

appeared

in the

was constrained, since regulation forbade banks from making

one borrower of more than ten percent of a bank’s

deemed

first

capital. In

loans

1963 the Comptroller of the Currency

these transactions to be agreements to repurchase rather than loans. This freed banks with excess

reserves from the regulatory limits on lending to one borrower, which greatly stimulated the development

of the federal funds market. (Mayer, 2001, 171)
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FDIC

s statistics in

1965, federal funds purchases on the books
of FDIC-insured

commercial banks amounted
in

to

only about $2.4

billion.

By

1980, commercial banks had

excess of $133 billion in federal funds on their
books, and by 1990

$245

billion.

this figure

reached

(HSOB, CB16)

However, the development of the

federal funds

market also had

its perils.

Federal

funds transactions are unsecured and are not protected
by deposit insurance. In addition,

they are typically very short term (one day or weekend).
In this context, commercial

banks rumored

to

be

in distress

federal funds borrowings.

As

may

will

find themselves suddenly unable to roll over their

be discussed below, problems rolling over federal

funds borrowing helped to provoke the failure of the Franklin National
Bank (1974) and
the Continental Illinois

crisis face a

increase

its

employing

Bank

(1984). Thus commercial banks experiencing a profitability

quandary. Borrowing heavily

in the federal

loan portfolio and thereby earn

this strategy is increasingly

way

its

exposed

funds market allows a bank

to

out of difficulties, however a bank

to the possibility

of a liquidity

crisis

reminiscent of a depositor-induced bank run.

Another dimension of the competitive

moment of financial

intermediation

was

strategies

to find

of commercial banks

ways of evading

the prohibition on the

payment of interest on checking accounts. One such example of the
designed to do this

is

the

financial innovations

“sweep” account. Larger depositors often require extensive

checking privileges, particularly
for payroll

in the first

capitalist firms

purposes or other “bulges”

in their

keeping large sums

in

checkable deposits

expenses. These deposits had been an
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attractive source

of interest-free funds for commercial banks,
yet they were threatened

the extent that non-bank financial
capitalists could

To prevent

deposits.

mimic

the checking privileges of bank

the loss of these deposits, commercial
banks developed sweep

accounts to enable large depositors

Sweep accounts move funds

to earn a rate

of return on

their

checking accounts.

of some prearranged limit out of the depositor’s

in excess

checking account and into an overnight repurchase agreement 3

that

would allow

depositor to earn a return on these excess funds. In
1980, commercial banks

extend these sorts of accounts to smaller depositors

ability to

transfer savings

to

in the

accounts that transferred funds from checking

won

the

the

form of “automatic

to interest-bearing

savings accounts.

Commercial banks

ways around

also sought

the Regulation

Q cap

on the

interest

payable on savings accounts. The development of certificate of deposit (CD) exemplifies
this strategy.

at

A CD provides

a saver with interest

maturity in a manner analogous to a bond. However,

deposits

4
,

and are thus covered by deposit insurance.

banks successfully lobbied for

Thanks

to these

commercial banks.

4

79) However,

CDs

Retail

CDs

bill

to

CDs

are classified as time

In the early 1970s,

be freed from Regulation

CD

principal

Q

commercial

limits altogether.

market grew ten-fold between 1965 and 1975.

CDs

also add

new

sources of instability to

are marketed widely (thus evading the prohibition on interstate

In such a repurchase agreement, the

repurchase the Treasury
to the interest

CDs

developments, the

(Meerschwam 1987,

3

payments and the return of the

bank would sell its customer a Treasury bill overnight, and
The repurchase would be at a given rate, equivalent roughly

the following day.

earned on the Treasury

bill in the

intervening period.

are classified as small time deposits, in contrast to large negotiable

are classified as large time deposits (see below).

203

CDs

(wholesale CDs) that

banking
savers

to

some degree) and

who have no

commercial banks

therefore enable commercial banks to
access funds from

longstanding relationship with the bank.
While

to access additional funds quickly

CDs

enable

by making small changes

in the

offering rate, they also contain the potential
of losing funds quickly. 5

While the
required reserve

federal funds market enabled

more

commercial banks

to

effectively,

evade

New

commercial banks

to

manage

their

and such innovations as sweep accounts allowed

Deal

interest rate controls,

commercial banks sought

financial innovations that incorporated both the minimization
of required reserves and the

evasion of interest rate controls.

One of the ways of doing

regulatory categories under which deposits are classified.

could be reclassified as a

savings

this

To

was

to

manipulate the

the extent that a deposit

account rather than a “checking'’ account, the

reserves held against that account could be reduced. Moreover, while checking accounts

paid no interest, savings accounts could pay up to the Regulation

could be classified as a savings account, yet be
the commercial

made

Q

ceiling. If a deposit

to function like a

checking account,

bank would both economize on required reserves and evade

the

prohibition on paying interest on checking accounts. This savings emanating from

lowering required reserves positions would
pressure on

Y

to

some

expenses associated with paying

extent counter-act the upward

interest

on the deposits

that

were

previously interest-free. This strategy was exemplified by the introduction of Negotiable

5

The potential instability introduced by commercial bank participation in CD markets attracted concern in
1965 when several weakened commercial banks offered brokers of CDs bonuses to place their issues and

subsequently

failed.

(See Myers 1971, 384)
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Order of Withdrawal

(NOW)

accounts, which enabled commercial
banks to offer

"negotiable orders of withdrawal” that function
like checks on accounts that are
not
categorized as transactions accounts.

Despite the variety of financial innovations employed
to economize on required
reserves,

pay

Regulation

in the late

interest

Q cap on
1

on accounts

that functioned like

checking accounts, and evade the

savings accounts, commercial banks were

still

under great pressure

970s. In response to this situation, commercial banks were
increasingly

withdrawing from Federal Reserve membership because the Federal
Reserve imposed

more

stringent required reserves ratios than

commercial banks were required

many

to maintain.

6

state-chartered,

This declining Federal Reserve

membership created concerns among Federal Reserve
implement monetary policy. The Depository
Control Act

(DIDMCA)

requirement for
Reserve.

7

all

of 1980 dealt with

officials

this

if

they were

This eliminated the incentive for commercial banks to

DIDMCA

to

and Monetary

by establishing uniform reserve

Reserve membership, however commercial banks were able

6

about their capacity

Institutions Deregulation

depository institutions, regardless

concessions in the Act. The

non-member

members of Federal

flee their Federal

to extract several

lowered required reserves

to

12% on

transactions

Nationally chartered commercial banks are required to be members of the Federal Reserve, while

state

chartered commercial banks can chose whether or not to belong to the Federal Reserve.
7

The

DIDMCA

gave

all

banks access

transfers, automatic clearing facilitates

offered at cost to

all

to discount

window, check clearing

,

safekeeping of securities wire

and cash transportation services. These were once

free, but

depository institution that maintain their required reserves. (Gart 1994, 83)
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now

are

accounts and
banks, by

1

3%

on non-transactions accounts. 8 After

further lobbying

by commercial

990 required reserves were eliminated on
non-transactions accounts, and by

1992 the checking account required reserves
also phased out Regulation

ratio

Q over a period of 6

was reduced

years,

to

10%. The

and overrode

on mortgage, agricultural, business and consumer loans

in excess

state

DIDMCA

usury ceilings

of $25,000 9 and
,

increased

FDIC

insurance to cover $100,000 per deposit account. Both
the financial

innovations created by commercial banks to enhance their
profitability in the

moment of financial
ratios, ultimately

system.

intermediation, and the legislative changes to required reserves

had a substantial impact on the reserves held

As Figure

first

in the

commercial banking

30, indicates required reserve holdings of the commercial banking

system were dramatically reduced as a proportion of the

total financial assets held

by

commercial banks.

8

As of 1951 required

reserves were

6%

on savings accounts, and

as high as

(depending on the classification of the bank). These required reserve
post-war period prior to the passage of the
9

States could re-impose usury laws

DIDMCA.

by 1983

if

ratios

23% on demand

(See Feinman undated, 587-588)

they so chose.
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deposits

were eroded throughout the

Figure 30: Vault Cash
Total Financial Assets

And Reserves Held At Federal Reserve As A
Of Us-Chartered Commercial Banks

Percentage

Of The

Source: Flow of Funds L.l 10.
.

While the reserves held

in the

commercial banking system were diminishing,

commercial banks were succeeding
for deposit insurance.

Thus

in increasing the sorts

the governmental safety net

of activities

that

were

was widening while

eligible

at the

same

time the capacity of stabilizing attributes of required reserves were being compromised.

For example, while Regulation

Q was

undergoing

commercial banks faced a quandary when

its

six year phase-out period,

interest rates soared during the early part

Volker's tenure as Chairman of the Federal Reserve. Regulation
liability, particularly

since

Q

was

of

a dire competitive

MMMFs that could offer money market rates of return were

producing a hemorrhage of funds from savings deposits. To deal with
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this

problem, the

1982 Depository Institutions Act (the
“Garn-St .Germain” Act) authorized
commercial

banks

to offer

money market

money market demand
instruments just as

insurance, unlike

MMMFs.

accounts

(MMDA). These

accounts invested

in

MMMFs did, however they were covered by deposits

In addition,

MMDAs were classified as savings accounts

because of a regulatory compromise allowing only
a fixed number of “checks” written
on
the account per month, which helped to

economize on the required reserves held

to

support them.

1

he strategy of taking fuller advantage of commercial banks'
access to the

government safety net was epitomized by development of so-called “brokered

A

broker, typically an investment bank 10 could split an
,

deposit insurance cap

maximum amount

among many commercial banks

that

is

covered by FDIC. In

this

amount of funds

deposits".

in excess

of the

so that each bank held only the

way, the depositor enjoyed deposit

insurance on their entire amount despite the explicit cap on deposit insurance for a single

depository account. If the funds were then put in a

money market
concerned
practices.

rate

that the

MMDA,

of return. As brokered deposits grew

the depositor could earn a

in popularity, the

FDIC became

heavy use of brokered deposits were promoting dubious banking

Commercial banks

in difficulties

might be tempted

to

pay

a

premium

to

have

access to brokered deposits, and the insurance coverage on such deposits diluted the
incentive for the broker to avoid dealing with commercial banks of questionable

solvency.

10

By

the early 1980s the

heavy use of brokered deposits were figuring

This financial innovation adds a third party, an investment bank, into the financial intermediation

process.

Thus investment banks were able

and commercial banks, which marks

income from facilitating the matching of depositors
subsumed class struggle between commercial and

to derive fee

a shift in the

investment banks.
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prominently in bank

of total

liabilities

1984 (by

failures,

of the

and

in

failed bank.

some
11

cases brokered deposits were in
excess of

While the FDIC attempted

instituting an insurance limit

of $100,000 per broker),

court. After a protracted struggle, limits

to

this

ban

this practice in

was defeated

on brokered deposits were included

Financial institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement act of 1989

50%

in

in the

(FIRREA) and

the

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act (FDICIA) of 1991

Commercial Banking

Strategies In

In addition to the attempts to

financial intermediation,

by adapting

The

The Second Moment Of Financial Intermediation

enhance

their deposit

commercial banks also endeavored

their competitive strategies in the

in the first

moment of

to support their profitability

second moment of financial intermediation.

financial innovations described in chapter 6

in that large corporate

base

were debilitating

to

commercial banks,

borrowers with good credit ratings were increasingly accessing

funds from securities issuance, the commercial paper market and other sources rather
than from commercial banks.

lent to riskier borrowers.

To

replace these borrowers, commercial banks increasingly

This also enhanced the earning power of their loan portfolios

since the interest rate charged on a loan increases according to the perceived riskiness of
the loan. This

largest

into risky lending areas

commercial banks.

portfolio if

11

movement

This data

is

it

is

A bank

is

was

particularly

pronounced among the

in better situated to withstand default risks in

its

confident of receiving the fullest possible benefits of the government

taken from a report by the Federal Reserve
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Bank of New York quoted

in d’ Arista,

137.

loan

Thus

safety net.

to

engage

the largest banks

in riskier lending, since

implicit in the

government safety

The increasing emphasis on

new

which

are perceived as “too-big-to-fail”

were best able

they benefited most from the moral
hazard dilemma
net.

credit cards in the 1970s

and beyond exemplifies

this

trend in commercial bank lending. Technological
developments (especially the

establishment of standards for magnetic strips in
1970) reduced the record-keeping

expense of these small consumer loans and enabled them
format. Credit card lending

debt.

However,

rates

of interest. Hubbard

credit cards

is

viewed

be standardized

in credit card

as risky, given that credit card loans are unsecured

have generally been able

cites

to

to

evade usury limits

to

charge high

an named Federal Reserve source indicating that the rate

of return from credit card lending

is

higher than that of any other asset — a premium of

12% above

the interest rate applied to short-term default risk-free lending. (Hubbard

1996, 325)

A

income

final

advantage of credit card lending

(see below), in the

is

also that they can generate fee

form of non-class revenue from the fees paid by

stores that

accept the credit card, and often fees paid by the credit card holder. Thanks to these

advantages, credit card loans (and related loans) exhibited a
rate

of

15% between 1970 and

1999, with

many

compound annual growth

years in the 1970s and

mid 1980s

exhibiting an annual growth rate in credit cards and other related loans in excess of 25%.
(author's calculations from

HSOB CB13

and early 1990s, credit cards proved

to

and CB15) In the

difficult

times in the 1980s

be a salvation for commercial banks. Mayer

quotes a MasterCard official’s claim that “In 1992 Citibank was technically insolvent.

What

kept them going

was

a billion-dollar profit
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on

credit cards”.

(

1

997, 191)

2

,

In addition to

expanding

into

consumer lending, commercial banks expanded

lending to third world states in the 1970s 12

.

As

US

large

commercial banks

aggressively to the third world governments (a practice
that

came

be

to

their

lent

know

as “loan-

pushing”), these states experienced an alarming increase
in the level of indebtedness. 13

By

the end of 1982, the nine major

countries loans that constituted

US

558)

US

288%

commercial banks had advanced

of their bank

commercial banks were plunged

interest rates in the early 1980s,

countries) could not

meet

its

commercial banks were able

it

capital.

into crisis

became apparent

debtor

(Sachs and Huizinga 1987,

when,

in the face

Mexico (and

that

LDC

of the high

other debtor

debt service commitments in 1982. For the next five years
to

manage

this crisis,

thanks in part to regulatory

permissiveness that allowed the banks to count as current income the interest payments
they received as a result of “involuntary” loans (that

is,

new

made

loans

to the debtor in

order cover interest obligations and thereby prevent outright default, (see Sachs and

Huizinga 1987, 557)

By some

accounts, this regulatory forbearance

seven or eight of the ten largest

1

The banks were

banks

into official insolvency.

fall

assisted in their zeal to lend to third world countries

nationally chartered commercial bank

OCC determined in

1979

as a single entity, thus

were able

US

generally subject to a

that the various public sector

many commercial banks

to continue to

“a single U.S. bank

is

engage

may have

that

10%

borrowers

in

by

an

LDC

A

13

still

not be

in

Senate report

loans outstanding to 20 different public entities

In 1970 the 15

10%

of their

violation of the rule” (in

FDIC

OCC

any one

in 1979.

entity.

in violation
at this

in Brazil,

may

far

of the

10% mle

time observed that

none of which
exceed the

limit,

1997, 204).

most heavily indebted nations had external public debt of about $18 billion, or almost
these states owed $402 billion, or about 47.5% of their GDP (see Ferraro and

GNP. By 1987

Rosser 1994, 333).
14

US

A

The

did not have to be considered

would otherwise have been

in highly concentrated lending.

lest

(FDIC 1997, 207)

a ruling of the

limit to loan to

individually exceeds 10 percent of the bank's capital, but which taken together

and

was necessary

commercial banks other than these nine major banks were much less exposed to third world debt
1 16% of bank capital by the end of 198. (Sachs and Huizinga. 1987, 558)

since their loans consisted of
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By

this

mechanism, Sachs and Huizinga report

that “ironically, during the

1982-86 the

debt crisis did not have a serious adverse
effect on the reported current
earnings of the

banks, even though
original) This

gave

it

called into question their very solvency”.
(1987, 567. italics in

US

commercial banks some time

the end of 1986 their exposure to

LDC

debtors

that

it

would increase

world debt exposure. As a
large

result

(ibid.,

was symbolized when

in its loan loss reserve

of losses connected

commercial banks posted losses of about $10

(ibid.,

respond to the problem, so

was 154% of capital,

the situation could be publicly acknowledged,
as

announced

to

by $3

that

by

By 1987

558)

Citicorp

billion to address

third

its

world debt problem,

to the third

billion in the

second quarter of 1987.

570)

In the attempt to earn their

difficulties

and

way

out of both their specific third world debt

their general profitability problems,

commercial banks turned

forms of risky lending. In the 1980s commercial banks increased
activities

connected with commercial

gas sectors,

all

their lending to

mergers and acquisitions, and

of which are traditionally perceived as risky lending

facilitated, in part,

by

legal

areas. This

oil

and

was

changes such as The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981

that accelerated depreciation

attractive,

real estate,

to other

L

allowances \ which made real estate investment more

and included other provisions

that facilitated the use

of debt

to finance

corporate takeovers and leveraged buyouts. (Wolfson 1994, 109-1 12) Real estate loans,
for

example, constituted 17.8% of total commercial bank assets

1990

15

this

Many

had climbed

to

in 1980,

however by

about 27.1%. (FDIC 1997, 152) However these real estate loans

of these provisions were subsequently repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which contributed

to the collapse

of the commercial

real estate

market

in the later 1980s.
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had increasingly been advanced on the
strength of the underlying
the borrowers ability to generate
earnings from the asset. 16
estate, particularly in

New

collateral rather than

A collapse

in

commercial

on

real

England, had disastrous implications for
commercial banks,

and played a prominent role in commercial
bank

failures in the later

1980s and early

1990s.

As commercial banks experienced problems
undertaken

to buttress their profitability

whole grew more precarious.
from Moody’s, but by 1993

lending activities

dilemma, the commercial banking system

In 1986, nine

J.P.

in the riskier

US

banks enjoyed a long-term

Morgan and Co. was

the only

bank

(Mayer 2001, 220) The impact of non-performing loans aggravated
commercial bank

profitability

failed per year.

Bank

years reached 200 or

16

An

failures

is

given

in

in loan

category.

the pressure that

to an

FDIC-member banks

year, (see Figure 17,

underwriting standards during the commercial real estate

FDIC’s History of the Eighties- Lessons

for the Future:

An

1980

to a negative

6.1%, and remained negative or close
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some

boom

in the

Examination of the Banking

.

in

in

Chapter 5)

Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s (1997) Overall returns on commercial real estate properties

18.1%

A rating

exceeded 120 per year between 1985 and 1992, and

more per

account of the erosion

1980s

left in this

was already experiencing, and contributed

accelerated incidence of bank failures. Before 1975, fewer that 10

triple

as a

to zero until

1994 (150).

fell

form

Responses

C ompetitive

B ey ond

Strategies In

Traditional

The

Fir st

Commercial Banking:

Moment Of Financial

Intermediation

Given the pressure experienced by commercial
banks during the denouement of
financial compartmentalization,

fall

commercial banks increasingly engaged

outside of commercial banking as

we have

defined

it

in activities that

in the dissertation.

Chapter

defined commercial banking as the taking of deposits
and using those deposits to
loans.

Thus commercial bank non-class revenues

in the first

3

make

moment of financial

intermediation consist exclusively of the receipt of deposits,
while value expansion

in the

second moment of financial intermediation consists of the
subsumed class and non-class
revenues derived from interest income on commercial bank loans.
As commercial banks
fashioned competitive strategies that

moved beyond

mix of revenues and expenditures changed.

traditional

In the first

commercial banking,

moment of financial

intermediation, commercial banks increasingly accessed funds via
deposits. In the second

moment of financial

their

means other than

intermediation, commercial banks generated

value inflows through means other than earning interest income on loans. 17 The current
section will discuss the migration of commercial banks into activities outside of
traditional

commercial banking

in the first

moment of financial

intermediation, while the

following section will consider the efforts of commercial banks to expand value by

means other than earning

17

interest

income from

For the purposes of this discussion, we leave aside the

commercial banking,
interest

for

example

loans.

traditional activities that are incidental to

the provision of safety deposit boxes, that generate revenues that are not

income.
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8

In

in

banking parlance, accessing savings

forms other than traditional deposits

is

are a non-class revenue that requires
the

expense paid

to attract deposits.

in the first

moment of financial

intermediation

called “purchasing” funds. 18 Purchased
funds

bank

to incur a

Y

expense, similar to the

Purchased funds are not subject

to

New

Deal

controls or reserve requirements, nor are they
eligible for deposit insurance.

Y

interest rate

One of the

landmarks in the use of purchased funds by commercial
banks was Citibank’s

development of the large negotiable

CD

negotiable

of deposit (CD)

in 1961.

19

The

large

has a relatively short maturity (typically 30 to 90 days),
but the creation of

a secondary market for

wholesale

certificate

CDs

often purchased

CDs

enabled the owner

are usually

by

denominated

in

to access

funds prior to maturity. These

amounts of $1 million or more, and

institutional investors seeking a small

premium over Treasury

Other ways of accessing purchased funds include Repurchase Agreements
(RPs)

commercial paper issued by a commercial bank via
borrowing

in the

its

are

holding company

21
,

bills.

20
,

or via

Euromarket. Ironically, these instruments often enabled commercial

1

Purchased funds are also known as managed

liabilities.

In the early post-war era, commercial banks held large amounts of government securities that they had
accumulated during the war effort. This provided commercial banks with a buffer, in that should they
require fund in excess of their deposit base, they could turn to the portfolio of government securities
.

However, by the 1960s commercial bank holdings of these securities had been depleted
commercial banks turned increasingly to purchased funds. (Mayer et. al. 1984, 66)
20

An RP

is

funds will

an agreement to

sell securities for

sell

and subsequently repurchase

some

securities.

substantially, thus

A commercial bank

specified time period, with the agreement that

it

in

need of

will repurchase

them

at a

later date.

21

Thanks to a 1962 ruling from the Comptroller of the Currency, commercial banks were permitted to
commercial paper. However, a struggle ensued when the Federal Reserve ruled that commercial paper

issue

was resolved as commercial paper came to be issued by
bank holding company (or a non-bank subsidiary), and the funds were made available to the affiliated
commercial bank when the issuer of the commercial paper purchased the banks loans. (Wolfson 1994, 178constituted a time deposit in 1966. Ultimately this

a

9)
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banks

to again access

some of the funds

the commercial banking system, as

negotiable

CD

that

when

a

non-bank competitors had lured away from

MMMF or a pension funds purchases a large

or commercial paper from a commercial
bank.

Despite their advantages as another source of
funds with which to earn income,

purchased funds are sometimes referred

to as the “hot

money” of bank funding (Sinkey

2002, 105) since they can dramatically exacerbate commercial
bank

instability.

Participants in the purchased funds markets tend to
be very large, well-informed
institutions that react quickly to

any adverse information

(as well as

rumor

22
)

about the

wellbeing of a bank. Over a very short period of time, a commercial
bank can find
virtually shut out

CDs

of purchased funds markets, regardless of the return

and other instruments with which

it

that

it

offers

purchases funds. Moreover, participants

itself

on

its

in

purchased funds markets can reallocate their funds almost instantaneously through
electronic channels in a “purchased funds run” or “electronic
traditional

bank run might be attenuated by the dramatic

truck to placate depositors, purchased

regulators to respond before a bank

money

becomes

runs allow

insolvent.

bank run”. While a

arrival

much

To

of money

less

in

an armored

time for banking

reflect the potential instability

of this source of funds for commercial banks, the FDIC defined many of these purchased
funds as “volatile

been changed

"

23

liabilities”.

to the

Rumors concerning

This descriptive regulatory designation has more recently

more benign-sounding “non-core

the possibility that a Japanese

liabilities”.

bank would acquire Continental Illinois, or that the
helped to produced the electronic bank run that

OCC had approached other banks to assist Continental,
devastated that bank in
23

As defined by FDIC,

May

1984.

denomination time deposits (such as CDs), foreign
and repurchase agreements and other borrowings. (Sinkey 2002,

volatile liabilities include large

office deposits, federal funds purchased,

435)
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As commercial banks came
were increasingly implicated

to rely

bank

in

1974 married both the tendency

to

more heavily upon them, purchased funds

failures.

The

failure

of Franklin National Bank

extend loans to poor credit

risks,

in

alongside a heavy

dependence on purchased funds. (Wolfson
1994, 56) Once Franklin’s problems became

known, a purchased fund run hurtled Franklin towards

outright failure very rapidly.

Although Franklin was not a particularly prominent bank,
the Federal Reserve judged the
situation to be so potentially

Eurodollar market that
at Franklin, the

liabilities

FDIC

it

to

both the domestic market for bank

Franklin could not be permitted to

fail.

To

CDs and

the

resolve the situation

required time to arrange for other banks to assume the
Franklin’s

and purchase

its

assets.

keep Franklin operating on
resolved. Franklin

damaging

life

This implied that the Federal Reserve was obliged to

support for several months while the situation was

was kept open with borrowing from

averaged slightly more than $1 billion per day between

the discount

May

window

that

8 and October 7 (Sinkey

2002, 563), and Federal Reserve guarantees on a daily average of $300 million

in loans

from other banks on the federal funds markets, (see Wolfson 1994, 56-59)

While lender of last

resort support

was conceived of as

a support to the depositary

system, the increasing reliance of commercial banks on purchased funds has generated
the de facto understanding that the Federal Reserve stands ready to stabilize commercial

banks

in their

Reserve

may

undertakings related to purchased funds.

be called upon to address a

involvement with purchased funds,
resort

mandate.

Any

crisis that

this represents

financial capitalist firm

may
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To

the extent that the Federal

emanates from commercial banks'

an expansion of this lender of last

purchase funds

in the first

moment of

financial intermediation. Indeed

many of the

instruments that commercial banks use
to

purchase funds, such as commercial paper, are
also used by non-bank financial
capitalists.

in

Thus providing a government-backed

safety net for commercial bank dealings

purchased funds represents a movement towards the
provision of emergency assistance

to financial capitalist activities in
general

destabilize the

-

so long as a given crisis can be

commercial banking system.

In this

shown

to

way, the migration of commercial

banks into purchased funds, and the increasing obligation

that the

government safety

net

address banking crisis that have large purchased funds
components, represents another
intensification

of the moral hazard dilemma faced by the government.

This implied lender of last resort support assists commercial banks

purchased funds since

non-bank financial
assists

it

lowers the

Y

in attracting

market for

cost of attracting purchased funds vis a vis their

capitalist competitors.

commercial banks

in the

To

the extent that lender of last resort support

purchased funds, commercial banks have a

competitive advantages vis a vis the non-bank financial capitalist firms in purchased

funds markets. Moreover, the advantage conferred by
is

this implicit

governmental support

greater the larger the commercial bank, since the “too big to fail” precept implies that

larger

banks are more likely

to receive this

larger

banks are more active

in

Sinkey notes
assets

that in 1985,

support than are smaller banks. Thus the

securing purchased funds than are the smaller banks.

purchased funds constituted

35%

of all FDIC-insured commercial banks, while the ten

held purchased funds equivalent to almost

60%
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of the average consolidated
largest

commercial banks

of their average consolidated

assets.

(2002, 106)

24

Implicitly the importance of lender
of last resort support

is

reflected in the

pricing dynamics of purchased funds
markets. Wolfson cites research illustrating
that,

during an instance of instability in the
wholesale
place in which banks regarded as too big to

fail

CD

market, a “two-tiering” effect took

paid less on their

banks, regardless of the profitability indicators
of the bank

CDs

than did smaller

in question.

(Wolfson 1994,

57)

Another implication of the de facto extension of emergency
government
assistance to address the purchased fund activities of
commercial banks

expense

to the

government of resolving bank

failures.

is

the increased

Deposit insurance was designed

to

contain banking runs by insuring individual deposits, so an
upper cap (currently of

$100,000) was seen as sufficient
their funds.

However,

to prevent legions

to address a

of small depositors from withdrawing

purchased fund run, creditors must be assured

their funds are protected in their entirety. This

dilemma was

Continental Illinois (ranked as the seventh largest bank

at the

Continental was a heavy user of purchased funds" 5 to fund
,

strategies in energy, real estate

“4

While

the largest

16%
25

failure

of

time of its collapse).

its

adventures lending

large

US

commercial banks, as Charles Partee, chair of

Board of Governors committee on bank supervision, confirmed:

commercial banks have diminished

1990s, (purchased funds constituted

commercial bank

by the

and other notoriously risky undertakings. But Continental

was by no means unusual among
the Federal Reserve

illustrated

that

in 1999),

45%

medium and

their reliance

on purchased funds somewhat

in the

of the average consolidated assets of the ten largest FDIC-insured

small commercial banks held only

26% (medium

sized banks) and

(small sized banks) of their average consolidated assets as purchased funds.

In part

funded

due

its

deposits)

to the unit

growth

banking laws in

in the late

Illinois

which

limit the accessibility

1970s via the purchased funds markets.

made up just 20% of the bank’s

total deposits

In

of deposits, Continental

1981 “core deposits”

(which include Negotiable

deposits from Euromarkets). (FDIC, 1997, 242 and 255)
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CDs and

(i.e.

traditional

Foreign

With Continental Illinois, when you get right
down to it, here was a $40 billion
bank with only $4 billion in deposits. The core
of the bank was very, very small
They re selling CDs, getting money from the
Eurodollar market, selling
commercial paper from the bank holding company. It
was an extreme case- but it
wasn t all that unusual. Citibank has a small core too.
Lots of big banks do (in
Gneder 1987, 525-6)

Largely in response to the Continental collapse, the
term “too-big-to-fail” gained
popularity in the banking lexicon. Given the possibility
that the insolvency of a large

bank might disrupt the markets
banks, the

LDIC was

for

purchased funds and potentially ramify

forced to guarantee that

all

to other large

depositors and other general creditors of

Continental would be “fully protected”, regardless of the cap on
deposit insurance,
despite the fact that a

number of the

liabilities in

question were not insurable deposits.

(LDIC 1997. 244)

From

the point of view of the class analysis of financial capitalist finns developed

in this dissertation, a firm

with only a minor emphasis on deposits would be more

accurately characterized a diversified financial capitalist firm. Chapter 6 described the

attempts by commercial banks to diversify their financial capitalist activity via the

holding

company

capitalist activity.

structure in

However,

which other subsidiaries engaged

the

movement

into

in

non-banking financial

purchased funds represents another

aspect of this diversification. Without changing the legal entity in which the commercial

bank was housed, commercial banking firms managed
capitalist activities within the firm that continued to

Of course,

the

monumental advantage

to

to diversify their financial

be classified as a commercial bank.

housing non-banking financial

within a firm categorized as a commercial bank
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was

that

it

provided a

capitalist activity

way

to extend

government safety nets

to

more types of financial

banks could respond

to their profitability

and FDIC privileges

to enable

them

to

capitalist activity.

Thus commercial

squeeze by abusing their lender of last resort

engage in

activities that

were increasingly similar

to financial capitalist activities in general.

S upplementing Profit ab ility Beyond Traditional
Commercial Bank Lending

As commercial banks found

their profitability

more problematic, one of their response was

to

from lending

supplement

activity

had become

income from

their profits with

sources other than interest on loans outstanding. Non-interest income
became
increasingly important for commercial banks throughout the
1980s and 1990s (see Figure
31).

While

in

1960 Commercial banks earned about 17 cents

every dollar of interest income earned, by the
cents per dollar.

32 displays the

1990s

The contribution of non-interest income

total

this figure

is

if non-interest

In

every year since 1980

had risen

and the
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to

for

over 30

ROA calculated

ROA would have been

income were excluded from the numerator of the

calculation.

income

indicated in Figure 32. Figure

ROA of FDIC- member commercial banks,

by excluding non-interest income.
negative

late

in non-interest

ROA

Figure 3

1

:

Non-Interest Income

As

A

Percentage

Commercial Banks, 1960-1999
Source Historical Statistics on Banking CB04.
.
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Of Interest Income

For FDIC-Insured

Figure, 32

etum 0n Assets 0f FDIC-Member Commercial
Banks Including And

T
Excluding f
Non-Interest Income, 1960-1999
Source: Historical Statistics on Banking
CB04.
:

.

-Total
~

The wide array of activities

that generate non-interest

ROA

ROA
Excluding Non-interest Income

income provokes

the

question of how to deal with this category of income in class analytic terms. Chapter
three

that,

assumed

upon

that non-interest

investigation,

the production of a

some

made

exploitation.

interest

is

a non-class revenue. Chapter three conceded

subset of these activities could arguably be classified as

commodity. At

generated by these activities

can be

income was

this point,

subsumed

it

may

class revenue, in that in

that these activities provide a condition

The

incomes

also be possible that the

some

of existence for

income

instances a case

capitalist

issue of the class analytic categorization of these various forms of non-

will not be explored here.

The preliminary assumption
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will be

maintained that non-interest income
that specific inquiry

may result

in

is

classified as a non-class revenue,
with the caveat

any of these instances of non-interest income
being

re-

classified.

One of the

sources of non-interest income for commercial
banks

is

fee income. This

includes fees charged for activities connected with
the operation of a deposit account (for

example, a fee might be levied on making withdrawals via
an automatic banking
machines). Sinkey claims that service charges on deposits grew

between 1995 and 1999. (2002,470) Fees were

an annual rate of 7.7%

also charged in association with lending

second moment of financial intermediation (such as annual fees changed

activities in the

for the provision

of credit cards). Moreover, fees were increasingly generated from some

of the new financial innovations. For example,

more

at

to enable a

given deposit base to support

lending, commercial banks began to securitize aspects of their loan portfolio.

Securitization involves gathering together loans (usually of a given type, such as

mortgages and

them

later credit card receivables

as securities,

payments)

and many other types of loans), packaging

and selling them (both the claims

to third parties.

When

to the interest

the loans are securitized, they are

balance sheet of the bank, thus freeing up funds to finance

may

retain the obligation to service the loans, thus

collection of the

payments on the variety of loans

it

new

moved

loans.

off of the

However, the bank

earns a fee for managing the

that

back the security. This financial

innovation not only assisted banks in their difficulties in the
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and the principal

first

moment of financial

intermediation,

status in the

it

also enabled

them

payment system and

to earn fees

their other

from

their advantages in terms

of their

comparative advantages in administering

loans.

Many of the
for the

fee

types of fee income generated by commercial banks
had implications

moral hazard issues discussed

in the

previous section. Banks increasingly earned

income on various types of guarantees, such

as lines of credit.

A

line

of credit

constitutes the promise to provide a loan should the
potential borrower wish to have

26
it.

(Ironically, as chapter 6 explained,

one of the unintended consequences of the growth

the provision of lines of credit

that

raise

money by

stabilizing the

was

it

enabled competitors to commercial banks

ultimately provided.

Y et

lines

may be

earned even though no loan

of credit can also have a destabilizing influence on the

commercial banking system. Lines of credit are often activated when
borrower faces
the point

when

difficulty.

to

commercial paper market). From a commercial bank's

point of view, lines of credit are lucrative in that a fee

is

Thus the commercial bank

the likelihood of default on the loan

is

is

a

would-be

obliged to advance a loan just

was

large banks to

to its collapse. If several firms tap their

lines

their lines

of credit prior

of credit simultaneously and subsequently

bank’s survival.

A

crisis in

the case

fail, this

one branch of productive

26

The

that adversely affect large

fee for this stand-by

arrangement

is

distinct

when Enron

obliged several

could threaten a commercial

capitalist activity

firms to activate their lines of credit just as that industry

economic events

at

high. Firms in distress often

activate lines of credit prior to their failure, as

honor

in

is in

profound

can send these

crisis.

Detrimental

numbers of firms simultaneously can provoke

from any

actually provided.
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interest

income paid when and

if

the loan

is

a widespread rush to activate lines of
credit.
entity that has a line

resort support,

By

acting as a lender of last resort to
any

of credit, commercial banks themselves

may

require lender of last

hence commercial banks have competitive advantage

in the attempt to

earn fee income from guarantees such as lines
of credit. However, the Federal Reserve

exposed

to the possibility that

resort to

non-bank firms via the mechanism of commercial bank

it

may be

is

prevailed upon to be the de facto lender of last

lines

of credit

that

subsequently send commercial banks to the discount window.

Another area

in

which commercial banks generate

of off-balance sheet income)

is

by acting

as a dealer

fee

income

(as well as other types

of derivatives. Derivatives are a

contract between two parties that provides the contract holder either the
necessity (in a
futures contract) or the possibility (in an option contract) of engaging in a
transaction in

the future

whose value

interest rates,

exchange

will be derived

rates, equity or

from the future values of some variable such as

commodity

prices or the occurrence of a host of

other economic or non-economic events. For example, a bank

pay

a party a fixed rate

on Treasury

of interest, while

bills (applied to

some

from which the contract pay-out

is

that party will

notional

may

pay the bank the prevailing

amount which serves

calculated).

The

enter into a contract to

as the reference point

dealer will build into this transaction

some margin which

constitutes their fee, and

may be

or less than the value the bank receives from the counterparty.

either

more

is
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rate

exposed

to the possibility that the

payout

Dealers

engage

it

in

in derivatives are

matched

interest rates

the

same

event.

trading,

go up

trader

is

meaning

will be

matching strategy

“over-the counter

matched two derivatives contracts so
is

to the necessity

of

Thus

dealer

may

force.

Moreover,

fulfilling the

*

” derivatives
contracts.

that the net effect

problem

For example,

at

bank

in

is

Although

on the derivatives

may

default

continues to be exposed

terms of the contract for the other “matched”

whose

default, while the derivative contract that

2

that pays the

scrupulously followed, there

this event, the derivatives dealer

potentially the counterparty

this

27

is

pays the counterparty

a possibility that one of the dealers’ counterparties

on the terms of their contract. In

derivatives.

of risks. Ideally, derivatives dealers

that a derivatives contract that

if this

many of these

neutral, there

counterparty.

to a variety

“matched” against another derivative

However, even

credit risk inherent in

the dealer has

exposed

is

intensified

the time of

by

the

derivatives contract benefits the

is

costly to the dealer remains in

immense leveraging

its failure,

Long Term

Capital

possible in

Management was

reported to hold $1 .25 trillion of notional exposure in derivatives with an estimated value
billion, despite its

own

capital base being a

Finally, derivative dealers

may

intentionally expose themselves to risk, as

of $125

establish a speculative position

by

mere $2.2

billion.

(Mehrling 1998, 9)

when

they

refraining from balancing one derivatives contract

with another matching derivative.

~7

Derivatives traded in organized futures exchanges have a clearing house guarantee to mitigate credit

(Edwards and Mishkin 1995, 15)
28

Derivatives traded in over-the-counter markets have no standard collateral or margin requirements,

despite the possibility that these provisions can be incoiporated into the derivatives contracts.
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risk.

Eager

to partake

of the lucrative aspects of dealing

of US banks grew

activities

and 1999,

until

29

value of $33
credit risk

by 1999

trillion.

US

at a

compound annual

rate

in derivatives, the derivatives

of about 20 percent between 1990

commercial banks held derivatives contracts with
a notional

However, the potential exposure of a derivatives dealer

and other hazards related

enormously damaging. This helps

to the speculative use

to explain

to

both

of derivatives can be

why derivatives

dealing

is

often housed

within a bank. Commercial banks benefit from their
lender of last resort support to

confidence in derivatives users that the dealer will be capable
of

fulfilling its contractual

obligations despite a confluence of adverse developments. This
further explains
a handful

of the largest

US

commercial banks are responsible

dealing, since their status as

their access to lender

too-big-to-fail

of last resort support

for the bulk

14),

why

only

of derivatives

bestows credibility on the likelihood of

in a crisis.

By 1992

the seven largest

accounted for more than 90 percent of all derivatives contracts held by

(Edwards and Mishkin 1995,

instill

US

and the number of money-center banks

US

banks

banks

that

dominate

derivatives dealing has dwindled further because of bank mergers in the late 1990s.

However concern

persists that interconnections

among

the largest banks active in the

derivatives markets, in combination with the highly leveraged nature of many derivatives
transactions,

may

create a calamity that devastates the major

US

commercial banks. As

Warren Buffet famously commented.

We

company, Berkshire Hathaway] try to be alert to any sort of
risk, and that posture may make us unduly apprehensive about the
burgeoning quantities of long-term derivatives contracts and the massive amount of
[his

megacatastrophe

29

Greenspan (1999) claims

market

is

about 25%, with

that

US

US

commercial banks share of the global over-the-counter derivatives

investment banks holding another 15%.
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uncollateralized receivables that are growing
alongside. In our view however
derivatives are financial weapons of mass
destruction, carrying dangers that while
now latent, are potentially lethal. (Buffet 2002,
16)

Conclusion: The Illusory Pursuit of Stability

This chapter has argued that one of the unintended
consequences of the

government safety net

to

promote the

been the negation of that agenda. As

stability

of the commercial banking system has

their profitability

was squeezed, commercial banks

increasingly used their access to deposit insurance and lender
of

last resort

support to

enable them to engage in a variety of activities that potentially
compromise the stability

of the commercial banking system. Worse

were most enticing among the
severely

largest

the incentives to abuse this safety net

“money-center” banks, whose failure could most

damage commercial banking

stabilizing project

still,

have been explored

stability.

in this

The

details

of the negation of this

chapter to serve as an illustration of the

impossibility of achieving stability from an overdeterminist perspective. While this

chapter explored

how

subverted, the intent

a particular set

is

of policies intended

to

promote

stability

were

not to critique this set of policies with a view to devising

preferable set of policies that could be

immune

to negation.

On

some

the contrary, the intent

to bring into question the quest for stability itself.

While
this analysis

this chapter

instability,

should not be construed as an argument that the history of commercial

banking since the
instability.

emphasized various sources of commercial bank

On

New

Deal can be understood as a unidirectional movement towards

the contrary, the rise of destabilizing impulses has provoked regulators,
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is

legislators

and even commercial banks themselves

to find

new measures

promote

to

For example, as required reserves were
attenuated as a stabilizing force

stability.

commercial banking system, regulators sought ways
of ensuring
backstop other than lender of last resort support.
This helped

that

in the

banks had some

to propel the

1988 Basel

Accord, which imposed new capital adequacy
regulations on commercial banks. The
Basel standards required banks to have a certain
level of capital based on the riskiness of
their assets.

Thus

the sufficiency of bank capital, rather than required
reserves,

viewed both as a source of liquidity

wanton bank exposure
risk-taking

was

to

stem bank panics and a means of restraining

to intensified risk.

Another measure taken

to retard excessive

themselves against the devastating possibility of default

bank

commercial banks had devised

to contract

exchange

with other parties to

in

some

instances these

they in turn set

instability.

commercial

a defaulted contract (of course, in

in

newer measures have contributed

motion other ways

in

to

commercial bank

which may unintentionally contribute

to

For example, the imposition of capital requirements has an unintended

possibility of intensifying volatility.

will

in their increasingly risky

credit derivatives that enable a

make good on

protect

for a fee).

While
stability,

bank

the introduction of risk-based fees for deposit insurance in the 1991

Comprehensive Deposit Insurance reform and Taxpayer Protection Act. To

activities,

became

be easily able

to acquire

new

A

commercial bank

capital,

that enjoys a solid reputation

which allows commercial banks

to

lending dramatically during a prosperous times (particularly in stock market

securing equity capital

is

relatively easy).

However,
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a

bank facing a

expand

booms when

crisis will

have great

difficulty acquiring

premiums 30 and

destabilizing

capital to stabilize

credit derivatives

instability in the

From an

new

31

its

operations. Risk-based deposit
insurance

have also had unintended

effects that

may

exacerbate

commercial banking system and beyond.

overdeterminist perspective, this interplay between
stabilizing and

dynamics

is illustrates

the illusiveness of stability.

Whether

stabilizing or

destabilizing impulses are in the ascendancy in a
particular overdetermined context, the

negation of these impulses

is

also set in motion.

agenda for economic growth and

Thus

to the extent that the

stability requires the stability

of commercial banking,

this overdeterminist analysis brings into question
the possibility

As

the

Marxian

profit in a competitive

market imply

argued frequently with reference

to

instability

Commercial banking

will always

30

have

contexts, the

of various

of sustaining

this goal.

dynamics of the pursuit of

sorts.

While

this point is

productive capitalist activity and the dynamics of

exploitation, the endogeniety of instability

activity.

many

tradition has pointed out in

Keynesian

is

in particular,

risks associated with

it,

also characteristic of financial capitalist

and financial

capitalist activity in general,

as well as opportunities to profit

by intensifying

Risk-based deposit insurance premiums were intended

to entrance the capacity of the FDIC to handle the
commercial banks to engage in riskier activities.
However, this regulation has favored large well-capitalized banks that were highly rated by banking
supervisors. During the many years in which the Bank Insurance Fund is above a given level, large banks
have been freed of the necessity of paying any deposit insurance premiums.

expenses of bail-outs, and

31

By

to act as a disincentive for

transferring default risk to third parities, credit derivatives create the possibility that a crisis in the

commercial banking system may be transferred into a crisis among the counterparties in credit derivatives.
Thus when, for example, insurance companies act as counterparties in credit derivatives, the Federal
Reserve could be faced with a commercial banking crisis that manifests itself as a devastation of insurance
companies.
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these risks.

Thus any public policy with

aspirations to promote stability
will continuously

be buffeted between the imperatives of promoting
opportunities

and containing the implications of the pursuit
of these
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profits.

to

pursue these

profits,

CONCLUSION

This dissertation
similarities exist

is

written at a time in which

between contemporary
economic developments and
the circumstances

surrounding the implementation
of the
the

1

990s, exuberance about a

market bubble.

numerous and provocative

-new

New

Deal financial reforms. In
the 1920s, as

in
i

era" of economic prosperity
culminated in a stock

In both periods, stock

market euphoria was accompanied
by a

reorganization of financial
capitalist activity and an
increasmg prevalence of
diversified
financial capitalist firms. In
both the early 1930s and the
early 2000s, the stock
market

decline heralded a period of
economic stagnation coupled with
financial scandals (such as
the

fall

of Enron

in the

contemporary period).

In

many

cases, these scandals

by the various conflicts of interest
animating diversified financial

were shaped

capitalist firms.

These

questionable activities of diversified
financial capitalist firms catalyzed
public animosity

towards finance, and created conditions

Bearing

in

mind

in

which

financial reforms

were again debated.

these similarities between the
depression-era animosity towards

finance and contemporary financial
critiques, an opportunity exists to
inform the current
strategic choices

of the

left

by revisiting the

earlier

New

Deal experiment with financial

reforms. While the overdetermined context
has changed dramatically from that which
existed at the

dawn of the New

Deal, in

some ways

the intentions of contemporary

progressive reformers to reshape finance in conformity
with a larger

agenda shows remarkable continuity with

now, progressive

this earlier period. In the

leftist

economic

New Deal

era, as

financial reform initiatives have the potential to focus
attention on
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finance at the expense of querying the specifically capitalist attributes of the economy.

While
in

financial critiques could be raised in conjunction with the critique of exploitation,

instances financial critiques are framed within an analysis that endorses the

many

capitalist class process.

The

issues raised here

is

not whether financial reform should or

should not be a component of a progressive agenda, but the implications of a progressive

politics in

In

which antipathy

of capitalism per

to finance eclipses critique

se.

an attempt to argue for the place of a class analytic anti-capitalism among the

discourses of

leftist

transformation, this dissertation has studied

reforms as a historical instance

in

intention to challenge capitalism.

which

On

the flaws in capitalism to enable

growth.

From

Marxian

it

to sustain

were motivated

to

vigorous and stable economic

class analytic perspective, this project of financial reform

reprehensible in two respects. First, despite the

might be incorporated

Deal financial

were advanced devoid of any

the contrary, these reforms

remedy

a

financial reforms

New

into this

many

economic agenda,

it

is

progressive characteristics that

sought to provide the conditions of

these reforms embodied a
existence for continued capitalist exploitation. Secondly,

policy measures deigned to remedy
determinist logic, in that they sought to implement

certain defects that

were seen as the

In order to critique

New

essential

impediments

to stable capitalist prosperity.

Marxian
Deal financial reforms from an overdetermimst

emphasizes the contradictions inherent in this
class analytic perspective, this dissertation
of existence of a stable capitalist growth.
project of securing the financial conditions

Particular

emphasis has been made on the ways
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in

which the contradictory imperatives of

New

Deal financial reform interacted with the
profit-maximizing strategies of financial

capitalist firms.

objectives, and

We

examine how these

how, thanks

policies sought to achieve their desired

in part to actions

of capitalist firms seeking to manipulate

these contradictions, they simultaneously set in motion
developments that subverted their

desired objectives.

The

dissertation presents the case that, in

of policies implemented by

New

some

respects, the pastiche

Deal financial reforms helped to secure the financial

conditions of existence ol the stability of pax fincincus and the
economic growth
characteristics of the golden age of Keynesian welfare state capitalism.
Yet

paradoxically, these policies also set in motion the negation of these achievements.

C onditions were promoted that

subsumed

class

payment

in

for access to

banking system was stabilized by
stability

was

further

some ways moderated and

money

New

capital. In

in

some ways

some ways

Deal financial reforms, and

raised the

the commercial

in

some ways

compromised.

What then can be

the contribution of this

economic history?

It

illustrates that

Deal policies are animated by contradiction, but then, following overdeterminist
everything

is

this

New

logic,

necessarily contradictory. This dissertation seeks to promote an awareness

of the ubiquity of contradiction

in

order to problematize the rejection of

overdetermination implicit in the search for some ideal policy configuration that could

escape contradiction. The stated motivation of the dissertation
class analytic Marxist alliance, and

to be inimical to this

1

to

promote a

radical,

consider the relentless search for policy optimality

proposed alliance. So long as

failed to achieve their objective

is

we

because of some flaws

235

are persuaded that radicals have

in the policies

they endorsed, then

leftists will

be engaged

in the

continuous refinement of their policy
mix

achieving their aims. This focuses
perspective, a Sisyphean task.

Deal

is

leftist

aspirations

on what

in

hopes of

from an overdeterminist

is,

Thus an analysis of the inherent contradictions
of the

New

offered to persuade radicals to abandon
an illusory quest for the ideal reforms.

However,

leftists

contemplating an alliance with class analytic
Marxism should

note that the embrace of overdetermination also
abolishes any comforting assurance that
the inclusion of an anti-capitalist

agenda

will

produce interventions that necessarily have

a greater likelihood of achieving their desired
non-class ends. Overdetermination implies
that, since all intervention is contradictory

(and hence implies

its

own

negation),

it

follows that the inclusion of the Marxian surplus labor
agenda with other radical agendas

can offer no claim that the resulting transformative project will be
any
contradictory than were the

New

less (or

any more)

Deal financial reforms. Thus overdeterminist Marxism

can not offer guarantees that such an alliance will increase (or for that matter
decrease)
the possibility of the success of radical non-class agendas.

It

can

make

the case that the

perpetuation of exploitative class relationships has detrimental consequences for the nonclass

economic agendas of radicals, and

that a variety

of democratic and egalitarian

aspirations have been continuously frustrated under capitalism.

Marxism cannot deny

that

its

own

However

overdeterminist

theory of causation precludes any appeal to the

inevitable triumph of radical agendas once the prevalence of non-exploitative production

arrangements

is

established. Overdeterminist

Marxism can only

236

offer the

commitment

to

struggle on behalf of a radical coalition agenda, which, from an overdeterminist

perspective,

is

the only

commitment

that

can be made on behalf of any

intervention.
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